Contemporary warfighting is undergoing rapid and profound transformation. As I have noted in prior analyses of disruptive technologies and future warfare, the convergence of precision guidance, hypersonic kinematics, distributed sensors, and iteratively autonomous machine systems has altered the character of conflict in both the tempo and geometry of engagement(s).
I offer that such changes are a fait accompli; thus, the sentinel issue is whether and to what extent United States’ (U.S.) defensive and counter-offensive capabilities are commensurately adapting. I submit that the convergence of technologies should compel the U.S.) to prioritize the accelerated development and deployment of high-energy laser (HEL) systems as a core component of an integrated defense architecture.
To substantiate this advocacy, I offer key examples of weaponized cutting edged technologies, how these weapons could be mitigated by laser engagement, and illustrate extant gaps in current US capabilities that compromise defensive and/or counter-offensive capabilities.
1. Proliferative Unmanned (Aerial, Maritime, Land and Space) Systems
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS Swarms)
Both state and non-state actors are fielding increasingly unmanned aerial systems (UAS), inclusive of relatively low-cost swarm platforms capable of saturating traditional air defenses. Systems developed by peer competitors (such as those demonstrated by the People’s Liberation Army [PLA]) emphasize distributed swarming, AI-enabled target recognition, and electronic resilience.
Laser neutralization example:
High-power lasers can defeat UAS by rapidly heating and structurally compromising control surfaces, propulsion systems, and onboard electronics. Against small drones, even 20–50 kW lasers can induce catastrophic failure within seconds at tactically relevant ranges. Importantly, lasers offer near-zero cost per shot compared to kinetic interceptors.
Current inadequacy:
Existing US systems, such as the Navy’s Laser Weapon System (LaWS), while effective against limited numbers of small UAS, are constrained by atmospheric/weather conditions, and power/thermal management factors in maritime environments. Swarm-scale engagements exceeding dozens to hundreds of targets tax available laser dwell time and tracking fidelity and thereby reduce their effectiveness.
Unmanned Surface and Submersible Vehicles (USV/UUV)
Adversaries are deploying unmanned maritime systems capable of reconnaissance, mine-laying, explosive attack, and ISR disruption missions. Swarm-enabled USVs, in particular, pose asymmetrical threats to naval assets in contested littoral environments.
Laser neutralization example:
Surface-mounted HELs can disable exposed sensors, ignite fuel stores, and compromise the structural integrity of small USVs before they approach a lethal radius. Lasers can also degrade exposed electro-optical masts or communications arrays of semi-submersibles or periscope-depth UUVs.
Current inadequacy:
However, laser propagation across the sea surface is affected by humidity, sea spray aerosolization, and refractive turbulence. Additionally, underwater targets remain largely invulnerable to conventional optical lasers due to the rapid absorption and scattering of laser energy in seawater. This represents a major capability deficit against submersible threats.
Unmanned Ground Vehicles
Unmanned ground systems ranging from robotic combat vehicles to loitering ground munitions are increasingly being integrated into combined arms operations.
Laser neutralization example:
HELs mounted on mobile platforms (e.g., the U.S. Army’s Directed Energy Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense prototypes) can disable optics, detonate onboard munitions, and degrade mobility components (e.g., tires or tracks).
Current inadequacy:
Power generation and thermal dissipation in maneuver formations remain limiting factors. Moreover, dust, smoke, and battlefield obscurants can significantly degrade beam quality and effective range of current operationally usable laser systems.
Space Systems
As formally noted by the U.S. Space Force, space has become an operational warfighting domain. Peer-competitor nations possess anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities, co-orbital inspection satellites, and kinetic intercept systems that can disrupt mission integrity.
Laser neutralization example:
Ground-based or airborne lasers can obfuscate (i.e., “dazzle”) or permanently damage (i.e., “blind”) sensing systems of optical reconnaissance satellites. High-energy laser systems could also potentially incur thermal damage to vulnerable satellite components (e.g., solar arrays).
Current inadequacy:
Atmospheric distortion severely limits the ground-to-orbit power density of current lasers. Adaptive optics can reduce but not completely eliminate this constraint. Furthermore, risks of engagement escalation in space require doctrinal clarity, and the use of lasers in/against orbital platforms generates both strategic and legal complexities.
2. Hypersonic Missiles
Hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), such as those being tested by China, can deftly maneuver at speeds exceeding 5 Mach, which compresses decision timelines and challenges, if not defeats extant means of kinetic interception.
Laser neutralization example:
Interception with megawatt-class airborne lasers could thermally compromise missile skins or fuel tanks prior to glide separation. During mid course phase(s) of flight, sustained heating can destabilize control surfaces and disrupt electronics.
