June 21, 2022

Russia's Cold War Perspective on Missile Defense in Europe

In this article, John P. Caves, Jr. and M. Elaine Bunn look at how Russia's opposition to the U.S. proposal to locate missile defense assets in Central Europe is primarily responsible for the controversy currently surrounding this initiative within Europe. They further look into how should Russia's objections be interpreted and what should be done about them?

Oct. 20, 2021

Future Directions for Great Power Nuclear Arms Control: Policy Options and National Security Implications

With New START expiring in 2026, this Occasional Paper by 2020 National Defense University-U.S. Strategic Command Scholar Lt T. Justin Bronder, USAF, provides an assessment of several possible nuclear arms control/risk reduction approaches for the United States to consider. The author evaluates each approach for its possible impact on U.S.-Russia strategic stability, extended deterrence, budget costs, and other key factors, and recommends that in the near-term the United States engage other major nuclear powers in talks on new risk reduction and confidence-building measures.

Nov. 4, 2020

Strategic Assessment 2020: Into a New Era of Great Power Competition

The complete "Strategic Assessment 2020: Into a New Era of Great Power Competition" includes selections from researchers in the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) and the WMD Center. To read the work of Paul Bernstein, Justin Anderson, Diane DiEuliis, Gerald Epstein, and Amanda Moodie, navigate to pages 105 and 169 or view our publications page.

Dec. 13, 2019

Russia's Hypersonic Weapons

While Russian hypersonic weapons could pose problems for U.S. and NATO defense planning, their introduction in the near-term is not likely to fundamentally alter the existing balance of power or the prospects for strategic stability.

Sept. 20, 2019

Power Under Parity

Distinguished Research Fellow Paul Bernstein contributed his expertise to this report on strategic parity in an era of great power competition.

July 23, 2019

The INF Treaty: A Spectacular, Inflexible, Time-bound Success

This article discusses the changing dynamics that led first Moscow and then Washington to reevaluate the merit of the INF Treaty. It concludes that the treaty's relative rigidity may play a key role in its undoing and suggests that future arms control negotiations develop more flexible and resilient mechanisms of review, dispute resolution, and verification.

July 18, 2016

The Soviet Biological Weapons Program and Its Legacy in Today’s Russia

In its first Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Case Study, the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CSWMD) at the National Defense University examined President Richard M. Nixon’s decision, on November 25, 1969, to terminate the U.S. offensive biological weapons program. This occasional paper seeks to explain why the Soviet government, at approximately the same time, decided to do essentially the opposite, namely, to establish a large biological warfare (BW) program that would be driven by newly discovered and powerful biotechnologies. By introducing the innovation of recombinant DNA technology—commonly referred to as genetic engineering—the Soviets were attempting to create bacterial and viral strains that were more useful for military purposes than were strains found in nature.

March 10, 2016

Making Russia Think Twice About Nuclear Threats

On September 11, 2013, Russian President Vladimir V. Putin, writing in The New York Times, issued “A Plea for Caution From Russia.”

March 9, 2016

Countering Russia’s Strategy for Regional Coercion and War

Much of the discussion since the 2014 Ukraine crisis began has focused on how Russia could exploit a local or regional political crisis (real or manufactured) to launch a military action that would result in a rapid fait accompli against one of the Baltic states (or elsewhere in eastern Europe), forcing NATO to weigh the costs and risks of a military response.

Aug. 15, 2015

Putin's Russia and U.S. Defense Strategy

The workshop addressed two questions bearing on the development of U.S. and NATO strategy toward Russia. First, how has Russia framed the problem of deterring and defeating a conventionally superior nuclear-armed major power and its allies? Second, what should the United States and NATO do to strengthen their deterrence and defense postures? In exploring these challenges with a diverse group of experts, the workshop also sought to give impetus to a community of interest that should work collectively to ensure that defense planning is informed by a detailed understanding of contemporary Russian attitudes, doctrine, and capabilities. In order to focus in depth on the deterrence challenge, the workshop did not undertake a comprehensive review of all the issues shaping Russia’s relations with the west. A number of worthy and important questions were therefore not discussed in detail, including the genesis of the current confrontation with Russia, the full range of recent developments in Russian military capability and doctrine, Russian domestic politics, and how to integrate the military and nonmilitary dimensions of national and international strategy toward Russia.