The Need for Biodeterrence… Now
A recent report reveals that the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) has increasing focus upon and fiscal dedication to biosciences and biotechnology, with an estimated economic commitment of 5-8% of its total national research and development spending, amounting to approximately $32 billion in comparable USD in annual funding. While the Biological Toxin and Weapons Convention established viable and valuable normative prohibitions against the development and stockpiling of biological weapons, its “general-purpose” framework recognizes that biological agents and toxins are inherently weaponizable, and the accelerating pace of scientific development has blurred the boundaries between legitimate research and that which can be employed for dual use.
For the Department of War (DoW) the challenge is not merely preventing traditional biological warfare, but instead is (and will increasingly be) deterring the tactical utility and strategic exploitation of biological effects across a widening spectrum of scientific methods, developments and technologies. In this context, a coherent program of biodeterrence that integrates biodefense capabilities, strategic signaling, and cross-domain resilience is now more crucial than at any point since the Cold War. Last week, the Institute for National Strategic Studies’ Center for Strategic Deterrence and Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CSDSWMD) held a symposium to introduce a Biodeterrence Framework, sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), and constituent to which were the efforts of Diane DiEuliis, Justin Anderson, Catherine Ellis, Sarah Gamberini and the CSDSWMD team.
As noted in both the document and the symposium, advancements in synthetic biology, gene editing, high-throughput genomic sequencing, neuroscience and computational biology have lowered the barriers, and accelerated the pace of manipulating biological systems. While such developments are not inherently malign (i.e.- what is referred to as malum in se), they facilitate breakthroughs that are dually-usable. For example, new methods of vaccine design can be repurposed to enhance viral transmissibility or immune evasion; and biomanufacturing platforms designed to produce therapeutic proteins could be used to synthesize toxins or other pathogenic substances.
Hence, near future biological threats may arise not from historically identified pathogens but from engineered or hybridized biological systems the properties and characteristics of which are novel, perhaps difficult to define, unpredictable in action and effect(s), and problematic to contain. In this light, traditional arms-control approaches alone are insufficient. Effective deterrence will require that the United States (US) possess both the capability and the resolve to prevent, mitigate, and respond to biological-effect operations and/or attacks. To be sure, the Department of Defense 2023 Biodefense Posture Review, and 2024 Chemical and Biological Defense Program Enterprise Strategy represent important steps in this direction in their emphases upon the need to (1) move beyond a threat model that is solely based upon known pathogens, and toward a strategy more focused upon mitigating biological effects regardless of the specific agent used; and (2) modernize capabilities in response to rapidly evolving biothreats associated with great-power competition.
Such calls for these moves are encouraging because biotechnology increasingly intersects with military objectives, including performance optimization of warfighters, bio-inspired materials, and the development of new bioagents and advanced countermeasures. As well, the global diffusion of biotechnology has expanded capabilities of exploiting biological systems such that small laboratories, non-state groups, and even individual actors can now access technologies that once required the resources of national-level programs. This diversification of actors (and tools) complicates deterrence calculations and measures, as a broader assortment of potential adversaries may now perceive biological methods as low-cost, plausibly deniable tools for tactical engagement and strategic disruption.
Thus, meeting these challenges, and the foci, scope, tenor and objectives of the aforementioned DoW incentives will require a fortified and sustained deterrence posture given that the strategic importance of biotechnology has not gone unnoticed, or unattended by peer competitors. From a deterrence standpoint, the evolving complexity of this risk and threat environment requires demonstrating both defensive resilience and the capacity to attribute, respond to, and impose costs upon actors employing biological methods.
Biodeterrence Beyond Biological Weapons
An additional and often underappreciated dimension of biodeterrence is its relevance to non-biological weapon systems that incur biological effects (e.g. kinetic/explosive, electromagnetic, radiological/nuclear). To wit, chemical agents directly target physiological systems, producing neurological, respiratory, or metabolic disruption; explosives certainly incur biological effects and may be used to deliver biologically active substances or disrupt ecological systems; directed energy technologies can affect neural and other physiological systems, and even low-level radiological exposures can damage cellular DNA and immune function. In these contexts, the boundary between “conventional” and biological warfare becomes operationally porous as the tactical and strategic objectives are often the same: simply put, to degrade the biological functioning of individuals, populations, or ecosystems.
Therefore, biodeterrence should be regarded more broadly as “deterrence of hostile actions designed to produce biological harm”. This includes any technology that ultimately targets human physiology, population health, biological infrastructure, and or bio-environmental elements. Operationally, such an approach aligns with the concept of integrated deterrence. If adversaries believe that biological effects (whether achieved through pathogens, toxins, radiation, or synthetic compounds) can and will be rapidly detected, mitigated, and attributed, the strategic incentive to employ such methods diminishes.
Taken together, these developments underscore the essentiality of a comprehensive biodeterrence program. The convergence of biotechnology, AI and multinational collaboration has transformed the biological domain into a contested strategic space, wherein biological engagement(s) and effects increasingly intersect with other technological approaches to warfare. Biodeterrence should be regarded and articulated as a cross-domain capability that integrates life-science expertise with intelligence, public health, and operational planning.
Recommendations
To address these challenges and seize the vantage of opportunity, the following recommendations are proposed:
1. Establishment of a dedicated DoW biodeterrence strategy. As noted in the Biodeterrence Framework, while biodefense programs exist, the US should embellish these approaches to create more comprehensive biodeterrence doctrine; to integrate force health protection, biosurveillance, medical countermeasure development, and strategic messaging toward deterring biological-effect operations.
2. Expansion of biosurveillance and rapid detection systems. The Framework highlights that effective deterrence entails accurate attribution and timely response. Investments in distributed biosensors, genomic surveillance, and AI-enabled detection systems would fortify abilities to quickly and reliably identify emerging biological threats.
3. Strengthening of biotechnology intelligence and monitoring. Any such steps toward biosurveillance and detection will necessitate more granular insight to and improved understanding of global biotechnology research and development. Intelligence capabilities should therefore track both traditional biological weapons programs as well as emerging technologies that have dual use potential and capability.
4. Integration of biodeterrence and chemical, radiological, and nuclear defense. Operational planning should recognize the biological effects of other weapon systems. Integrating biomedical expertise into cross-domain threat assessment would serve to improve preparedness, deterrence and defense.
5. Development of strategic partnerships with the biotechnology industrial sector. The private sector currently drives much of the innovation in bioscience. Cultivating public-private partnerships, and expansion and increased engagement of the extant defense industrial base (DIB) can accelerate and advance development of medical countermeasures, bio-manufacturing capacity, and resilient supply chains to augment more effective deterrence by denial.
Conclusion
Advances in biotechnology, the ambitions and dedication of peer competitors, and the reality of convergent biological effects incurred by multiple weapon systems emphasize the importance and necessity of a robust program of biodeterrence. The goal is not merely defending against biological weapons, but rather affording more capable means to ensure that adversaries recognize that any attempt to exploit biological systems fail to achieve strategic advantage. In this way, a strong biodeterrence framework stands as a critical pillar of integrated preemption and restriction in an era when the boundaries between biology, technology, weaponization and warfare are increasingly indistinct, evermore tested, and intentionally transgressed.
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed in this essay are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent those of the United States government, the Department of War, or the National Defense University.
Dr. James Giordano is Head of the Center for Strategic Deterrence and the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and leads the Program in Disruptive Technology and Future Warfare of the Institute for National Strategic Studies.