Last week’s Strategic Insights addressed how biotechnology has emerged as a foundational and formidable element in the evolving character of warfare. The integrative convergence of big data analytics, artificial intelligence (AI), and advanced bioengineering and manufacturing has created rapidly expanding dual-use capabilities that can be leveraged in both non-kinetic and kinetic engagements. This increasingly complex battlespace fosters imperatives to develop and implement realistic, robust approaches for deterring the development and use of weaponizable biotechnologies.

Complexities and Challenges of Current Biothreat Deterrence

Traditional models that are based on centralized state actors and clearly established thresholds of force may not be wholly viable (or of value) in this space, as developments in  biotechnology incur four major challenges to realistic deterrence; these are:

1. Attributional Ambiguity:

Effective deterrence relies on credible attribution. Yet in the biological domain, delayed onset of effects, environmental confounds, and plausible deniability challenge timely and accurate attribution. This uncertainty diminishes the credibility of retaliatory threats and weakens deterrent postures.

2. Proliferation and Asymmetry:

Low barriers to entry have enabled non-state actors, rogue scientists, and state proxies to gain access to potent biotechnological tools. This asymmetrical capability means that even marginal actors — that can be difficult to define and identify — can exert considerable disruptive influence.

3. Regulatory Lag and Policy Non-coherence:

As described in last week’s Strategic Insights, regnant international regulatory and oversight frameworks such as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) lack both the granular of view (of the palette of emerging developments that pose clear risk and threat) and the robust enforcement mechanisms found in nuclear arms control treaties. Verification protocols remain insufficient, and national-level biosecurity policies vary widely. Without cohesive governance, deterrence strategies risk fragmentation and ineffectiveness.

4. Moral and Legal Variability:

The ethical and legal precepts guiding and governing the development, testing, and use of biotechnologies and bioagents are not internationally uniform, and such variation in norms, standards and practices can establish differing allowances and constraints in nations’ biotechnology enterprises that have dual-use applications. Further, the development and production of agents and technologies that have demonstrable medical applications and value raise questions about what constitutes “preventive military medicine,” or warfighter optimization, and thus tests the limits of categorization and control. These uncertainties can paralyze policymaking and render deterrent postures politically untenable.

Opportunities for Realistic Deterrence

I posit that such challenges also offer unique opportunities to establish frameworks and systems that reinforce biosecurity and enhance deterrence. Toward these goals, I propose the following steps:
 

1. Development of Enhanced Intelligence and Surveillance:

Investment in bio-surveillance and signal detection technologies is essential. Leveraging AI-enabled platforms to monitor supply chains, publication trends, synthetic gene orders, and laboratory footprints can enhance early warning systems. Covert sampling, digital bio-forensics, and molecular attribution methods should be continuously refined and integrated into intelligence protocols.

2. Establishment of Alliance-Driven Norms:

Multilateral alliances should be leveraged to establish common standards, share threat intelligence, and conduct joint preparedness exercises. By building a coherent deterrence posture across allied states, it becomes more difficult for adversaries to exploit jurisdictional vagaries or inconsistencies.

3. Creation of Resilient Civil and Military Infrastructures:

Investing in biodefense readiness — including rapid diagnostics, distributed manufacturing of countermeasures, and population-level bio-surveillance — enables tactical nimbleness, deterrent capability and credibility, and strategic fortitude. Simply put, adversaries are less likely to deploy biological weapons if there is credible evidence that their effects will be swiftly and effectively mitigated, prevented, and/or reversed.

4. Revisiting and Revising Dual-Use Risk Assessment Protocols:

Instituting standardized, enforceable dual-use risk assessments for all state-funded research in biotechnology can be instrumental to preemptively identify and mitigate misuse. Such assessments should focus on technical feasibility, and also consider intent modeling, geopolitical context, and feasible “down-range” applications in non-kinetic and kinetic scenarios.
 

5. Instantiating Programs of Cognitive Deterrence and Strategic Messaging:

Cognitive influence — shaping perceptions, beliefs, decision-making, and behavior of adversaries — will be an essential component of any genuine program of deterrence. Strategic communication campaigns that explicitly define the consequences of hostile bioagent/biotechnology use, combined with demonstrations of defensive and retaliatory capacities, can strengthen deterrence postures through collective psychological means and effect(s).

6. Development of Innovation-Informed Deterrence Postures:

Military planning must include biological and cognitive threats within its tactical appraisals and strategic calculus. This includes modeling and war-gaming scenarios of bioengineered epidemics and pandemics, use of neurocognitive weapons, and/or targeted biotechnological sabotage. Incorporating such threats into joint command and control systems can facilitate real-time response coordination and deterrent articulation.

Proactive Defense

A comprehensive posture of deterrence must entail and obtain viable aspects of defense. Considering evolving risks and threats, defense must transition from reactive response to proactive anticipation. Several critical capabilities must be fortified, to include:

1. Predictive Bio-surveillance: Developing and employing AI-based systems to continuously model potential threats based on global biotechnology research trends, social media, biotechnology databases, and sentinel public health signals.
2. Modular Countermeasure Platforms: Investing in “plug-and-play” vaccine and therapeutic platforms (e.g., mRNA, CRISPR-based antivirals and antifungals) capable of rapid reprogramming against emerging bioagent threats.
3. Cognitive and Behavioral Biosensors: Developing sensors that track physiological and neurocognitive markers on potentially high-value target individuals (and groups) to detect early signs of exposure (ideally prior to the onset of overt signs and symptoms).
4. Biotechnological Forensics: Advancing types of DNA watermarking, chain-of-custody tracking, and AI-enhanced epidemiological modeling and reconstruction to enable rapid, reliable attribution.
5. Integrated Bio-Cyber Defense Units: Creating hybrid military-intelligence teams that use AI-based bio-surveillance methods capable of tracking, mapping, and interdicting bio-threats across physical and digital domains.

