Sept. 29, 2023

China's Expanding Nuclear Capabilities: A Conversation with David Logan and Phil Saunders

September 14, 2023 —

Sept. 29, 2023

Why Xi Jinping Doesn't Trust His Own Military

September 26, 2023 — Over the last two months, a series of senior Chinese generals have disappeared from public view, including the defense minister and the leadership of the force responsible for China’s intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). These disappearances are surprising given the perception that Chinese President Xi Jinping dominates the People’s Liberation Army and his ruthless commitment to rooting out malfeasance earlier in his tenure. In fact, that such incidents have not only continued but also affected some of the most sensitive parts of the PLA showcases the limits of Xi’s power.

March 27, 2023

Dictators, Summits, and War Crimes

Where is the Sino-Russian partnership going? And what does it — and Putin’s indictment for war crimes — mean for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine?

Jan. 17, 2023

The PLA's Strategic Support Force and AI Innovation

If China’s strategic ambitions for AI are clear, how it intends to integrate AI into the PLA remains opaque. The CCP’s goals for militarized AI are still shrouded in mystery, even as the PLA clearly views AI as a technology that will be vital for driving next-generation warfare. Our research into the SSF took a deep dive into open-source information, convened subject matter experts, and looked to scholarly analysis to form a more precise understanding of what role the SSF might be playing in the PLA’s AI innovation—and what role it definitely is not.

Dec. 4, 2022

A South China Sea Conflict and the ROK's Cooperation with the United States

Considering the ROK's regional cooperation with the U.S., mutual solidarity with ASEAN countries, and the SLOC security in the South China Sea, the ROK will support U.S. diplomatic efforts to bolster international norms in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, the ROK might be cautious about its full-blown or military support to the U.S., which could result in China's diplomatic protests and economic reprisals.

Dec. 4, 2022

A South China Sea Conflict and the U.S.-ROK Alliance

China’s “gray zone” tactics to intimidate rival claimants in the South China Sea have become a U.S. concern. Against a backdrop of a recently deepening U.S.– Philippines alliance, this article suggested a gray zone conflict scenario in which China blockades Filipino resupply vessels for Filipino marines on the Sierra Madre at Second Thomas Shoal in a fictional late 2020s environment.

Dec. 4, 2022

Xi's New Central Military Commission: A War Council for Taiwan?

A key result of the 20th Party Congress was the reappointment of Xi Jinping as chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and the selection of new CMC members. Some have argued that the new military brass indicates a greater inclination by Xi to use force against Taiwan, but the evidence does not support this view.

Aug. 17, 2022

Pushing Back Against China's New Normal in the Taiwan Strait

The key question moving forward is how to prevent China from making a more aggressive posture against Taiwan the new normal. More frequent Chinese exercises and incursions close to Taiwan should be monitored and, if necessary, thwarted, countered, or disrupted. If Chinese exercises involve military aircraft venturing into Taiwan’s airspace, for example, Taipei and Washington should consider measures to warn or intercept the Chinese planes. In response to the threat of a quarantine or blockade, Taipei needs to invest in appropriate capabilities and increase stockpiles of critical resources. Finally, larger, more frequent Chinese exercises around Taiwan would make determining China’s intentions more difficult. The United States and Taiwan should refine their approach to strategic warning, identifying indicators that can differentiate between a Chinese military exercise and preparations for an actual attack.

March 8, 2022

China's Military Strategy for a 'New Era': Some Change, More Continuity, and Tantalizing Hints

In 2019, China’s Central Military Commission adopted a new strategy for the People’s Liberation Army, titled the ‘military strategic guidelines for the new era.’ This was consistent with the past but framed by Xi’s political consolidation, growing threats from the United States and Taiwan, and a new military structure. This article documents the strategy and asks what would drive a more fundamental adjustment. It concludes that the strategy reflected a determination to focus the PLA on the necessary and the achievable, but a new direction could be influenced by changes in the strategic landscape, rapid modernization, or new operational concepts.

July 28, 2020

Beyond Borders: PLA Command and Control of Overseas Operations

China’s latest round of military reforms is driven primarily by Xi Jinping’s ambition to reshape the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to improve its ability to win informationized wars and to ensure that it remains loyal to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The reforms are unprecedented in their ambition and in the scale and scope of the organizational changes.