



STRATEGIC FORUM

National Defense University

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Key Points

- ◆ Nordic states (Norway, Sweden, and Finland) efforts to enhance societal resilience through unique “total defense” and “comprehensive security” initiatives are unlikely to change the near-term strategic calculus of Russia. Over time, however, a concerted application of total defense in harmony with Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty will aid in the resilience to, and deterrence of, Russian hostile measures and hybrid warfare, and serve as a complement to a regional denial-based deterrence strategy.
- ◆ The Nordic states are uniquely positioned and equipped to coordinate with their Baltic neighbors and partners to enhance multilateral cooperation on defense technology, regional information sharing, and best practices for the implementation of total defense.
- ◆ The Nordic states could “export” resilience to the greater Baltic Sea Region by strengthening participation in European Union energy and infrastructure projects with the Baltic states, amplifying efforts to connect infrastructure links among allies and partners and decouple from adversaries. For their part, the Baltic states should aggressively adopt a whole-of-society approach to total defense.

Baltics Left of Bang: Nordic Total Defense and Implications for the Baltic Sea Region


by Håkon Lunde Saxi, Bengt Sundelius, and Brett Swaney

Sponsored by the U.S. National Defense University (NDU) and the Swedish National Defense University, this paper is the second in a series of Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Forums dedicated to the multinational exploration of the strategic and defense challenges faced by the Baltic states. The December 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy described Russia as “using subversive measures to weaken the credibility of America’s commitment to Europe, undermine transatlantic unity, and weaken European institutions and governments.”¹ The U.S. and European authors of this paper, along with many others, came together in late 2017 to explore possible responses to the security challenges facing the Baltic Sea Region (BSR). This second report highlights early research and gaming insights indicating the importance of total defense and comprehensive security, whole-of-society approaches to deterrence and defense of the Baltic Sea Region from Russian aggression.² It also provides recommendations for how the Nordic and Baltic states can leverage aspects of total defense and comprehensive security to generate a credible asymmetric defense and build societal resilience.³

For the Nordic states of the Baltic Sea Region—Sweden, Finland, and Norway—the Russia challenge is well understood.⁴ Recent studies and gaming insights commonly envision a scenario in which Russian conventional forces, bolstered by an antiaccess/area-denial bubble projected by the Kaliningrad Oblast, overwhelm their Baltic neighbors, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. With that momentum, Russian forces might then invade the strategically valuable Swedish island of Gotland or the Finnish Åland islands in order to establish control of the BSR.⁵

While prior studies have demonstrated the potential consequences of Russian aggression, a now familiar Russian hybrid strategy has already been observed

Figure 1. Baltic Sea Region



Source: Wikimedia Commons, available at <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Baltic_Sea_map.png>.

aimed at preparing the operational environment astride the Nordic states. For instance, it is clear that Sweden has been the target of a wide array of active measures stemming from Russia that include disinformation and coordinated campaigns to influence and divide Swedish public opinion on major social and political issues.⁶ Propaganda aimed at other Nordic-Baltic governments and Russian speaking populations is prevalent, and Russian

violations of the territorial waters and airspace of other BSR countries are frequent and deliberate.⁷ Russia also exerts pressure in more subtle ways. In 2015, both Norway and Finland experienced a sudden influx of migrants crossing their border with Russia. This influx could not have happened without the permission of Russian security services. The goal appears to have been to force the Nordic states to negotiate bilaterally over the issue and

send a signal to the European Union (EU) that Russia has the capacity to act against their interests.⁸

Norway, Sweden, and Finland are a pivotal bulwark in the defense of the Baltic Sea Region. During the Crimean War (1853–1856) and the Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War (1918–1920), the Swedish fortress of Viapori (today, Suomenlinna in Finland) and the Finnish Åland islands were key strategic bastions. Today, the Swedish island of Gotland remains critical to the BSR as it could complicate Russian antiship cruise missile strikes on allied or partner military forces in the event of a crisis. Additionally, allies and partners could use the airfields on Gotland to control regional airspace and the main port, Visby, as a logistical hub.⁹ Finally, both Finland and Norway border Russia, and while Norway is a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member, Sweden and Finland are not. Conversely, while Sweden and Finland are members of the European Union, Norway is not. No matter how the region is viewed, the Nordic states are vital to the security and stability of the BSR.

Hostile Measures and the Hybrid Challenge

Russian strategy in the BSR is highly opportunistic and driven by concerns for its own security and persistent fear of outside invasion. These strategic traits have been cultivated and ingrained by hundreds of years contending with vulnerable geography and a bloody history.¹⁰ Small countries on the periphery of Russia are viewed less as potential friends and partners than as potential beachheads for enemies.¹¹ While this is especially true of the Baltic states, the Nordic states are not immune to these impulses.

