Preparing for Near-Future Warfighting 

As noted in last week’s special edition Strategic Insights, the Department of War will focus upon furthering research, testing and use of six key domains of disruptive technology (viz., applied artificial intelligence [AI], biomanufacturing, contested logistics technologies, quantum and battlefield information dominance, scaled directed energy, and scaled hypersonics). The operational character of near-future warfare will be defined by six characteristics enabled by technologic convergence: compression of decision timelines, ambiguity of attribution, integration across domains, dependence on data and algorithms, asymmetric advantage to technologically sophisticated forces, and vulnerability to technological disruption.

Decision timelines will compress as AI systems process sensor data, generate courses of action, and enable dynamic targeting at machine speed. Human judgment remains essential but must be exercised through anticipatory frameworks rather than reactive decision-making. Commanders must shape the decision space through intent, constraints, and priorities rather than directing individual actions.

Attribution ambiguity will increase as quantum communications, AI-enabled deception, and non-kinetic effects blur the line between technical failure, natural phenomena, and adversary action. Was that satellite malfunction a component failure, directed energy attack, or quantum sensor exploitation? This ambiguity creates strategic space for action below thresholds that would trigger response but also increases risk of miscalculation and inadvertent escalation.

Cross-domain integration becomes operationally mandatory as technologies bridge traditional domain boundaries. Quantum sensors in space detect subsurface changes, hypersonic weapons transit all domains in minutes, AI systems fuse intelligence across domains simultaneously, and directed energy systems engage threats from sea, air, land, and space. Joint operations become not merely coordinated but truly integrated.

Data and algorithmic dependence create new centers of gravity. The side with superior data, more sophisticated algorithms, and more resilient computational infrastructure gains decisive advantages. This transforms information warfare from a supporting element to a decisive domain—protecting our data and algorithms while degrading adversary capabilities becomes as important as kinetic fires.

Technologically sophisticated forces gain asymmetric advantages, but technological sophistication alone proves insufficient. Integration matters more than individual capability superiority. An adversary with inferior technology but superior integration may outperform a force with technological advantages employed separately. This places premium on experimentation, iterative development, and operational adaptation.

Finally, technological dependence creates vulnerability. AI systems can be deceived, quantum hardware is fragile, biomanufacturing introduces biological risks, contested logistics technologies remain vulnerable to cyberattack, directed energy systems depend on power generation and distribution, and hypersonic weapons require complex supporting infrastructure. Resilience through redundancy, adaptability, and low-technology fallback options becomes essential.

Implications for Joint Warfighter Readiness

I posit that preparing the joint warfighter for the employment of these technologies will require dedication to and sustained engagement of five critical dimensions: technical literacy, education and training, organizational structure, operational concepts, and the development of ethical frameworks for use. Let’s address each in turn.

First, technical literacy must become a core competency across the joint force. This is not to suggest that every warfighter should become a quantum physicist or synthetic biologist, but understanding how these technologies can be used to shape the operating environment will become as fundamental as map reading or weapons handling. The military that achieves higher collective literacy and fluency in technology will gain significant  advantage(s) in operational tempo and tenor, as leaders at the tactical level can nimbly maximize emerging capabilities under the rapidly changing conditions in the field (without requiring centralized direction on how to operate these tools)

Second, toward this goal, education must evolve beyond platform focal thinking toward more effects-based operations that leverage technologic convergence. The aforementioned technical literacy will be mandatory to understand how AI, quantum, directed energy, and other technologies integrate to generate desired missional outcomes. Professional military education should incorporate technology competency, forecasting, and scenario-based training in the ethically sound use of these tools as both aligned with current laws of armed conflict and international treaties, and as relevant to sustaining asymmetrical advantages in global power competition.  

Third, organizational structures optimized for industrial-age warfare will likely prove to be inadequate for technology-enabled convergent operations. Cross-functional teams that integrate operators, technologists, intelligence professionals, and effects planners must become standardized within various levels of warfighting units and echelons. The traditional separation between tactical, operational, and strategic level planning for engagement and effect(s) becomes less distinct when technologies (such as quantum sensors, AI decision systems, and hypersonic weapons) can compress decision timelines to minutes. Organizational agility and distributed decision-making authority become operational necessities rather than just command and control preferences.

Fourth, operational concepts must evolve to exploit convergent capabilities while concomitantly mitigating new gaps and weaknesses. It’s important to recognize that each technology can confer vulnerabilities that convergent employment can both amplify, and if used in deterrence and/or defensively, could mitigate. For example, quantum sensing and computing can optimize AI system effectiveness, and distributed biomanufacturing can enable development of novel pathogens and disruptive bioagents. Contrastingly, quantum communications can be used to secure the networks upon which AI systems depend, and biomanufacturing can fortify the logistics of supply chains for delivery of preventive measures against harmful bioagents (e.g., vaccines, drugs, etc.).

Fifth, and literally most critical, we must develop ethical frameworks that analyze (and constructively critique) if and to what extent existing ethical precepts are sufficient to both address the issues generated by emerging technologies, and to navigate the use of these technologies in the changing operational settings and contingencies that their employment evokes.  

Proposed Recommendations

To prepare the joint force to capably, effectively and efficiently employ these technologies, I offer the following recommendations:

First, an organizational culture should be cultivated that embraces experimentation and tolerates controlled failure; the path to effective convergent operations runs through iteration and improvement, not prediction.

Second, investments in education and training should be focal to developing both technical competence and ethical reasoning necessary to effectively address the circumstances, conditions, issues and dilemmas that the operational use of these technologies are most likely to present.

Third, joint forces should be structured for agility and mission-specific operational integration of technologies rather than “prior war”-reminiscent separation of functions.

Fourth, these technologies and operational concepts for their (individual and convergent) employment should be developed and refined through red teaming, wargaming, and well-defined settings and contexts of field evaluation before adversaries force their premature use and adaptation under fire.

Fifth, governance frameworks, norms, and agreements should be informed by global power realities that channel technological development toward stability rather than unconstrained competition.

Bottom Line

The convergent employment of emerging disruptive technologies will determine whether joint forces maintain operational dominance or cede advantage to adversaries who prove more adept at integration across technologies, domains, and the spectrum from competition to conflict. Preparing for this future demands intellectual courage, organizational adaptation, and ethical clarity. The time for such preparation is now—the future arrives faster than bureaucracies adapt, and the consequences of unpreparedness grow more severe as technological capabilities proliferate. Our peer competitors and adversaries are not waiting. Neither should we.​​​​​​​​​

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed in this essay are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States government, Department of War, or the National Defense University.

Dr. James Giordano is director of the Center for Disruptive Technology and Future Warfare of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.