This essay assesses Xi Jinping’s January 2026 purge of Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice-Chair Zhang Youxia and Chief of the Joint Staff Department General Liu Zhenli. The analysis focuses on the extent to which Xi Jinping grants the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) autonomy in the military sphere.

Many analyses of party-army relations in China assume a tacit bargain by which the party grants the PLA a degree of autonomy on military issues in exchange for the military’s political loyalty, sometimes called the “conditional compliance” model.1 Since assuming his role as Chairman of the CMC, Xi has emphasized the power of the CMC’s “Chairman Responsibility System” (CRS) to assert the right to make all military decisions, but in practice, he continued to respect many PLA institutional equities. The current purges of senior PLA leaders, however, suggest that Xi has intervened decisively in the military sphere and that the past assumption of a tacit bargain that grants the PLA a significant degree of autonomy may no longer be valid.

This analysis provides context for understanding Xi’s unprecedented purge of senior PLA officers and concludes by assessing four models that Xi might use to tighten future control over the PLA. It assesses the impact of each on party control and operational effectiveness. None seems likely to solve what may be an unsolvable problem. The most likely approach could involve a mix of younger generals who might be more honest and more politically compliant, and further efforts to strengthen the political work system and monitoring capabilities.

My central argument is that despite Xi Jinping asserting his authority to make military decisions through the CRS, in practice, Xi has continued to respect many PLA institutional equities. The most recent round of purges challenges the validity of this assumption going forward.

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