Russia has always presumed influence in its own neighborhood.¹² Its insecurity, imperial identity, and self-conception as a great power drive its desire for influence and a degree of control within the BSR.¹³ Of course, a key Russian objective is also to halt EU and NATO activity in their perceived sphere of influence. In 2016, Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov wrote

that the choice to pursue NATO enlargement “is the essence of the systemic problems that have soured Russia's relations with the United States and the European Union.”¹⁴ Russia is keenly sensitive to any discussion of Finland or Sweden joining NATO or orienting further toward the West. There is a silver lining, however, as Russia often treads lightly with Finland and Sweden out of a desire to avoid driving their citizenry and political leaders toward greater alignment with NATO. Norway may also benefit from self-imposed restrictions on its NATO membership, such as limitations on the basing of nuclear weapons and permanent basing of allied forces in peacetime.¹⁵

Russia works to achieve its strategic objectives through the use of “hostile measures”—a broad range of tools applied simultaneously and without a clear causal logic.¹⁶ This approach is characterized by the exploitation of economic, ethnic, linguistic, regional, religious, social, and other divisions in target nations, often as preparation for higher-level violence or hybrid warfare.¹⁷ Russian leaders hope that the effect of these measures will create opportunities to exploit.¹⁸ This approach has been disorienting, perplexing, or puzzling to the U.S., allied, and partner strategy and policy communities as it stands in sharp contrast to their more familiar formal system of preplanning to achieve objectives through a specific strategy or particular tactics.¹⁹

Deterring and defending against Russian aggression in the BSR, prior to open hostilities, or “left of bang,” is a political problem that requires a broader adaptive approach. In light of the threat environment, the governments of Norway, Sweden, and Finland rely on unique strategies of total defense and comprehensive security, with an emphasis not just on territorial security, but on crisis response, societal resilience, and regional security. Due to their broad conception of security, Nordic total defense strategies are well suited to enhancing resilience to hostile measures, countering hybrid challenges, delaying or disrupting short warning aggression, and for some, supporting regional allied efforts.

Understanding Total Defense

Military theorist Carl von Clausewitz observed that defeating the enemy “can, in practice, be replaced by two other grounds for making peace: the first is the improbability of victory; the second is its unacceptable costs.” He also indicated that “the defense is intrinsically the stronger form of waging war. . . . [I]f attack were the stronger form, there would be no case for using the defense.”²⁰ For Clausewitz, demonstrating the capability to impose costs and make victory seem improbable could shift an adversary’s cost-benefit analysis enough to deter an attack. This strategy is at the heart of modern total defense and comprehensive security concepts to dissuade Russia from aggressive action.

Modern total defense is a whole-of-society approach to national security involving the coordinated action of a nation’s military, paramilitary, police forces, civilian branches of government, private sector, and general population, thus enhancing conventional defense and deterrence measures. Total defense is well suited to counter hostile information operations, provide for the psychological defense of the population, bolster internal security, build the resilience of critical services and infrastructure, enhance military defense, lend support for allies and partners, and respond to natural disasters and other crises that have no direct human agency.²¹ On one end of the spectrum, total defense is an asymmetric or unconventional approach aimed at defeating the adversary’s will to engage or continue with aggression by influencing their perception of costs and benefits. On the other end, total defense is a whole-of-society approach to societal resilience and preparedness in the face of natural and manmade crises. Resistance to occupation or malign influence and resilience in the face of crises are intended to send important signals to adversaries and allies that the population of a nation and its government are prepared to defend and deter against aggression.

This total defense approach is particularly beneficial in situations where there is no clear threshold for the start of hostilities,²² making it useful in deterring and

defending against Russian hostile measures and hybrid warfare. The concept of societal resilience enconced within total defense and comprehensive security harmonizes well with Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty.²³ The commitment to resilience, civil preparedness, and civil-military readiness was reinforced at the NATO Summit in July 2016 during the meeting of the North Atlantic Council.²⁴ The broad concept of security embraced by total defense also finds harmony with Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which provides for solidarity in the case of a wide range of crises, to include natural disasters.


Furthermore, total defense as a concept is defensive, even predominantly nonmilitary in nature, seeking to solidify the status quo with capabilities that are themselves defensive. As a result, total defense efforts are less likely to be framed as provocative or escalatory in nature compared with formal NATO or national efforts to bolster conventional forces. This allows Nordic partners and those who adopt similar concepts to better shape the strategic narrative by playing to international perceptions of legitimacy based on the right to self-defense and the freedom of the global commons.

Each Nordic state has maintained a version of total defense and brings unique national characteristics to the concept. There are important differences and areas of emphasis that should be examined in order to enhance the security of the BSR. The concepts of total defense and comprehensive security offer much that could be leveraged to export resilience throughout the region.

Sweden and Total Defense 2.0

Days before Christmas in 2010, the first suicide bomber in the Nordic region detonated his device near a crowded shopping street in the city center of Stockholm. In 2015, Sweden absorbed a large influx of immigrants that strained the Swedish government’s internal consensus and was further exacerbated by another deadly terrorist attack in April 2017.²⁵ Dramatic forest fires rampaged during the summer months of 2014 and 2018, and the Russian annexation of Crimea fundamentally changed

Figure 2. Total Defense



Source: *If Crisis or War Comes* (Karlstad: Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, May 2018), 8–9, available at <www.dinsakerhet.se/siteassets/din-sakerhet.se/broschyren-om-krisen-eller-kriget-kommer/om-krisen-eller-kriget-kommer---engelska.pdf>.

the Swedish view of security in the BSR.²⁶ The broad spectrum of challenges illustrates the way Sweden views its own defense. While Russia is indeed a primary catalyst for action, Sweden can enhance resilience to all challenges by embracing total defense, which was formally resurrected in the 2015 Swedish Defense Bill.²⁷ Prior to 1991, Sweden's total defense machinery (total defense 1.0) was well resourced, continuously trained and exercised, and could rely on obligatory military service for all young men. Unfortunately, the foundations of Swedish total defense atrophied in the decades following the end of the Cold War.²⁸ Sweden has had to rebuild and relearn how to flex these muscles.

