Through its publications, INSS aims to provide expert insights, cutting-edge research, and innovative solutions that contribute to shaping the national security discourse and preparing the next generation of leaders in the field.
Feb. 17, 2026
The Recent Rash of Biotechnology Risks: A Call to Fortify Force Capability
The tools of modern biology such as state-of-the-art gene editing, modular DNA assembly, cell-free systems, benchtop automation, and AI-enabled formulation have distributed bioweapon capability beyond the skillcraft of traditional state laboratories. Although specialized methods and equipment are required for bioagent manufacture, the relative ease of acquiring and using these means is such that more actors can gain access to such agents and can do so without the need for bespoke facilities.
Dec. 22, 2025
Biotechnologies and the Treaty Gap: Why Biological Weapons Governance Is Falling Behind; and Some Thoughts on How to Fix It
The Scottish ballad Auld Lang Syne, written in 1788 by poet Robert Burns is a tune traditionally played to ring out the passing year and herald in the new. The lyrics offer an invitation to celebrate that which was good, and toast to what may come.
June 24, 2025
Brain Scanning: Assessing Emigration of U.S. Scientific Talent to Surveille Strategic Implications for China’s Dual-Use Technological Capabilities
Intensifying global competition in science and technology (S/T), particularly in fields with considerable disruptive potential - such as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, synthetic biology, and neurotechnology—has become a defining feature of 21st-century geopolitical dynamics.
Feb. 19, 2025
Drones and Biotechnological Weaponry: Emerging Risks, Strategic Threats, and Viable Readiness
The United States National Drone Association (USNDA) recently announced its sponsorship of the inaugural, international U.S. Military Drone Crucible Drone Championship to provide a venue for exercising U.S. and allied military drone training, advanced piloting, operational utility, and counter-measures’ capability.
Dec. 2, 2019
Synthetic Biology Industry Practices and Opportunities for Biosecurity and Potential Roles for the U.S. Government
This report summarizes discussions with industry representatives about the current and future structure of the synthetic biology industry, perspectives on potential misuse and vulnerabilities of synthetic biology tools and capabilities, and business practices to prevent misuse of tools and to protect industry assets.
April 4, 2018
Biodata Risks and Synthetic Biology: A Critical Juncture
Intrinsic to growing ability to apply classical engineering to biological systems is the mounting ‘digitization of biology’, as the genetic code and its related metadata (including translated proteins, associated functions, herein referred to as “biodata”) are amassed in order to engineer biology for specific purposes. There are three unique risks categories associated with the digitization of biology: 1) pathogen risks; 2) manufacturing risks, and 3) risks to individual privacy that can allow human harms.