Two events, one domestically and one abroad, should be regarded as conveying an identical strategic signal that the barriers to engagement of weaponizable bioagents are dropping, and the pathways toward multiple vectors of use are increasing.
The first event is the discovery of biological and chemical materials of concern being stored in decidedly non-specialized refrigerators and freezers in spaces not designed, permitted, or transparently governed for legitimate biomedical work in (a residential home in) Reedley, California. Investigators described thousands of vials and laboratory materials, with some containers reportedly labeled as high-consequence pathogens, and extensive cold-storage capacity. Whatever the ultimate adjudication of intent may be in this case, the operational message for national security is sobering; weaponizable biological and chemical agent capability can be staged and sustained within mundane infrastructure, embedded in civilian environments, obscured behind a veil of “normal” optics of household storage. This is biodefense and force-protection problem, as it clearly heightens concerns about what could be developed, preserved, moved, and plausibly distributed from such a site, and thus compresses timelines for detection, complicates attribution, and broadens the set of potential actors and viable targets.
The second event is the public disclosure on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference that European partners determined that epibatidine, a potent neurotoxin, was apparently used to poison opposition leader Alexei Navalny. Although Moscow has denied the allegation, this still matters because it demonstrates how state or non-state actors can operationalize exotic toxic agents in ways that leverage rarity, unfamiliarity, and forensic complexity to impede rapid clarity, influence narratives of attribution, and expand the scope of covert operations. The strategic lesson is that use of assassination-grade bioagents is not a relic of Cold War tradecraft, but is a current engagement option that can be adapted, and augmented using the tools and techniques of biotechnology and synthetic biology.
The tools of modern biology such as state-of-the-art gene editing, modular DNA assembly, cell-free systems, benchtop automation, and AI-enabled formulation have distributed bioweapon capability beyond the skillcraft of traditional state laboratories. Although specialized methods and equipment are required for bioagent manufacture, the relative ease of acquiring and using these means is such that more actors can gain access to such agents and can do so without the need for bespoke facilities. Domestic cold storage, common lab consumables, and dual-use reagents can support the steps needed to progress along the pathway of bioweapon production, while outwardly appearing to be consistent with legitimate research or diagnostics; and this becomes particularly an issue when oversight is inconsistent across jurisdictions.
As well, current methods in synthetic biology and gene editing enable manipulation of toxins and microorganisms in ways that can optimize potency, stability, or delivery characteristics. Even without creating bioengineered precision-pathogens, relatively modest edits to molecular structure can alter functional profiles, modify toxin expression, and increase environmental persistence. The techniques and technologies of precision medicine also facilitate tailoring the biological effects of agents, not for mass casualty effects, but rather for selective incapacitation or assassination of select targets, and/or sabotage of readiness or social stability through localized outbreaks or contaminated supplies.
These methods allow considerable scalability. Synthetic biology is increasingly an industrial enterprise. Legitimate scale-up techniques (e.g., bioreactors, continuous manufacturing, standardized protocols) are not inherently nefarious but can very much reduce the technical bottlenecks that once limited production. The risk is repeatable manufacture with consistency and distribution logistics that can be repurposed for dual-use.
This advanced bioengineering can complicate classical attribution. Gene editing can blur biosignatures of toxins and pathogens, emulate natural variants, and create agents that do not align with known reference strains. Added to this is that neurotoxins (and especially those that are rare) can be difficult to rapidly detect, may degrade quickly upon the death of the targeted individual, and confirmation (and thus attribution) often requires specialized assays, chain-of-custody and provenance investigation, and correspondingly significant dedication of personnel, resources, time and funds. These factors are attractive to actors who value covert engagement, delay, deniability, and narrative manipulation.
Simply put, these two events are bookends on a continuum of emerging risk that ranges from latent capability embedded in the civil space to operationalized biological and chemical agent use for tactical advantage and strategic messaging. Both highlight the reality that biosecurity is not simply an issue of incurring large-scale casualties, but instead should be seen as a persistent competition, means of covert action, vector of domestic vulnerability and disruption, and impetus to protect the joint force and the homeland.
In light of these developments and toward these latter goals, I propose the following recommendations, as consistent with emphases on emerging biotechnology risks as defined in both the National Defense Authorization Act and National Security Strategy.
1. Development of a Department of War (DoW)-wide “biosecurity-by-design” program for the defense biotechnology ecosystem. Such a program should seek to institute standardized nucleic-acid sequence screening and customer vetting across DoW-funded and DoW-adjacent synthesis and biomanufacturing work that is aligned with both allied best practices and current of dual use research of concern (DURC) oversight parameters. Laboratory automation, inventory controls, and tamper-evident cold-chain management should be incentivized and surveilled, because these elements are evidently now part of the threat landscape, and not merely logistics.
2. Bioforensic and rapid attribution capabilities should be expanded by investing in deployable, high-reliability sampling and analysis tools, methods and protocols that are integrated with intelligence oversight and operational planning. Such measures would reduce an adversary’s benefiting from the delay and ambiguity that are conferred by exotic toxins and engineered microbes. The Navalny case brings into stark relief how consequential such determinations can become.
3. Bio-engagement risk and threat modeling should be operationalized in force protection and installation security. Threat assessments should include low-profile biological staging (e.g., small laboratories, cold storage facilities, dual-use supplies), insider facilitation, and proximity risks to military bases and defense industrial sites. Relevant medical, CBRN and public health resources should be trained to recognize nontraditional indicators and response protocols.
4. An interagency “domestic biothreat fusion cell” should be established with direct DoW interfacing. The Reedley case demonstrates that domestic biorisks can emerge outside of characteristic public health surveillance and traditional counterterrorism indicators. In light of this, the DoW should work to develop mechanisms with various national agencies (e.g., DHS, FBI, CDC, state and city law enforcement, as well as Interpol) that can surveille anomalous laboratory activity, hazardous wastes, and procurement patterns while working within (local, regional, national, and even international) legal authority.
5. Table-top exercises, war gaming and strategic planning of synthetic biology and gene-editing misuse pathways should be institutionalized to include scenarios that focus on coercive signaling (assassination/toxin events), readiness degradation, and gray-zone biological harassment. Outcomes of these exercises should be used to compel procurement priorities (e.g., medical countermeasures, detection, decontamination equipment and resources), doctrine, and allied coordination, given that adversaries are already experimenting at the seams of our current capabilities.
In sum, the recent episodes at home and abroad should prompt moving past simple binaries of “biological” versus “chemical” agents, “state” versus “non-state,” actors, and “battlefield” versus “homeland” risks and threats. The reality is evidence of convergence of these categories as constructs and contexts for current and near-future engagements. Synthetic biology and gene editing are accelerating that convergence by lowering technical thresholds and expanding the palette of plausible, deniable bioagent use. For the DoW, the imperative should be disciplined acknowledgement, address and adaptation: building prevention into the enterprise, accelerating attribution, hardening the force, and integrating biosecurity-by-design to the logic of strategic competition.
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed in this essay are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States government, Department of War or the National Defense University.
Dr. James Giordano is head of the Center for Strategic Deterrence and the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and leads the Program in Disruptive Technology and Future Warfare of the Institute for National Strategic Studies.