Much of the current Swedish effort has been focused on rebuilding the civil-military relationship and fleshing out the coordinating mechanisms in preparation for cultivating its total defense 2.0 efforts in succeeding

years. For Sweden, total defense is a combined effort of the military, civilian agencies, the private sector, and local communities (see figure 2). Swedish total defense is a whole-of-society approach to building resilience and security. The priorities of Swedish societal security are broad and include the protection of the population, securing the functions of society, and protecting fundamental values such as individual rights, the rule of law, and democratic systems.²⁹

The mandate for societal resilience under total defense 2.0 has been centered around the strengthening of the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) that was founded in 2009. The MSB replaced a trio of outmoded agencies: the Swedish Rescue Services Agency, the Swedish Emergency Management Agency, and the National Board of Psychological Defense.³⁰ The goal of MSB has been to develop resilience across all sectors of

society and at every level of government. However, MSB was not given the authority to command civil society services during an emergency. The creation of Sweden's MSB was paired with a new "crisis coordination secretariat" located in the Prime Minister's Office, but was moved to the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs in 2014. The mandate of this secretariat is a bit narrower as it is limited to coordination and crisis management within government ministries. In contrast, MSB leads through proactive network building and preparation. Since 2006, all government entities have been obligated to produce and submit a risk and vulnerability analysis. A similar risk and vulnerability analysis is required by all 290 autonomous municipalities throughout Sweden and contributes to a high degree of situational awareness of societal vulnerabilities.

The Quills in Total Defense

Having the capacity to coordinate and manage the relationships between civil and military actors is only one part of the equation. The other half consists of having the capabilities to resist Russian hostile measures and hybrid warfare and affect some level of deterrence. Like the Swiss, Swedish total defense 2.0 relies on a "hedgehog" or "bitter pill" model for societal defense.³¹ Historically, this strategy has been employed by states that are too small to mount an independent defense but have the willpower to resist for long periods of time. Since aggressive, often revisionist powers seek quick, opportunistic territorial takeovers, the strategy demonstrates to the adversary that any attempt at conquest would be long and costly. To enhance this aspect of total defense 2.0, Sweden has placed a heavy emphasis on the role of the individual being able to transform into "warfare mode" and survive unaided in the event of a crisis or armed attack during at least the first 12 weeks. Sweden is also in the process of reconstituting the National Board of Psychological Defense, slated for reactivation in 2021, to bolster societal resilience.

In May of 2018, the Swedish government distributed a 20-page brochure to all 4.8 million households in

Sweden outlining how to behave in the case of foreign aggression.³² In addition to describing basic emergency preparedness techniques, the pamphlet includes instructions on how to spot and resist disinformation as well as how to resist armed attack (see figure 3). This is not just an important tool of popular education on resilience and resistance, it is also an important information campaign signaling to an adversary the intent, and perhaps the will, to resist. To further bolster societal resilience, the conscript system in Sweden for men and women, which had been discarded in 2010, was reactivated in 2017.³³ These are positive developments, but they lack resources. Major investments in training, exercises, and logistics to mobilize, pre-position supplies, and coordinate community efforts, among many other tasks, need to be undertaken before these reforms achieve their desired effect.

Reengineering the Swedish Military

While NATO will not abandon rotational and forward deployed forces in the Baltic states, it is unlikely to establish a large forward presence. It is apparent, then, to regional leaders like Sweden, that total defense 2.0 needs a revitalized military defense element. Swedish defense reform is designed to provide military capabilities to meet a wide array of future conflicts, to break up an attacking force, and deny adversaries the opportunity to achieve objectives below the threshold of armed attack. Sweden's defense investment plans will result in an expanded naval force of 24 ships with surface warfare and antisubmarine capabilities, 18 mine warfare vessels, cruise missiles, additional unmanned aerial vehicles, and Gripen fighters.³⁴

In the near term, the Swedish Royal Navy is upgrading their *Gävle* and *Visby*-class corvettes and *Gotland*-class submarines. Additionally, the Swedish navy plans to build two next-generation A26 submarines, which will be useful for operations in the BSR.³⁵ This maritime capability is critical as Russian hybrid strategy could include submarines tapping or disrupting subsea energy and communications cables and inserting special operations

Figure 3. Resistance

If Sweden is attacked, resistance is required

We must be able to resist various types of attacks directed against our country. Even today, attacks are taking place against our IT systems and attempts are being made to influence us using false information. We may also be affected by conflicts in our region. Potential attacks include:

- Cyberattacks that knock out important IT systems.
- Sabotage of infrastructure (e.g. roads, bridges, airports, railways, electricity cables and nuclear power stations).
- Terror attacks that affect a large number of people or important organisations.
- Attempts to influence Sweden's decision makers or inhabitants.
- Severed transport links that result in a shortage of foodstuffs and other goods.
- Military attack, for example airstrikes, rocket attacks or other acts of war.

Heightened state of alert

The Government can decide to put the country on a heightened state of alert in order to improve Sweden's chances of defending itself. In a heightened state of alert, peacetime laws apply, but other laws may also be used. For example, the state can requisition private property that is of particular importance to Sweden's total defence.

In a heightened state of alert, the whole of society has to gather its collective forces in order to ensure that which is most important functions. In a heightened state of alert, you may be called up to help in various ways.

Information about the heightened state of alert will be broadcast on radio and TV. Sveriges Radio's radio station P4 is the emergency channel.

Total defence

Total defence

If Sweden is attacked by another country, we will never give up. All information to the effect that resistance is to cease is false.

