Through its publications, INSS provides rigorous, forward‑looking research and analysis on critical national security issues that support the joint warfighter and inform Department of War decision‑makers.
June 1, 2012
Proliferation Risks of Civilian Nuclear Power Programs
The risks of nuclear proliferation—the further spread of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material, technology, and expertise—derive in part from the technical characteristics of the nuclear fuel cycle and the national and international management of fuel cycle activities.
Dec. 1, 2011
U.S. Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention
On October 1, 1990, two months after Iraq’s surprise invasion and annexation of Kuwait had put the United States and other members of the international community on a collision course with the Saddam Hussein regime, President George H.W. Bush spoke to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in New York. He described Iraq’s brutal aggression against its neighbor as “a throwback to another era, a dark relic from a dark time.” Noting that Saddam Hussein had waged a “genocidal poison gas war” against Iraq’s restive Kurdish minority during the 1980s, President Bush hinted that if it ultimately proved necessary to liberate Kuwait by force, the United States and its allies could face Iraqi attacks with chemical weapons—highly toxic chemicals designed to incapacitate or kill.
Jan. 1, 2010
Avoiding a Crisis of Confidence in the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent
The United States needs to modernize and ensure the long-term reliability and responsiveness of its aging nuclear deterrent force and nuclear weapons infrastructure.
Oct. 1, 2009
President Nixon’s Decision to Renounce the U.S. Offensive Biological Weapons Program
The nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union was a prominent feature of the Cold War. A lesser known but equally dangerous element of the superpower competition involved biological weapons (BW), living microorganisms that cause fatal or incapacitating diseases in humans, animals, or plants. By the late 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union had both acquired advanced BW capabilities. The U.S. biological weapons complex, operated by the U.S. Army Chemical Corps, consisted of a research and development laboratory at Fort Detrick in Maryland, an open-air testing site at Dugway Proving Ground in Utah, and a production facility at Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas that manufactured biological warfare agents and loaded them into bomblets, bombs, and spray tanks.
July 1, 2009
Aligning Disarmament to Nuclear Dangers: Off to a Hasty START?
Confronted by a daunting array of nuclear threats, and having pledged to reinvigorate the application of disarmament tools to address these dangers, the Obama administration has decided to focus its initial efforts on negotiating a new bilateral agreement with Russia to replace the Cold War–era Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which expires at the end of this year.
June 1, 2009
Are We Prepared? Four WMD Crises That Could Transform U.S. Security
This report, written by the staff of the National Defense University Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the fall of 2008 and the early winter of 2009, was conceived initially as a transition paper for the new administration following the 2008 American Presidential election.
Nov. 1, 2001
The Counterproliferation Imperative: Meeting Tomorrow's Challenges
This monograph describes the current state of the field with respect to the intelligence, policy, operational, and programmatic issues related to counterproliferation. It seeks to present the counterproliferation imperative within the broader context of strategy and deterrence developing in the Bush administration and highlights key contemporary issues. Finally, the monograph suggests areas for future emphasis in improving our understanding of the NBC threat in further developing appropriate responses.
March 1, 2001
Beyond Nonproliferation: Secondary Supply, Proliferation Management, and U.S. Foreign Policy
This article addresses both the supply motivations and the behavior of the three most significant secondary suppliers of proliferation technology (Russia, China and North Korea) as well as various U.S. policy responses designed to mitigate these activities.