Through its publications, INSS aims to provide expert insights, cutting-edge research, and innovative solutions that contribute to shaping the national security discourse and preparing the next generation of leaders in the field.
May 11, 2021
(Dis)trust and verify?: Arms Control in Today’s (Dis)Information Environment Part I
Ms. Sarah Jacobs Gamberini's recent article for Inkstick Media examines arms control and disinformation. This is the first article in series of papers by Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) Fellows on Arms Control in Today’s (Dis)information Environment, the goal of which is to contribute to a discussion about how disinformation could play a role in future arms control treaties and agreements.
Nov. 4, 2020
Strategic Assessment 2020: Into a New Era of Great Power Competition
The complete "Strategic Assessment 2020: Into a New Era of Great Power Competition" includes selections from researchers in the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) and the WMD Center. To read the work of Paul Bernstein, Justin Anderson, Diane DiEuliis, Gerald Epstein, and Amanda Moodie, navigate to pages 105 and 169 or view our publications page.
Nov. 6, 2019
The death of the INF Treaty has lessons for arms control
In her article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Dr. Amy J. Nelson argues that despite the treaty's failure, there is much to be learned from its undoing, as well as from the current state of arms control.
July 23, 2019
The INF Treaty: A Spectacular, Inflexible, Time-bound Success
This article discusses the changing dynamics that led first Moscow and then Washington to reevaluate the merit of the INF Treaty. It concludes that the treaty's relative rigidity may play a key role in its undoing and suggests that future arms control negotiations develop more flexible and resilient mechanisms of review, dispute resolution, and verification.
May 10, 2018
Iran's Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Policy
Fort Lesley J McNair — This book chapter, published in Crossing Nuclear Thresholds: Leveraging Sociocultural Insights into Nuclear Decisionmaking assesses the principal drivers of Iran's strategic culture and their broader implications for the country's nuclear decisionmaking processes.
March 20, 2017
March Issue, Arms Control Today: "Deter and Downsize: A Paradigm Shift for Nuclear Arms Control"
The nuclear triad approach to nuclear arms control deserves recognition for playing an important role in limiting and ultimately contributing to the reduction of their respective deployed nuclear forces, but it is unable to address the nuclear competition within the present geostrategic environment, where multiple states view nuclear forces as critically important to their long-term security. If nuclear arms control is to play a key role in preventing friction between nuclear powers and reducing nuclear risks in the 21st century, there needs to be a shift in focus and an expansion in participants.
Sept. 25, 2016
Why the U.S.-Israel Military Aid Package Matters
After months of tense and drawn-out negotiations, on September 14 the United States and Israel signed the largest U.S. military aid package given to any country, amounting to $3.8 billion annually. The new aid package reaffirms the United States’ unwavering commitment to the security of Israel. But the culmination of the aid deal, set to come into
March 16, 2016
Applying Jus in Bello to the Nuclear Deterrent
On December 7, 2015, the UN General Assembly passed A/RES/70/50, titled “Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free-world,” by a vote of 132-36. Co-sponsored by Austria and several other states central to the “Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons” movement, the resolution charges that any use of nuclear weapons would inherently violate the
June 1, 2012
Proliferation Security Initiative: Origins and Evolution
On December 9, 2002, the United States and Spanish navies cooperated to interdict a North Korean vessel, the So San, in the Arabian Sea.1 The operation initially appeared to be an unqualified success, a textbook example of interdiction to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), related materials, or delivery systems. According to press reports, the United States began tracking the vessel when it first left North Korea, believing that it was carrying a cargo related to Scud ballistic missiles. The So San flew no flag, making it a stateless vessel under international law, subject to interception and boarding by warships on the high seas.2 The United States asked the Spanish navy to stop and search the So San when the ship reached the patrol area of Combined Task Force (CTF) 150, then under Spanish command. The mission of CTF 150 was “to promote maritime security in order to counter terrorist acts and related illegal activities” in the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean.3 Thus, the United States proposed—and Spain agreed—to use a tool developed to combat global terrorism in a counterproliferation mission.
Jan. 1, 2012
Defining "Weapons of Mass Destruction" (Revised)
This revised Occasional Paper explores the issue of defining weapons of mass destruction with a focus on summarizing how the term has been used in disarmament negotiations, U.S. national security policy, Soviet and Russian military doctrine, and American political discourse. The paper identifies alternative definitions for WMD, addresses some of the key policy issues associated with different definitions, and proposes a definition appropriate for the Department of Defense.