Through its publications INSS provides cutting-edge research, analyses, and innovative solutions on critical national security issues in support of the joint warfighter and Department of War stakeholders.
Jan. 22, 2026
The Arctic is a Strategic Distraction
Over the past five years, numerous articles have called for increased U.S. defense resources focused on the Arctic. This is a strategic mistake, a distraction.
Dec. 11, 2025
The Challenge of a Rising, Nuclear-Armed China
This National Institute for Public Policy article examines several specific developments in China’s nuclear arsenal, which, coupled with Beijing’s aggressive foreign policy, hold sobering implications for U.S. national security interests.
Nov. 6, 2025
We Can’t Buy Our Way Out: It’s Time to Think Differently
Current U.S. force structure and major platforms are likely to fail in the emerging operational environment.
Jan. 31, 2023
China's Indo-Pacific Folly
Beijing’s ambition to isolate Washington from its Asian allies has been derailed in large part by its desire to redress more immediate grievances—namely, to reclaim what it sees as lost territory and punish countries that offend its sensibilities.
Oct. 20, 2021
Future Directions for Great Power Nuclear Arms Control: Policy Options and National Security Implications
With New START expiring in 2026, this Occasional Paper by 2020 National Defense University-U.S. Strategic Command Scholar Lt T. Justin Bronder, USAF, provides an assessment of several possible nuclear arms control/risk reduction approaches for the United States to consider. The author evaluates each approach for its possible impact on U.S.-Russia strategic stability, extended deterrence, budget costs, and other key factors, and recommends that in the near-term the United States engage other major nuclear powers in talks on new risk reduction and confidence-building measures.
June 24, 2021
Arms Control in Today's (Dis)Information Environment Part III
Information manipulation and covert influence campaigns have long been tools of sub-threshold strategic competition used to try to influence arms race dynamics, arms control decisions, and the enforceability of compliance and verification regimes. During the Cold War, such massive covert operations were only feasible by great powers. Today, not only are there more actors with potential stakes in arms control decisions, but global connectivity and digitization combined with a panoply of new Digital Age tools make it easier to obfuscate, deny, and manipulate the information environment around arms control.