Through its publications, INSS aims to provide expert insights, cutting-edge research, and innovative solutions that contribute to shaping the national security discourse and preparing the next generation of leaders in the field.
Oct. 1, 2012
Japan-China Relations 2005–2010: Managing Between a Rock and a Hard Place An Interpretative Essay
DOWNLOAD PDFExecutive Summary Between China and Japan, the past is ever-present. Notwithstanding shared cultural and historic ties, throughout the past century and going back to the Sino-Japanese war at the end of the 19th century, a bitter legacy of history—the Boxer Rebellion; the Mukden Incident and Japan’s occupation of South Manchuria (1931);
Sept. 10, 2012
Countering Violent Terrorism & the Role of Military Special Operations: A View from India
On behalf of the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies and the Program on Irregular Warfare and Special Operations, I wish to welcome you to this special event this afternoon. I’m Tom Lynch. I’m the research fellow for South Asia and the Near East at the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the Center for Strategic Research. It’s my distinct pleasure to work for NDU President MG Greg Martin, his Director of Research for the Institute for National Strategic Studies, COL Tim Vuono, and the Director for the Center for Strategic Research, Dr. Nick Rostow. None of these gentlemen are here with us this afternoon, but all sent along their greetings and best wishes to General Katoch and to all of you here today. It’s my pleasure to work closely with the Program on Irregular Warfare, an affiliate of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, and I’m indebted here and wish to acknowledge the hard work and support of that program’s leadership, specifically Dr. Joe Tonon and Mr. Matt Reid, and thank them for their instrumental role in making this presentation, by LTG Katoch, possible here today. Thank you, gentlemen. I’m also most pleased to be sitting here next to the General today, on this his first visit ever to Washington, DC as I understand it, and to hear him speak in person on today’s topic which is, “Countering Violent Extremism and the Role of Special Forces: a View from India.”
Sept. 1, 2012
Managing Sino-U.S. Air and Naval Interactions: Cold War Lessons and New Avenues of Approach
The United States and China have a complex, multifaceted, and ambiguous relationship where substantial areas of cooperation coexist with ongoing strategic tensions and suspicions. One manifestation involves disputes and incidents when U.S. and Chinese military forces interact within China’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Three high-profile incidents over the last decade have involved aggressive maneuvers by Chinese military and/or paramilitary forces operating in close proximity to deter U.S. surveillance and military survey platforms from conducting their missions. Why do these incidents continue to occur despite mechanisms designed to prevent such dangerous encounters? Could new or different procedures or policies help avoid future incidents?
The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992
On the morning of September 28, 1991, then-Colonel Frank Klotz witnessed an historic moment at Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota. As he and other senior officers from the base bomber and missile units watched, the crews for the B-1 strategic bombers that had been on alert that day climbed into their cockpits, started the planes, and taxied one after another away from the alert aircraft parking area. That scene was repeated at all 11 Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases in the United States. By the end of the day, there were no U.S. bombers on alert for the first time in over 30 years.
June 1, 2012
Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference
This study explains how one part-time interagency committee established in the 1980s to counter Soviet disinformation effectively accomplished its mission. Interagency committees are commonly criticized as ineffective, but the Active Measures Working Group is a notable exception. The group successfully established and executed U.S. policy on responding to Soviet disinformation. It exposed some Soviet covert operations and raised the political cost of others by sensitizing foreign and domestic audiences to how they were being duped. The group’s work encouraged allies and made the Soviet Union pay a price for disinformation that reverberated all the way to the top of the Soviet political apparatus. It became the U.S. Government’s body of expertise on disinformation and was highly regarded in both Congress and the executive branch.
Proliferation Security Initiative: Origins and Evolution
On December 9, 2002, the United States and Spanish navies cooperated to interdict a North Korean vessel, the So San, in the Arabian Sea.1 The operation initially appeared to be an unqualified success, a textbook example of interdiction to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), related materials, or delivery systems. According to press reports, the United States began tracking the vessel when it first left North Korea, believing that it was carrying a cargo related to Scud ballistic missiles. The So San flew no flag, making it a stateless vessel under international law, subject to interception and boarding by warships on the high seas.2 The United States asked the Spanish navy to stop and search the So San when the ship reached the patrol area of Combined Task Force (CTF) 150, then under Spanish command. The mission of CTF 150 was “to promote maritime security in order to counter terrorist acts and related illegal activities” in the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean.3 Thus, the United States proposed—and Spain agreed—to use a tool developed to combat global terrorism in a counterproliferation mission.
April 1, 2012
Cross-currents in French Defense and U.S. Interests
France is the only European ally—except for the United Kingdom (UK)—that regards its military capabilities, operational performance, and defense industry as vital levers to exert global influence. While the French believe strongly in their need to preserve “strategic independence,” they see new challenges in the evolving international security environment that will oblige them to accept greater cooperation with others, even in areas once considered too sensitive to discuss. Although some French strategists remain uncomfortable with the notion of closer defense ties with the United States, others ask whether there might be a greater danger ahead: specifically, if Europe’s strength dissipates as America “rebalances” toward the Asia-Pacific region, where does France turn to find capable and willing partners to protect its security interests?
March 1, 2012
Russia and the Iranian Nuclear Program: Replay or Breakthrough?
Despite protests across Russia sparked by last December’s fraud-filled Duma (parliament) elections, Vladimir Putin is preparing to return to the presidency this May. Will Putin replay his 2004–2008 approach to Iran, during which Russia negotiated the S–300 air defense system contract with Tehran? Or will he continue Russia’s breakthrough in finding common ground with the United States on Iran seen under President Dmitriy Medvedev, who tore up the S–300 contract?
Jan. 1, 2012
Defining "Weapons of Mass Destruction" (Revised)
This revised Occasional Paper explores the issue of defining weapons of mass destruction with a focus on summarizing how the term has been used in disarmament negotiations, U.S. national security policy, Soviet and Russian military doctrine, and American political discourse. The paper identifies alternative definitions for WMD, addresses some of the key policy issues associated with different definitions, and proposes a definition appropriate for the Department of Defense.
The Iron Triangle Manifested: U.S. Air Force Tanker Lease 2001–2005 Case Study
The proposed lease of the KC–767 tanker aircraft was one of the most infamous procurement scandals of the post–Cold War era. Interactions within the military-industrial-congressional complex led to legislation permitting the Air Force to lease tankers from Boeing using an operating lease rather than standard procurement. Following the outcry from Congress, industry, the media, and numerous watchdog groups, Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) launched a wave of investigations and hearings. During the lease debate, participants reached a number of compromises documented in congressional legislation. However, this was not sufficient to continue the lease process. After nearly 4 years, Congress cancelled the tanker lease and directed the Air Force to pursue a traditional procurement approach.