Through its publications, INSS aims to provide expert insights, cutting-edge research, and innovative solutions that contribute to shaping the national security discourse and preparing the next generation of leaders in the field.
March 25, 2020
Infodemic
In their article in Inkstick, Dr. Justin Anderson and Ms. Sarah Jacobs Gamberini examine the daunting challenge of attempting to halt the spread of misinformation (erroneous information) and disinformation (deliberately false information) about the coronavirus (COVID-19).
Dec. 13, 2019
Russia's Hypersonic Weapons
While Russian hypersonic weapons could pose problems for U.S. and NATO defense planning, their introduction in the near-term is not likely to fundamentally alter the existing balance of power or the prospects for strategic stability.
Dec. 4, 2019
Fentanyl as a Chemical Weapon
John Caves provides some perspective on the question of whether fentanyl should be considered a chemical weapon, and offers some recommendations to mitigate the risk that fentanyl compounds could be weaponized in the future.
Dec. 2, 2019
Synthetic Biology Industry Practices and Opportunities for Biosecurity and Potential Roles for the U.S. Government
This report summarizes discussions with industry representatives about the current and future structure of the synthetic biology industry, perspectives on potential misuse and vulnerabilities of synthetic biology tools and capabilities, and business practices to prevent misuse of tools and to protect industry assets.
Nov. 6, 2019
The death of the INF Treaty has lessons for arms control
In her article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Dr. Amy J. Nelson argues that despite the treaty's failure, there is much to be learned from its undoing, as well as from the current state of arms control.
Sept. 20, 2019
Power Under Parity
Distinguished Research Fellow Paul Bernstein contributed his expertise to this report on strategic parity in an era of great power competition.
July 23, 2019
Systems-based Approach to Biodefense Policy Analysis
In this article, co-authored by Dr. Diane DiEuliis, the authors describe a systems-based analysis of the US biosecurity and biodefense policy landscape to analyze functional relationships between policies. They identify two approaches in US policy for countering biological threats: prevention of theft, diversion, or deliberate malicious use of biological technologies, and development of capabilities and knowledge to assess, detect, monitor, respond to, and attribute biological threats.
The INF Treaty: A Spectacular, Inflexible, Time-bound Success
This article discusses the changing dynamics that led first Moscow and then Washington to reevaluate the merit of the INF Treaty. It concludes that the treaty's relative rigidity may play a key role in its undoing and suggests that future arms control negotiations develop more flexible and resilient mechanisms of review, dispute resolution, and verification.
May 22, 2019
Honey, I Shrunk the Lab: Emerging Microfluidics Technology and its Implications for Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Weapons
Emerging microfluidics technology has significant extant and potential implications for chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons threats. In E&C Research Paper no. 5, Cyrus Jabbari and Philipp Bleek argue that policymakers concerned about CBRN threats have an opportunity to get ahead of, or at least less behind, some of these developments.
Dec. 3, 2018
Deterrence in the 21st Century: Integrating Nuclear and Conventional Force
In this article, published in Strategic Studies Quarterly, Robert Peters, Justin Anderson, and Harrison Menke advocate better integration between nuclear deterrence strategies and nuclear deterrence operations with US conventional defense policy, strategy, and planning processes.