Current inadequacy:
Existing HEL systems lack the power density and sustained dwell capacity that are required to defeat the current generation of hypersonic missiles at operational ranges. Moreover, factors such as beam jitter, atmospheric attenuation, and limited airborne power further constrain defensive capability, and thus, operational utility of the current complement of laser systems available to the U.S. military.
3. Electronic Warfare (EW) Systems
Advanced EW platforms disrupt communications, GPS, radar, ISR networks, and (as evidence from cases of Havana Syndrome victims has shown) can incur (multifocal) harm to personnel.
Laser neutralization example:
HELs can physically damage the exposed antennae, radar arrays, and sensor nodes of EW systems. Indeed, lasers can provide immediate, attributable kinetic effects on electronic infrastructure.
Current inadequacy:
Many EW systems are hardened, mobile, and shielded. Target acquisition and sustained beam lock on moving, electronically counter-measured systems remain technical challenges that limit the operational utility of current lasers against state-of-the-science/technology EW systems.
A Strategic Rationale for Emphasizing Laser Weapons
Lasers offer a number of distinct operational advantages, including speed of light engagement, sustainability of engagement (i.e., limited primarily by available power supply), low cost per shot, precision scalability, and reduced possibility for collateral damage. Yet, they remain limited by power constraints, atmospheric interference, and variable beam control; each and all factors that reduce their viability and value for integration within joint defensive or counter-offensive system chains.
To lessen, if not bridge these gaps, I therefore offer the following recommendations for Department of War (DoW) focus upon laser technology research, development and force adoption.
1. Invest in Scalable, Megawatt-Class Power and Thermally Managed Systems. The core limitation of current HEL systems is energetic. The DoW should prioritize compact, high-density power generation (including advanced battery, hybrid turbine, and potentially nuclear micro-reactor integration for maritime and perhaps space platforms) and novel thermal dissipation systems. Without solving power and heat constraints, laser technologies will remain viable only as “niche” weapons rather than exercising transformative defensive and counter-offensive capability and value.
2. Accelerate Development of Advanced Adaptive Optics and Atmospheric Compensation Systems. Degradation of a HEL beam due to turbulence, humidity, dust, and aerosols limits operational reliability and thus mission effectiveness and value. Investment in real-time adaptive optics, AI-enabled beam focusing, and multi-spectral laser architectures can enhance system fidelity and utility in and across air, ground and maritime environments.
3. Develop Integrated Laser–Sensor–AI Architectures. Laser effectiveness is critically reliant upon the integrity and capability of the targeting system(s) used. Integration with advanced ISR, machine-learning/AI-based target recognition, and distributed sensor networks will enable rapid target identification, verification and prioritization, and aligns directly with broader multi-system initiatives defined in current Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) objectives.
4. Expand Airborne and Space-Based Laser Platforms. Boost-phased hypersonic defense will most likely require high-altitude or orbital laser platforms. Therefore, the DoW should revisit the development of airborne laser systems (beyond prior prototypes) that incorporate modern materials science, adaptive optics, and lightweight power systems. Investment in these embellishments should be based and focused upon parallel studies of peer-competitors’/adversaries’ space-based directed energy systems’ capabilities, so as to optimize time/cost effectiveness and efficiency of establishing US defensive/counter-offensive assets (within defined treaty and escalation constraints).
5. Establish Clear Doctrine and Escalation Frameworks. To this latter point, directed energy use, particularly in space or against dual-use infrastructures, can incur escalation and legal ramifications. Thus, the DoW must develop doctrine, rules of engagement, and alliance coordination frameworks to ensure that any employment of lasers supports deterrence rather than promotes destabilization.
Conclusion
The rapid evolution of unmanned systems, hypersonic delivery platforms, and electronic warfare capabilities presents multidomain threats that challenge traditional kinetic defenses. High-energy laser systems are not a panacea, but they do offer scalable, precise, and economically sustainable countermeasures that align with the tempo of modern warfare.
If the U.S. fails to accelerate maturation of laser weapons, there is definitive risk of ceding defensive overmatch in an era defined by speed, and distributed lethality. Conversely, if the DoW invests prudently (viz., in power generation, beam control, AI integration, and doctrinal clarity) lasers, and other forms of directed energy technology can become a cornerstone of 21st-century deterrence and defense. In this regard, laser systems should be viewed as essential elements in preserving operational an asymmetrical advantage in air, land, sea, cyber, and space domains.
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed in this essay are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States government, Department of War or the National Defense University.
Dr. James Giordano is Head of the Center for Strategic Deterrence and the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Program Lead for Disruptive Technology and Future Warfare of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.