Source: *If Crisis or War Comes* (Karlstad: Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, May 2018), 12–13, available at <www.dinsakerhet.se/siteassets/dinsakerhet.se/broschyren-om-krisen-eller-kriget-kommer/om-krisen-eller-kriget-kommer---engelska.pdf>.

forces (SOF) on islands of geostrategic importance. Russia could also use surface ships and other means to launch cyber attacks on port or ship infrastructure networks.³⁶ As a partial response, Sweden deployed its first new military regiment since World War II—a unit of 350 soldiers—to garrison the island of Gotland.³⁷

The planned investments are eagerly awaited, but it remains to be seen if the political will and resources for such an effort can be sustained. Military spending in Sweden was 2.6 percent of GDP in 1991 and fell to 1.1 percent in 2015.³⁸ However, there is positive momentum. The recent report of the Swedish Defense Commission proposes increased defense spending amounting to 1.5 percent of GDP by 2025.³⁹ If Sweden is serious about total defense and the regional security of the BSR, it must commit to growing investments in new capabilities and the readiness of its forces. The current pace may yet be too slow to impact Russia's strategic calculus.

Finland and Comprehensive Security

Finland has the longest border with Russia—nearly 1,340 kilometers of largely uninhabited forests and rural outposts. Historically self-reliant, Finland has an established tradition of total defense by combining military and civil planning and capabilities. Unlike many nations, Finland never completely relaxed its guard after the Cold War and maintained the structures to support a total defense strategy. An updated concept was formalized in 2003, more than a decade before the rest of the West began to grapple with the implications of the so-called Gerasimov Doctrine.⁴⁰ For Finland, total defense became its “comprehensive security model.” The difference is important, as the comprehensive security model is less military in flavor and is instead focused on countering hostile measures by emphasizing societal resilience and the

psychological defense of the populace.⁴¹ *Comprehensive security* reflects an expansive definition of security, and includes capabilities that enhance resilience to natural disasters, mass migration, financial crisis, cyber disruption, and the resilience of democratic systems.

In contrast to Sweden's MSB, Finland's coordination and preparation is managed by the Security Committee. However, all appendages of the Finnish government have a great deal of autonomy. All measures are taken by government ministries for their particular sectors or specialties as a crisis dictates. All other State organs move into a supporting role. This was outlined explicitly in the 2001 Finnish Emergency Powers Act, and allows for a level of autonomy and agility to respond in the event of crisis.

Like Sweden, Finland's system of comprehensive security is dependent on a populace ready and imbued with the willingness to sacrifice against both military and nonmilitary crises. Finland's resolve was tested during the Winter War (1939–1940) against the Soviet Union, and again during the Continuation War (1941–1944). During the Cold War, Finland had a robust system of conscription. Every male served in the Finnish Defence Forces, and then afterward as part of its reserve. This allowed Finland to generate more than 500,000 soldiers from a population of five million (the total size of the reserve was 1,000,000 soldiers). At age 18, every male is called up for service, and women may volunteer. Today, approximately 70 percent of the male population spends from 6 months to 1 year providing security for society. All conscripts enter the reserve after the completion of their 6–12-month obligation. Today, almost a million men and women serve in the Finnish Defence Forces' reserve.⁴² This also enhances the inherent will to sacrifice among the populace since nearly every household in Finland has one or several citizen-soldiers in their midst.

Resisting Disinformation


A key feature of Russian hostile measures and hybrid warfare is the weaponization of information or disinformation campaigns. Finland's experience offers

insights for the defense of the BSR. Like other countries along the Baltic Sea or in Eastern Europe, Finland has observed an increase in fake news stories and propaganda linked back to Moscow (see figure 4). This information warfare has sought to undermine many of the governments of the BSR. However, the main thrust of propaganda and disinformation is aimed at the Baltic states, which are portrayed as failed nations, ruined by migration, poverty, and controlled by a sinister elite backed by the West.⁴³

Finland has long understood the need to prioritize the defense of society against Russian information warfare. There is evidence to suggest that the relative immunity of the Finnish population to Russian disinformation and propaganda can be attributed to an emphasis on a well-educated population. Finland's 2010 Security Strategy for Society places great importance on the strategic task of education, for which the Ministry of Education and Culture is the lead agent.⁴⁴ The Finnish education system makes an effort to raise the awareness of students to information threats, understand the "Finnish way of life," and prepare for responsible conduct during a crisis situation.⁴⁵ Public awareness of Russian propaganda efforts goes a long way toward inoculating the Finnish population.

The real problem, however, is not false information running wild on social media. Real fractures in Finnish society must be dealt with or ameliorated for any true resilience to be sustained. Finland relies on a relatively homogenous society—politically, socially, and economically—supported by a "Nordic welfare state," to maintain cohesion and resistance to Russian disinformation and propaganda. More succinctly, the best way to respond is not always by correcting and combating false information. Instead, it is about having your own positive narrative and sticking to it.⁴⁶ A strong public education system, a long history of balancing Russia, and a comprehensive economic and socio-cultural policy allow Finland to consistently deflect coordinated propaganda and disinformation.⁴⁷ In fact, where Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have struggled to push back against Russian

Figure 4. ECFR Perceptions of Russian Influence



Source: Kadri Liik, *Winning the Normative War with Russia: An EU-Russia Power Audit* (London: European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2018), 4, available at <www.ecfr.eu/page/-/EU-RUSSIA_POWER_AUDIT_.pdf>. Used with permission.

disinformation, Finland has found surprising resilience. For instance, in March of 2016, the Finnish-language bureau for Sputnik closed after it failed to attract enough readers.⁴⁸ While there are many aspects of Finnish society that cannot be replicated by other BSR states, the emphasis on awareness and education as well as maintaining a positive narrative are ways other BSR states can work to inoculate themselves against Russian information warfare.

