Through its publications, INSS provides rigorous, forward‑looking research and analysis on critical national security issues that support the joint warfighter and inform Department of War decision‑makers.
March 31, 2026
Defining the Palette of Biodeterrence: Appreciating a Broader Toolkit
As noted in the recently released Biodeterrence Framework, biological weapons present a uniquely complex challenge to traditional models of deterrence, in that their development can be concealed within ostensibly legitimate scientific enterprise, their effects may be delayed or ambiguous, and their attribution can often be difficult, particularly given the increasingly broadened scope of biothreat possibilities.
March 19, 2026
A Framework for Biological Weapons Deterrence Rollout Event
On 12 March, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the National Defense University (NDU) co-hosted the Framework for Biological Weapons Deterrence: Report Rollout event.
March 16, 2026
A Framework for Biological Weapons Deterrence
The United States and its allies and partners face a rapidly expanding array of biothreats, to include the potential employment of increasingly sophisticated and lethal biological weapons (BW).
Dec. 8, 2025
Artificial Intelligence: A Double-Edged Sword in Support and Subversion of the Biological Weapons Convention Part One: Framing the Issues
The recent announcement that artificial intelligence (AI) will be employed to surveille and support compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) reflects both the capabilities for data collection, integration and analysis that such systems enable, and the iterative integration of AI within biodefense ecologies and operations.
Sept. 16, 2021
A Weapon of Mass Destruction Strategy for the 21st Century
In a recent article in War on the Rocks, CSWMD Expert Consultant, Dr. Seth Carus, and colleagues explore how the U.S. government should, through the National Security Council, formulate a unified strategy that addresses the changing character of, and challenges posed by, WMD. That strategy should align current and future national security capabilities in order to prevent the proliferation of such weapons and discourage adversaries from using them to harm the United States, allied nations, and broader American national security interests.
Oct. 3, 2017
Options for Synthetic DNA Order Screening, Revisited
DNA synthesis is a valuable research tool in the design of new biological products for medicine and manufacturing, and the ability to chemically synthesize long tracts of DNA has allowed for the development of influenza vaccines and diagnostic tests.
Aug. 30, 2017
North Korean Collapse: Weapons of Mass Destruction Use and Proliferation Challenges
38 North — Among all the challenges associated with a North Korean collapse, the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or movement of WMD out of the country will have the largest strategic implications.
April 14, 2017
The Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Program: An Enabler of the Third Offset Strategy
In the current era of rapidly emerging technologies, adversaries are not only rediscovering chemical and biological weapons; they are also displaying an increased propensity to employ them to cause strategic instability among deployed forces or nations undergoing conflict. The United States's investments in its Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) can be a critical enabler of the third offset strategy, which is a DOD initiative that seeks to maximize force capability to offset emerging threats.
July 18, 2016
The Soviet Biological Weapons Program and Its Legacy in Today’s Russia
In its first Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Case Study, the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CSWMD) at the National Defense University examined President Richard M. Nixon’s decision, on November 25, 1969, to terminate the U.S. offensive biological weapons program.1 This occasional paper seeks to explain why the Soviet
Nov. 3, 2015
In Good Health? The Biological Weapons Convention and the “Medicalization” of Security
Since the 1990s, the group of stakeholders working to combat biological weapons (BW) proliferation has broadened to include new actors who have not traditionally focused on security issues, including organizations from the public health sector, researchers in the life sciences, and the biosafety community.