The Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CSWMD) is a recognized leader in formal and informal WMD education and is designated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the focal point for WMD education in Joint Professional Military Education (JPME).
CJCSI 1801.01E, 20 December 2019
CSWMD helps build and sustain a DoD community committed to improving WMD education. CSWMD experts bring to the education mission a broad and deep expertise obtained through decades of Federal, academic and private sector experience that allows them to deliver to students and future leaders topical and incisive instruction on WMD strategy, policy, operations and technology.
The May 2020 Joint Chiefs of Staff PME Vision highlights the need to develop “strategically minded joint warfighters who think critically and can creatively apply military power to inform national strategy, conduct globally integrated operations, and fight under conditions of disruptive change.” Programs of instruction designed to achieve this goal must take account of the ways in which WMD inform strategy and shape the character of competition and war. It is for this reason that the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) declares as one of its objectives "Dissuading, preventing, or deterring state adversaries and non-state actors from acquiring, proliferating, or using weapons of mass destruction."
To advance these leadership objectives CSWMD works with DoD education institutions and programs to ensure that future leaders, staff officers and strategists:
Develop basic and applied knowledge of WMD threats and responses to enable critical thinking and informed decisionmaking on strategy, policy and operations;
Understand the strategic and operational impact of WMD in Great Power Competition, as well as at all levels of conflict, from regional to global;
Apply deterrence and countering WMD strategies, concepts and capabilities in order to achieve military objectives and to provide the best risk-informed advice to senior leaders.
May 25, 2021
Arms Control in Today’s (Dis)Information Environment Part II
Dr. Justin Anderson's recent article is the second in a series of papers by Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) Fellows examining Arms Control in Today’s (Dis)information Environment. The goal of the series is to contribute to a discussion about how disinformation could play a role in future arms control treaties and agreements.
May 11, 2021
(Dis)trust and verify?: Arms Control in Today’s (Dis)Information Environment Part I
Ms. Sarah Jacobs Gamberini's recent article for Inkstick Media examines arms control and disinformation. This is the first article in series of papers by Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) Fellows on Arms Control in Today’s (Dis)information Environment, the goal of which is to contribute to a discussion about how disinformation could play a role in future arms control treaties and agreements.
Jan. 27, 2021
China’s Hypersonic Weapons
Bernstein and Hancock identify potential strategic and operational issues that will need to be addressed as China's hypersonic capabilities mature.
Nov. 4, 2020
Strategic Assessment 2020: Into a New Era of Great Power Competition
The complete "Strategic Assessment 2020: Into a New Era of Great Power Competition" includes selections from researchers in the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) and the WMD Center. To read the work of Paul Bernstein, Justin Anderson, Diane DiEuliis, Gerald Epstein, and Amanda Moodie, navigate to pages 105 and 169 or view our publications page.
July 29, 2020
Inevitable bedfellows? Cooperation on military technology for the development of UAVs and cruise missiles in the Asia-Pacific
Will states in the Asia-Pacific develop real capabilities to deter Chinese aggression? In this discussion paper – published as part of the Missile Dialogue Initiative research programme – Dr Amy J. Nelson and Dr T. X. Hammes examine the increased likelihood that UAV and cruise-missile technologies will proliferate throughout the Asia-Pacific.
Dec. 13, 2019
Russia's Hypersonic Weapons
While Russian hypersonic weapons could pose problems for U.S. and NATO defense planning, their introduction in the near-term is not likely to fundamentally alter the existing balance of power or the prospects for strategic stability.
Nov. 6, 2019
The death of the INF Treaty has lessons for arms control
In her article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Dr. Amy J. Nelson argues that despite the treaty's failure, there is much to be learned from its undoing, as well as from the current state of arms control.
Sept. 20, 2019
Power Under Parity
Distinguished Research Fellow Paul Bernstein contributed his expertise to this report on strategic parity in an era of great power competition.
July 23, 2019
The INF Treaty: A Spectacular, Inflexible, Time-bound Success
This article discusses the changing dynamics that led first Moscow and then Washington to reevaluate the merit of the INF Treaty. It concludes that the treaty's relative rigidity may play a key role in its undoing and suggests that future arms control negotiations develop more flexible and resilient mechanisms of review, dispute resolution, and verification.