Enhanced Opportunity Partners

Sweden and Finland are not NATO allies. Neither has signed the North Atlantic Treaty nor do they currently seek NATO membership. While the 2014 annexation of Crimea caused Swedish popular support for NATO membership to surge from 17 percent in 2012 to 43 percent in 2018, neither Sweden nor Finland will likely join the Alliance.⁴⁹ Remaining militarily non-aligned is still viewed as a contribution to predictability and stability in the BSR. While Sweden and Finland left neutrality behind when they became members of the EU in 1995, and became NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partners shortly after the Wales Summit in 2014, Russia continues to refer to both countries as “neutral states,” and often points out that formal NATO membership for Sweden and Finland would raise concerns about the balance of power in the Baltic Sea Region. It is clear, however, that Sweden is taking steps to engage more closely with NATO, and Finland is relaxing its traditional mode of self-reliance in favor of greater solidarity with Western partners.

Their non-aligned positions, in combination with total defense, have strengths and weaknesses. On the one hand, as NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partners, the collective defense of the region is strengthened by preparing for cooperative action. Both Sweden and Finland are highly interoperable with NATO forces. But this remains a fragile position that depends entirely on the circumstances. In addition, Sweden and Finland lack formal access to NATO’s decisionmaking structure and joint operational planning. Continuing to strengthen

mechanisms for information exchange and operational planning could address some of these deficiencies.

As a precaution, Sweden and Finland have turned toward each other, establishing a program in 2015 to deepen cooperation on all aspects of peacetime activity such as joint use of military bases, combined antisubmarine exercises, and common command and control capabilities, in addition to updating laws that allow each to offer and receive assistance to or from each other in addition to other partners and NATO. Sweden and Finland have also moved forward with the creation of a combined Finnish-Swedish Brigade Framework and joint Naval Task Group.⁵⁰ These bilateral linkages under the framework of cooperation beyond peace show promise for enhanced security in the BSR, bolstering total defense initiatives, and mitigating their vulnerable position without the formal guarantee of NATO’s collective defense.

Norway and a Split Perspective

Like Sweden, provocative Russian behavior and changing regional security dynamics have prompted Norway to shore up its own security by re-engaging with a tradition of total defense. Recent efforts have been catalyzed by aggressive Russian activity. Since 2017, the Norwegian armed forces (NAF) have experienced electronic communications and GPS interference linked to Russia. Most of these incidents coincide with NATO exercises. Norwegian bases have also been subject to “mock attacks” by Russian aircraft.⁵¹

While not yet as focused on a whole-of-society approach, Norway’s total defense concept is still centered on civil-military cooperation in the event of a crisis or conflict. The Norwegian armed forces are in charge of the military dimensions, and the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB) is in charge of the civilian dimensions, including the mission to bolster “societal resilience.”⁵²

The recent exercise Trident Juncture 2018 was an opportunity for the NAF and DSB to test their procedures and preparedness.⁵³ During the exercise, Norwegian commercial vessels were used as platforms for

maintenance, fuel supply, and logistics support. The civil-military concept is called STUFT, “ships taken up from trade.” During the exercise, the civilian crew was supplemented by a military crew. The exercise tested civil society’s willingness and ability to support the NAF under the total defense framework. NATO should endeavor to include these elements as a standard feature of regional exercises with Nordic and Baltic partners.

Like its Nordic cousins, conscription is a key piece of Norway’s whole-of-society framework. Conscription in Norway reached its peak during the late Cold War, when nearly all able-bodied male citizens were required to serve.⁵⁴ The number of conscripts has since declined considerably, especially since the early 2000s. A revised Compulsory Military Service Act came into effect in 2015, which extended conscription to all female citizens. Norway was the first NATO country to introduce universal conscription, encompassing both men and women. Today, Norway typically requires 8,000 conscripts out of a yearly pool of 60,000 that may be called up for service for up to 1 year.⁵⁵ Further, all citizens between 18 and 55 years old are subject to be called on as reinforcements in war.⁵⁶ Extending conscription to women stands in contrast to male-dominated conscription or voluntary service regimes in most NATO states. This is important because the armed forces should not exclude half the population, and it must be able to recruit from among the best and most capable candidates. This enhanced diversity increases the toolbox of the armed forces and broadens societal awareness and participation in the defense of the nation.

Unlike Sweden and Finland however, Norway does not view the BSR as its highest strategic priority. Historically, Norway has favored its alliances with major Western powers and eschewed overinvesting in the relationships between its Nordic-Baltic neighbors. As a NATO member, Norway was also more skeptical of NATO enlargement eastward. However, in 2014 the crisis in Ukraine increased Norway’s interest in the BSR. Oslo now perceived ensuring the security of the Baltic states to be in its vital interests, since NATO’s Article 5

security guarantee was the bedrock of Norway’s defence policy. Norwegian air, land, and maritime forces were rotated into the region to demonstrate clearly to Russia that the Baltic states were behind “NATO’s red line.”⁵⁷ In October 2015, a government-appointed expert commission on defense argued that Norway should be able to participate in the defense of the Baltics, stating that “the Norwegian Armed Forces must be able to rapidly provide and transfer units to the Baltic area.”⁵⁸ These efforts, and the increased attention to the BSR, was in line with the attention given by larger Western allies.

