The Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CSWMD) is a recognized leader in formal and informal WMD education and is designated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the focal point for WMD education in Joint Professional Military Education (JPME).
CJCSI 1801.01E, 20 December 2019
CSWMD helps build and sustain a DoD community committed to improving WMD education. CSWMD experts bring to the education mission a broad and deep expertise obtained through decades of Federal, academic and private sector experience that allows them to deliver to students and future leaders topical and incisive instruction on WMD strategy, policy, operations and technology.
The May 2020 Joint Chiefs of Staff PME Vision highlights the need to develop “strategically minded joint warfighters who think critically and can creatively apply military power to inform national strategy, conduct globally integrated operations, and fight under conditions of disruptive change.” Programs of instruction designed to achieve this goal must take account of the ways in which WMD inform strategy and shape the character of competition and war. It is for this reason that the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) declares as one of its objectives "Dissuading, preventing, or deterring state adversaries and non-state actors from acquiring, proliferating, or using weapons of mass destruction."
To advance these leadership objectives CSWMD works with DoD education institutions and programs to ensure that future leaders, staff officers and strategists:
Develop basic and applied knowledge of WMD threats and responses to enable critical thinking and informed decisionmaking on strategy, policy and operations;
Understand the strategic and operational impact of WMD in Great Power Competition, as well as at all levels of conflict, from regional to global;
Apply deterrence and countering WMD strategies, concepts and capabilities in order to achieve military objectives and to provide the best risk-informed advice to senior leaders.
June 1, 2012
Proliferation Security Initiative: Origins and Evolution
On December 9, 2002, the United States and Spanish navies cooperated to interdict a North Korean vessel, the So San, in the Arabian Sea.1 The operation initially appeared to be an unqualified success, a textbook example of interdiction to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), related materials, or delivery systems. According to press reports, the United States began tracking the vessel when it first left North Korea, believing that it was carrying a cargo related to Scud ballistic missiles. The So San flew no flag, making it a stateless vessel under international law, subject to interception and boarding by warships on the high seas.2 The United States asked the Spanish navy to stop and search the So San when the ship reached the patrol area of Combined Task Force (CTF) 150, then under Spanish command. The mission of CTF 150 was “to promote maritime security in order to counter terrorist acts and related illegal activities” in the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean.3 Thus, the United States proposed—and Spain agreed—to use a tool developed to combat global terrorism in a counterproliferation mission.
Failure as a Policy Catalyst On December 9, 2002, the United States and Spanish navies cooperated to
Proliferation Risks of Civilian Nuclear Power Programs
The risks of nuclear proliferation—the further spread of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable
Jan. 1, 2012
Defining "Weapons of Mass Destruction" (Revised)
This revised Occasional Paper explores the issue of defining weapons of mass destruction with a focus on summarizing how the term has been used in disarmament negotiations, U.S. national security policy, Soviet and Russian military doctrine, and American political discourse. The paper identifies alternative definitions for WMD, addresses some of the key policy issues associated with different definitions, and proposes a definition appropriate for the Department of Defense.
Dec. 1, 2011
U.S. Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention
On October 1, 1990, two months after Iraq’s surprise invasion and annexation of Kuwait had put the United States and other members of the international community on a collision course with the Saddam Hussein regime, President George H.W. Bush spoke to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in New York. He described Iraq’s brutal aggression against its neighbor as “a throwback to another era, a dark relic from a dark time.” Noting that Saddam Hussein had waged a “genocidal poison gas war” against Iraq’s restive Kurdish minority during the 1980s, President Bush hinted that if it ultimately proved necessary to liberate Kuwait by force, the United States and its allies could face Iraqi attacks with chemical weapons—highly toxic chemicals designed to incapacitate or kill.
Jan. 1, 2010
U.S. Withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty
As President George W. Bush made these remarks in a speech at the National Defense University (NDU) on May 1, 2001, National Security Council (NSC) Senior Director for Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense Robert Joseph listened attentively. Within just 4 months of taking office, President Bush was articulating one of his key national security priorities: setting the conditions for the United States to move full steam ahead on developing, testing, and eventually deploying a wide range of missile defense technologies and systems—a priority that in all likelihood would mean U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
As President George W. Bush made these remarks in a speech at the National Defense University (NDU)
Oct. 1, 2009
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: Looking Back, Looking Ahead
This Occasional Paper traces the general evolution of the countering WMD enterprise in the Clinton and Bush administrations and anticipates some of the major WMD challenges that lie ahead.
President Nixon’s Decision to Renounce the U.S. Offensive Biological Weapons Program
The nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union was a prominent feature of the
July 1, 2009
Aligning Disarmament to Nuclear Dangers: Off to a Hasty START?
Confronted by a daunting array of nuclear threats, and having pledged to reinvigorate the