Optimizing Opportunity

To further transform challenges into opportunities, both the BWC and national biosecurity strategies must evolve. The current verbiage of the BWC must be revised to incorporate language that directly addresses gene editing, synthetic biology, AI-enabled bioengineering, and neurotechnology. This includes defining thresholds of dual-use risk, mechanisms of verification, and agreed-upon metrics for what constitutes “proscribed/prohibited” activities. And given the utility, necessity and value of big data and AI in biotechnology (and bioweapon) development, guidelines should be established to define acceptable uses of AI in biological modeling, synthetic organism design, and public health surveillance.

While policy — such as that established by signatory treaties and conventions — is vital for high level oversight and governance, executable practices afford “boots on the ground” steps toward fortifying deterrence and defense. For example, AI-generated synthetic gene sequences, whether for research, therapeutic, or industrial use, should be embedded with cryptographically secure watermark codes indicating source, purpose, and approval pathway. These should be registered in a global ledger accessible to law enforcement and health authorities. To meet this task, the US and allied states should collaborate on real-time digital platforms integrating genomics, epidemiology, cyber-forensics, and AI analytics to identify and trace suspect bioscientific and technological research and development activity.

In this regard, it is important to recognize that the majority of advanced biotechnological development now resides in the private sector. Therefore, The US, working in concert with both allied and peer-competitor governments must work incentivize voluntary compliance with security protocols through tax credits, research grants, economic cooperation, and liability protections.

Evidently, this presumes (and necessitates) a whole-of-nation (and cooperative nations’) approach, which conjoins the military, civilian R/D institutions, the industrial sector, and the political establishment to both the effort and the strategic goal it serves. Participatory to this effort, the biotech industry should be included in red-team simulation drills to test resilience against biothreat scenarios.

And focal to such exercises, all levels of military command must be educated on the capabilities, limitations, and implications of next-generation biotechnological threats. Specialized training programs should prepare warfighters and medical personnel to operate in biologically contested environments, including recognizing non-traditional symptoms and deploying countermeasures.

Conclusion: Toward Strategic Bio-Deterrence Doctrine

Deterrence in the biotechnological era cannot rely or be based upon Cold War-era perspectives; rather, it must evolve into a dynamic, multidimensional framework that integrates intelligence, innovation, alliance-building, resilience, and cognitive-influence operations. The original BWC framework, while laudable in intent, is now inadequate in its technical scope and missional reach. To rectify these limitations, and bring the BWC of-age, I humbly opine that a forward-leaning, adaptive, and integrated approach to oversight and defense can be instrumental in reclaiming the initiative. With targeted reform, robust technological partnerships, and a new ethic of biosecurity, it may be possible to both contain the threats posed by gene editing, synthetic biology, and AI, and leverage these same tools for greater resilience, deterrence, and peace through preparedness

As biological systems become central to both vulnerabilities and capabilities, the military must not only anticipate threats but actively shape the operational and normative environments in which those threats are manifest. The stakes are high: failure to develop realistic and adaptive deterrence mechanisms risks both the erosion of military advantage, and the destabilization of global security. The opportunity lies in embracing complexity and fostering a new doctrine of bio-strategic deterrence that is anticipatory, interoperable, and resilient. In so doing, the U.S. and its allies will reaffirm their strategic leadership in shaping the character, the ethical and operational contours, and constraint of 21st-century conflict.

Acknowledgment

So much of my work in this space has been in collaboration with my esteemed colleague, Dr. Diane DiEuliis, Distinguished Fellow of the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University; to whom I am most grateful. For an overview of our work over the past decade, I refer the reader to the following publications:

DiEuliis D, Giordano J. Safely balancing a double-edged blade: identifying and mitigating emerging biosecurity risks in precision medicine. Frontiers in Medicine.11 (2024).

DiEuliis D, Giordano J. Responding to future pandemics: Biosecurity implications and defense considerations. Parameters 53(2): (2023).

DiEuliis D, Giordano J. The need for modernization of biosecurity in the post-COVID world. mSphere, 12: 8-14 (2022).

DiEuliis D, Giordano J. Precision medicine and national security: Implications, issues and imperatives. Military Medicine, 17(12): 35-39 (2021).

DiEuliis D, Giordano J. COVID-19: Lessons to be learned for biosecurity and future operational environments. Journal of Defense Resesearch in Engineering 8(3): (2020).

DeFranco JP, DiEuliis D, Giordano J. Redefining neuroweapons: Emerging capabilities in neuroscience and neurotechnology. PRISM 8(3): 48-63 (2019).

DiEuliis D, Lutes CD, Giordano J. Biodata risks and synthetic biology: A critical juncture. Journal of Bioterrorism and Biodefense  9(1): 2-14 (2018).

DiEuliis D, Giordano J. Gene editing using CRISPR/Cas9: implications for dual-use and biosecurity. Protein and Cell 15: 1-2 (2017).

DiEuliis D, Giordano J. Why gene editors like CRISPR/Cas may be a game-changer for neuroweapons. Health Security 15(3): 296-302 (2017).

DiEuliis D, Giordano, J. Neurotechnological convergence and “big data”: A force-multiplier toward advancing neuroscience.  In: Collmann J, Matei SA (eds.) Ethical Reasoning in Big Data: An Exploratory Analysis. NY: Springer (2016).

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed in this essay are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States government, Department of Defense, of the National Defense University.

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Dr. James Giordano is the Director of the Center for Disruptive Technology and Future Warfare of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.