However, while Norway’s interest in the BSR has grown since 2014, it remains a lower order concern. Norway’s main focus is directed toward its own “High North” region, and secondly, toward maintaining close ties with the Western allies that ultimately will ensure its security. The situation today is a little better than in 1939 when the Swedish embassy in Oslo wrote home to Stockholm about the “complete lack of interest from the Norwegian side for all Baltic Sea problems.”⁵⁹ Nevertheless, as before 2014, the BSR is not Norway’s first priority. As one former Norwegian Minister of Defence and Minister of Foreign Affairs once lamented, “it was not always easy to get the Icelanders and Norwegians to realize that what was happening in the Baltic [sea region] also affected their safety.”⁶⁰

Despite the pull of the Arctic, Norway remains conscious that there are at least two areas of vital interest in the BSR. First, preserving the inviolability of international law and second, upholding NATO’s Article 5 security guarantees via its NATO relationship with Baltic allies. Additionally, with key allies such as the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany leading, Norway has been keen to work with these nations on NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence and Alliance reinforcement efforts that are centered on the “Eastern Flank” of the Alliance. While Norway will continue to focus its attention on the Arctic, greater pressure from NATO and major Western allies may induce it to devote additional resources to the security of the BSR.⁶¹

Challenges and Risks with Total Defense

Of course, the whole-of-society approach to total defense faces a wide range of challenges that are often discounted. One of these challenges is the various tribal mentalities that define distinct professions and training. One might imagine divisions between civil and military professionals, public sector authorities and private sector actors, and safety and security professionals. The gaps between these communities, like any state or society, are difficult to navigate. They have their own terminology, ways of organizing and procurement, preferences for technological solutions, and methods of information sharing. The results for whole-of-society coordination are slow communication and impediments to speedy reform. For Finland, a long tradition of regularly exercising these relationships and communities prevented many of these traditional gaps from being serious impediments.

The Nordic model of total defense is built around public-private partnerships. The private sector is crucial because much of the critical infrastructure of a nation, energy, transit, information networks, and many capabilities necessary in crisis, such as maritime transport and communications, are owned privately. This represents a significant challenge for Nordic states, but most especially for the government of Sweden, which owned much of the critical infrastructure during the Cold War. Today, the degree of privatization is far greater and the loss of an immediate threat from Russia after the Cold War allowed many of the public-private linkages to wither. Building trust and communication between the public and private sector is a challenge that will take years to rectify.

Not only will progress in rebuilding the connective tissue between government and private entities take time, progress thus far has been uneven. In Sweden, for instance, cooperation from the major players in the financial sector appears well ahead of other sectors. Although there are islands of excellence to be found in the cybersecurity and information assurance realms as well as fora for information exchange on supervisory, control,

and data acquisition systems, there remain few linkages among them. Cooperation can be facilitated by institutions such as the Swedish MSB, which will be important in coordinating and harmonizing their efforts.⁶² Interestingly, public-private relationships, while posing significant near-term challenges for Sweden, remains a relative strength for Finland due to the deliberate maintenance and economic support of those relationships in the post-Cold War era.

Finally, one of the most significant modern challenges to a whole-of-society approach to total defense is what may be best described as “flow security.” The nations of the BSR are more interconnected than ever before. As a result, a total defense strategy dependent on societal resilience must account for networks and infrastructure that are inherently trans-boundary. Undesirable flows include those of narcotics, weapons, trafficked persons, and cyber intrusions, among others. Electric grids, cyber infrastructure such as cable networks and server farms, interconnected and often “global” supply chains, and financial markets are all security flows that must be engaged with partners and allies to secure.

More broadly, there are some inherent risks with the adoption of a whole-of-society approach to total defense by an ally or partner. For example, the dispersal of equipment intended for popular resistance cells could end up on the black market.⁶³ Further, a resisting population will almost certainly be the target of harsh Russian retaliation. Today, Russian military exercises regularly identify resistance capabilities and civilian support as factors that must be addressed. Russian planning appears to have assumed, based on their experience in Crimea, that their forces would meet little or no resistance. That changed after their prolonged experience in Ukraine’s Donbas.⁶⁴ Now their forces prepare for a resisting population. Nonetheless, decentralized and aggressive resistance (both violent and non-violent), as part of a whole-of-society approach to total defense, synchronized with an allied, even global strategic messaging campaign, can make it clear that a country is not vanquished.

Exporting Resilience

The security interdependence between Nordic and Baltic states has increased considerably over the past decade. It is reminiscent of past cycles of closer cooperation such as the solidarity support to the Baltics provided by Nordic states shortly after their independence in the 1990s. However, one of the key findings of the politico-military exercises conducted for the “Baltics: Left of Bang” study informing this paper has been the difficulty of cooperation and coordination among regional partners in the BSR. Fortunately, there are several opportunities for the Nordic states to expand multilateral cooperation that will support total defense efforts, bolster information sharing, and enhance societal resilience to hostile measures and hybrid warfare.

The Euro-Atlantic strategic context is entangled with interdependencies, and since the 1990s, one potential platform for greater regional coordination has been the Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe (E-PINE). While U.S. engagement in the BSR is often through NATO or via bilateral arrangements, E-PINE offers a forum in which the Nordic and Baltic states are able to engage with the United States and each other outside of the NATO and EU architectures—each with their disadvantages and subject to political considerations beyond the BSR that may impede cooperation. In this way, the Nordic-Baltic Eight (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden) and the United States are able to meet at least twice yearly to discuss cooperative security.⁶⁵ This is a format that should be leveraged as it allows the United States to discuss and synchronize on issues of regional security with all Nordic and Baltic partners.

The Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEF)CO framework is an underutilized platform for cooperation on issues of total defense and societal resilience.⁶⁶ Participants in the tabletop exercises often leaned on the NORDEF)CO framework as they sought greater regional coordination. In fact, Nordic defense ministers recently gathered on the island of Gotland in April 2019 under

the NORDEF)CO framework to discuss total defense and regional security.⁶⁷ In their most recent meeting in Stockholm in November 2019, they established a secure communications hotline for direct consultations in crises affecting the region.

NORDEF)CO’s emphasis on linking defense industrial bases and generating efficiencies in procurement offers a tangible way to enhance total defense and societal resilience and should be encouraged and expanded as Nordic states ramp up their defense spending. NORDEF)CO could also be leveraged for greater cooperation with the Baltic states. This would bolster Sweden and Finland as regional leaders, enable greater interoperability among regional forces, and allow for wider training and exercises.⁶⁸ An expanded role for NORDEF)CO could also ameliorate some of the regional deficiencies in intelligence sharing and provide a means for expanded cooperation in the integration of more conventional military assets such as regional air defense systems.⁶⁹

Finally, with robust scientific and technological communities, wealthy economies, and eager defense industrial bases, the Nordic states should invest in and leverage existing technologies that can revolutionize the potency of total defense and societal resilience such as 3D manufacturing, drones, artificial intelligence, robust cyber capabilities, and inexpensive space capabilities.⁷⁰ NORDEF)CO offers a potential framework for the cooperative development, procurement, and deployment of many of these key technologies. The extent to which the Nordic states are able to coordinate and expand the benefits of these technologies with their Baltic partners will only enhance regional resilience and the effectiveness of total defense.

Close regional cooperation through E-PINE and NORDEF)CO are vital given the various regional sensitivities. For instance, while the Ukraine crisis brought Nordic and Baltic security perceptions closer together, Finland has attempted to improve and enhance its defense arrangements in a way that minimizes confrontation with Moscow. The Baltic states, however, have been far more strident in communicating the Russian threat to their NATO and European allies. This discordance runs

the risk that Helsinki may come to view their involvement in wider regional defense as less attractive, resulting in more reluctant or curtailed engagement. E-PINE and NORDEFECO should be leveraged as environments in which an improved cooperative ethic can be cultivated and differing strategic perceptions harmonized.⁷¹

Of course, cooperation and communication among regional allies and partners is not the only lesson of the politico-military exercises. A related finding was the impact of the trust deficit between Russia and the West. Frequently, efforts to build trust or act in good faith during the exercise were undermined or ignored because of the inherent deficit. This represents a significant challenge in managing the potential for crisis or conflict. For Russia, the Nordic states, and the West, the process of growing apart started well before the annexation of Crimea, perhaps as early as 1999 and the war in Kosovo. Relations have worsened consistently throughout NATO enlargement. Despite this, the maintenance of lines of communication is necessary and forums for multilateral security dialogue with Russia are more important than ever.

Security interdependence among BSR nations also extends to the maritime security of the Baltic Sea, which is a mix of flow security concerns and has become one of the most pressing issues. Connections providing critical energy, supply, commercial goods, and communications infrastructure that transit the Baltic Sea are particularly vulnerable to hostile measures and hybrid warfare and require tightly knit regional cooperation to secure. Nordic partners should continue to build on cooperative maritime security efforts by integrating law and enforcement and naval capabilities. This requires greater coordinated maritime domain awareness.⁷² The Sea Surveillance Cooperation Baltic Sea (SUCBAS) program is an important framework for this. Originally launched in 2006 as a Swedish-Finnish undertaking, SUCBAS has enlarged to include all NATO members around the Baltic Sea (Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Germany).⁷³ In 2015, the United Kingdom also joined. Norway however, is still not a member and remains skeptical of its utility, unwilling to pay entry costs, though it

is eager to encourage neighbors to participate in a similar maritime surveillance project, BarentsWatch, with a focus on the High North. It should be a priority to encourage Norway's entry into the SUCBAS arrangement. Improvements to SUCBAS itself could also be made by implementing multilevel information sharing architecture in which the armed forces of NATO members and partners could share classified information over the entire conflict spectrum while providing unclassified situational awareness and insights suitable for their law enforcement agencies.⁷⁴

The Nordic states could also prioritize assisting their Baltic neighbors in building resilience to hostile measures and hybrid warfare by offering assistance in the training of civilians in nonviolent and low-end resistance methods and assistance in the training of police forces and borders guards. Given their long traditions of total defense, the Nordic states are in a position to offer assistance in building the capacity among the Baltic states for whole-of-government coordination. For instance, they may seek to advise the Baltic states on best practices regarding increasing coordination between defense and interior ministries, the armed forces, nongovernmental organizations, and other societal institutions. The Nordic states are also in a position to offer assistance and cooperation on regional cybersecurity and cyber defense.⁷⁵ Despite the fact that each nation has their own traditions and systems codified in law that can make cooperation difficult, some headway has been made. The NORDEFECO Cyber Warfare Collaboration Project that interfaces with the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, in Tallinn, Estonia, is an encouraging, but nascent development.

Within the BSR and among Nordic-Baltic partners, there is also considerable room to expand the joint use of special operations forces. In a gray zone environment, SOF, operating in close coordination with police and intelligence agencies, are crucial to detecting changes in the operational environment and countering adversary infiltration, subversion, and sabotage, as well as galvanizing the populations' will to resist aggression.⁷⁶ However, there are significant hurdles given that each nation's legal ability

to use SOF within its own and/or other's territory differs among all states. SOF has also traditionally been an instrument of external engagement for Nordic and Baltic states, while societal resistance action has been conducted by the home guard units. BSR states will have to reconfigure their use of SOF as another element of societal resilience and total defense at home. One step toward a solution might be to build on the Sweden–Finland cooperation that began in 2015 that includes the use of SOF and perhaps expand it further with regional agreements to include the Baltic states themselves.

