As noted in the recently released Biodeterrence Framework, biological weapons present a uniquely complex challenge to traditional models of deterrence, in that their development can be concealed within ostensibly legitimate scientific enterprise, their effects may be delayed or ambiguous, and their attribution can often be difficult, particularly given the increasingly broadened scope of biothreat possibilities. For these reasons, deterrence merely by denial, while a staple cornerstone of strategic defense and arguably important, is by itself insufficient to an effective counter-biothreat posture. We have asserted that a more robust and adaptive framework is required to integrate disruption and the systematic diminishment of adversarial capabilities to research, develop, and deploy biological weapons.
Historically, deterrence by denial in the biological domain has emphasized biodefense programs focused on medical countermeasure development, surveillance systems and diagnostics, and consequence management capabilities. These are essential tools, but the fundamental limitation of denial is its reactive stance. Even the most advanced detection systems cannot guarantee early identification of a novel or entirely new bioagent; and the most sophisticated medical countermeasures require time to develop, produce, distribute, and administer. In the interim, force readiness, civilian security and national stability may be degraded. Thus, denial by “right of bang” response does not impose adequate cost or incur uncertainty on adversarial use of emerging biological weapons.
Moreover, the democratization of biotechnology has fundamentally altered the threat calculus. Advances in gene editing, synthetic biology, and computational biology have lowered barriers to entry, such that capabilities once the province of state-level programs are increasingly becoming accessible to smaller states, non-state actors, and even skilled individuals. This diffusion in capacity erodes the effectiveness of stand-alone denial-based approaches, as the number and diversity of potential threat vectors expand beyond that which solely defensive systems can manage.
To address these realities, we posit that deterrence must entail a more comprehensive paradigm that integrates disruption and diminishment as core components. Deterrence by disruption seeks to interfere with, delay, degrade, or preclude an adversary’s ability to successfully pursue biological weapons programs. This approach can (and we opine should) be engaged across scientific, technological, economic, informational, and operational domains. In the scientific and technological domain, disruption involves monitoring and influencing the global biotechnology ecosystem. This includes identifying dual-use research of concern, tracking the proliferation of enabling technologies, and implementing safeguards within natural and life sciences research and development enterprises. International collaboration is essential in this regard, as much of the relevant work occurs within multinational networks, that continue to grow with investment in global bioeconomies. By shaping norms, standards, and oversight mechanisms, cooperative states can reduce the likelihood that legitimate research is diverted toward malign purposes.
Operationally, disruption may involve intelligence-based actions to interdict materials, equipment, or expertise necessary for biological weapons’ development. This could involve export controls, supply chain interventions, and targeted sanctions against entities engaged in identified illicit activities. Cybertechnologic capabilities also play a role, enabling disruption of digital infrastructures and functions that support research and development efforts. Such measures obtain deterrent effect by increasing the cost, complexity, burden and risk associated with pursuing biological weapons, thereby reinforcing deterrence.
Diminishment of adversarial capability is equally important. Rather than merely responding to threats or disrupting specific activities, diminishment approaches seek to systematically reduce an adversary’s capacity to engage in biological weapons development over time. This can be achieved through a combination of strategic policies and/or tactically targeted actions. For example, limiting access to critical materials such as specialized reagents, high-containment laboratory equipment, or advanced sequencing platforms can constrain an adversary’s technical capabilities. Similarly, restricting the flow of expertise through visa controls, academic partnerships, and professional exchanges may reduce opportunities for knowledge transfer. While such measures must be carefully balanced against the benefits of open scientific collaboration, they represent an important lever in shaping the global biotechnological landscape.
Economic instruments can also play a role in capability diminishment by imposing sanctions that target biotechnology sectors, research institutions, and/or affiliated industries to incur significant constraints on an adversary’s ability to establish, expand and/or sustain bioweapon programs. Informational strategies can be employed to enable granular screening mechanisms to prevent the acquisition of sensitive technologies through foreign direct investment or joint ventures. AI-based surveillance can be used to expose illicit activities and attribute responsibility, which could be instrumental to justify disruptive and/or diminishment engagements earlier in the evolution of adversarial bioweapon research, development, and engagement cycles. Thus, deterrence by disruption and diminishment are as much about influencing cognition as about constraining capability.
Importantly, we opine that these approaches must be integrated within a broader deterrence framework that includes credible response options. Clear policies regarding proportional response, whether diplomatic, economic, or kinetic are necessary to reinforce deterrence. However, any punitive measures to sustain denial must be complemented by proactive efforts to control and constrain the threat environment.
We assert that such an expanded deterrence paradigm has several implications.
First, it necessitates closer integration with civilian scientific and public health communities. The boundaries between defense and public health are increasingly blurred in the context of biological threats. Effective deterrence requires situational awareness that spans these domains, as well as the ability to leverage whole-of-nation capabilities across them.
Second, it demands investment in intelligence capabilities tailored to the natural and life sciences. Traditional intelligence frameworks must be adapted to monitor scientific developments, track emerging technologies, and assess the intent and capability of potential adversaries. This includes cultivating expertise in disciplines such as molecular biology, bioinformatics, and epidemiology within the intelligence community, and refining the focus to more thoroughly assess and analyze industrial efforts in this space.
Third, it undergirds the importance of alliances and partnerships. Biological threats are inherently transnational, and it is difficult for any single nation to effectively monitor global activities and address them in isolation. Collaborative efforts to share information, establish norms, and coordinate responses all fortify collective deterrence. Concomitantly, alliances can serve as platforms for coordinated disruption and capability diminishment based upon the acquisition and analyses of such intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance efforts, thereby synergizing their effectiveness, efficiency and impact.
Finally, this approach requires a more nuanced understanding of risk. Efforts to disrupt and/or diminish adversarial capabilities must be calibrated to avoid unintended consequences, such as driving activities to be more occult, or impeding beneficial scientific research. This necessitates a careful balance between security and innovation in the ongoing assessment of the effectiveness and impact of implemented measures.
In conclusion, the unique characteristics of the biological domain (viz. – the dual-usability of rapidly evolving science and technology, and the challenges of attribution) demand integrating deterrence by disruption and capability diminishment into strategic planning, and tactical engagements to better address the complexities of the biothreat landscape. We believe that the most effective deterrence is achieved not only by defending against attack, but by shaping the conditions under which such attacks are conceived, developed, and ultimately deemed untenable.
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed in this essay are those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent those of the United States government, Department of War, or the National Defense University.
Dr. Diane DiEuliis is an Expert Consultant with the Center for Strategic Deterrence and Weapons of Mass Destruction Studies of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, and is a co-author of the recently released Biodeterrence Framework.
Dr. James Giordano is Head of the Center for Strategic Deterrence and Weapons of Mass Destruction Studies, and leads the Program in Disruptive Technology and Future Warfare of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.