Intensifying global competition in science and technology (S/T), particularly in fields with considerable disruptive potential - such as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, synthetic biology, and neurotechnology—has become a defining feature of 21st-century geopolitical dynamics. Central to this competition are China’s ongoing efforts to develop and employ such technologies for political initiatives and military applications. An influential element in this competition is the emigration of S/T researchers from the United States (U.S.) - due to disillusionment with U.S. funding, promotion and/or tenure systems, opportunity and appeal of China’s universities, or coercion - and their contribution to the Peoples’ Republic of China’s (PRC) dual-use research and development (R/D) ecosystem.
We opine that the loss of U.S.-trained or U.S.-based scientific talent to China—either through direct relocation or through remote collaborations and affiliations—represents a significant force multiplier for China achieving strategic S/T advantage. We acknowledge the current reality of this “brain drain” of S/T talent. However, we also propose that herein lies an opportunity for deliberate and nuanced surveillance and analysis of such talent flows: (1) to yield actionable insights to the evolving nature, direction, pace, and intended uses of China’s dual-use R/D efforts; toward (2) informing U.S. military preparedness in both non-kinetic and kinetic domains.
China’s Strategic Absorption of Foreign S/T Talent
The PRC’s S/T acquisition programs, including the former “Thousand Talents Plan” and its successor initiatives, have systematically targeted foreign-trained S/T experts (particularly from the U.S.) for recruitment into efforts focusing on disciplines foundational to next-generation military capabilities (e.g.- AI and quantum information sciences; advanced materials, bioengineering, cognitive sciences, etc.). A prominent example is the rapidity with which the PRC has developed robust biotechnology capabilities, engaging R/D within both academia as well as within the industrial space, generating global commercial partnerships, particularly in the pharmaceutical arena. It is telling that while the US still leads in AI innovation, a key metric the PRC is pursuing is AI engineering talent, that is applicable across disciplines, in order to garner more distributed success. What distinguishes China’s approach in such efforts is a seamless integration of civilian and military research infrastructures under the rubric of Military-Civil Fusion (MCF), which ensures that S/T advances generated in university or commercial settings are readily translatable to military utility.
Moreover, the Chinese government has demonstrated a sophisticated capability to absorb, copy, adapt, and weaponize foreign-origin research through frameworks and processes instituted to empower academic institutions, state-owned enterprises to exercise acquisition of intellectual property by leveraging Chinese statues relevant to international law. The return or remote cooperation of U.S.-trained researchers advances China’s domestic innovation capabilities, and also enables bypass of export controls. Taken together, these factors allow state objectives that prioritize strategic advantage in multiple domains, to include:
Non-Kinetic Engagements: Advances in AI and neurotechnologies can be employed for enhanced capabilities in information warfare, cognitive domain operations, and cyber-espionage.
Kinetic Engagements: Technologies such as gene-editing platforms, synthetic biology processing, and/or drones can be readily adapted into low-cost, high-impact weapon systems.
Surveillance of Talent Flows: A Strategic Intelligence Opportunity
While the emigration of U.S.-based scientific talent to China represents a loss in human capital and a gain for an adversarial actor, we opine that it also provides a valuable—if underutilized—intelligence opportunity. Patterns of emigration, collaboration, and knowledge transfer can serve as proxies for understanding the trajectory of Chinese dual-use innovation. Monitoring these trends can inform U.S. and allied strategic assessments in several ways, to include:
Identifying Emerging Capability Areas: Analysis of S/T backgrounds, publication records, patent contributions, and new affiliations of emigrant scientists can infer those scientific disciplines and technological domains that China is prioritizing for near- and mid-term military application.
Assessing Technological Maturity and Timeline: Assessment of patterns of recruitment of experts in particular areas—such as computational neuroscience, nanobiotechnology, or quantum physics—can be useful to indicate current S/T gaps China is seeking to fill toward establishing technological maturity to achieve strategic goals.
Forecasting Doctrinal Shifts: Surveillance of talent flux can afford insights to how Chinese military doctrine may be adapting to, and adopting new technologies. For example, a surge in recruitment of experts in behavioral modeling and neural interface technologies might signal forthcoming PLA investment in cognitive warfare capabilities.
Targeting Counterintelligence and Diplomacy: Tracking S/T research and industrial networks can bolster U.S. and allied efforts to preemptively identify sensitive knowledge domains, shape export control policies, and tailor academic, commercial, and diplomatic outreach to reinforce trust and retention within the domestic scientific community.
Mitigation Recommendations
To counter the strategic risk posed by scientific emigration to China, we believe that the U.S. should develop a multi-pronged approach that combines security vigilance with incentives for retention and responsible collaboration of S/T talent. We have noted in discussions of “decoupling” that a variety of tools exist to maintain US dominance in emerging S/T fields, and innovation and talent are key. Toward these ends, we propose the following recommendations:
Strengthen Domestic Retention: U.S. research institutions must be resourced and empowered to offer competitive, mission-aligned opportunities for those domains of S/T innovation that preserve and strengthen national security initiatives. Creating protected pathways for dual-use research within Department of Defense programs at national laboratories, and through durably funded National Science Foundation, and/or National Institutes of Health DoD cross-collaborations can establish venues and nexus sites for preserving valuable S/T research and researchers. Such programs and projects would also (1) unburden civilian academic institutes from conducting dual-use R/D; and (2) enable embellished controls, oversight, and governance for any/all domestic dual-use R/D.
Refine Vetting and Partnership Protocols: Academic and private sector institutions should adopt more rigorous protocols to assess risk in/of international research collaborations. To such ends, we advocate increased institution and stringency of security briefings, background checks, and affiliation audits in all federally funded S/T initiatives.
Enhance Surveillance and Attribution Infrastructure: The U.S. should establish an interagency task force to systematically monitor emigration and engagement trends in S/T. Big data analytics and AI-driven network mapping can facilitate real-time awareness of such trends, patterns and emerging risks.
Conclusion
In the evolving competition for S/T advancement and superiority, it is important to understand that the people involved are as vital as the programs and projects implemented, and products and platforms invented. The emigration of U.S. S/T talent to China represents a strategically relevant transfer of cognitive capital with broad implications for national security. As China integrates foreign-acquired knowledge and capability to its dual-use innovation initiatives, it gains significant advantage in leveraging resultant S/T in both non-kinetic and kinetic spheres.
However, we assert that this challenge posed by the current reality of “brain drain” of S/T talent also provides the U.S. with an opportunity to understand, anticipate, and influence China’s defense development trajectory through careful surveillance and interpretation of emigrant talent flows. By scanning trends in human mobility, scientific innovation, and strategic competition, the U.S. can better posture to confront and shape future military engagements in an era defined by disruptive and convergent S/T.
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed in this essay are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States government, Department of Defense or the National Defense University.
Dr. Diane DiEuliis is Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, DC, USA
Dr. James Giordano is the Director of the Center for Disruptive Technology and Future Warfare of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, DC, USA