Finally, as the Baltic states consider the adoption and implementation of total defense, the Nordic states should amplify their efforts to export resilience in the areas of energy, transportation, and other infrastructure. The framework provided by the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, which emphasizes projects on the low end of the resilience scale, remains a useful initiative and should be amplified.⁷⁷ Furthermore, the promise of Nordic cooperation on energy in the Baltics can be vectored through mechanisms like the EU Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan.⁷⁸ The regional interconnection of Baltic Sea energy grids will go a long way toward ending Baltic state isolation and dependence on the BRELL (Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) ring.⁷⁹

Energy infrastructure projects such as Estlink, connecting Estonia and Finland; Nordbalt, linking Lithuania and Sweden; and others have demonstrated significant progress. Second, Rail Baltica, the largest EU project in the Baltic states, will eventually connect the capitals of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (with additional connections to Helsinki via Tallinn) with European-gauge track. This will allow for a standardized rail link to Nordic allies and partners along a North–South axis. Unfortunately, the project is not expected to be completed until 2025.⁸⁰ The Nordic states should endeavor to accelerate these projects with their Baltic partners and infuse them with good governance to inoculate them against Russian propaganda. The Baltic states, for their part, should aggressively pursue a whole-of-society approach to total defense.

Summary

Although outright territorial aggression by Russia against the Nordic or Baltic states is unlikely at present, building resilience and responding to Russian hostile measures and hybrid warfare is a necessity. Sweden, Finland, and Norway are building on their Cold War traditions of total defense and comprehensive security to defend and deter against a new generation of Russian hostile measures and hybrid warfare. Each has taken a distinct approach, embracing whole-of-society efforts that enhance societal resilience in conjunction with conventional military reforms. The Nordic states are strengthening their ability to engage in territorial defense, better respond to regional crises, and inoculate their societies from malign Russian influence and disinformation. While the Nordic states have a long history of total defense, since the 2014 crisis in Ukraine there is a broad acknowledgment that they must become exporters of resilience in the BSR—working with regional partners to shore up defense and deterrence. While cooperation and coordination have been challenges, there are fertile areas for multilateral engagement between Nordic and Baltic states, expanding the scope of NORDEFECO, leveraging E-PINE, deepening maritime cooperation between naval and law enforcement entities, expanding the scope and use of SOF in the BSR, and amplifying Nordic–Baltic cooperation on energy and rail infrastructure, among others.

What is likely, however, is the persistent employment of hostile measures against the nations of the BSR. While a whole-of-society approach to total defense will do much to shore up resilience, disinformation will be a persistent challenge. For all the maliciousness of Russian disinformation campaigns, their actual impact remains debatable.⁸¹ The European continent has united strongly against Russia. What Western narrative has Russia been able to change after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the proxy war in Ukraine? There seems to be only one: Prior to 2014 Russia was regarded as a potential partner, a nation to be engaged and cooperated with. Now, Russia has become an adversary and even an “enemy.” Russian

information warfare has not been able to change the broad strategic framework or specific Western states' policy perspectives on geopolitical issues such as Ukraine, Syria, and Libya. There is no doubt that Russian disinformation has been harmful and successful at sowing discord, but there is a case to be made that the major strategic narratives have not shifted much in Russia's favor, nor have there been any, as of yet, catastrophic shifts in the Western Alliance attributable to Russian disinformation.⁸² Instead, allies and partners in the BSR are cooperating in ways they have never done before.

Enhancing Nordic-Baltic resilience with a whole-of-society total defense strategy holds the most promise to continuously frustrate Russian interference, and will provide solid resistance to hostile measures, disinformation, and hybrid warfare. Aided by and in close cooperation with their Nordic partners, and as a complement to a larger denial-based deterrence strategy,⁸³ Baltic states' implementation of total defense will signal to Russia that it will pay a significant price for its interference in the region.

Notes

¹ *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, December 2017), 47, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.

² For the purposes of this paper, *deterrence* is the threat intended to discourage an adversary from beginning an undesired action.

³ While *total defense* in this paper is often used as an umbrella for the concepts under discussions, the authors note that total defense and comprehensive security are unique models with differing national characteristics.

⁴ Denmark, another Nordic state, also plays a key geostrategic role as "gatekeeper" to the Baltic Sea, and as a regional partner and ally. However, the role of Denmark is explored in detail in a subsequent Strategic Forum.

⁵ David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, *Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016), available at <www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1253/RAND-RR1253.pdf>.

⁶ Martin Kragh and Sebastian Asberg, "Russia's Strategy for Influence Through Public Diplomacy and Active Measures: The Swedish Case," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 40, no. 6 (2017), 773–816, available at <www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2016.1273830>.

⁷ Franklin D. Kramer and Magnus Nordenman, *A Maritime Framework for the Baltic Sea Region* (Washington, DC: Atlantic Coun-

cil, March 2016), 2–3, available at <www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/issue-briefs/a-maritime-framework-for-the-baltic-sea-region>.

⁸ Piotr Szymanski, Piotr Zochowski, and Witold Rodkiewicz, "Enforced Cooperation: The Finnish-Russian Migration Crisis," Centre for Eastern Studies, April 6, 2016, available at <www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-04-06/enforced-cooperation-finnish-russian-migration-crisis>; Andrew Higgins, "E.U. Suspects Russian Agenda in Migrant's Shifting Arctic Route," *New York Times*, April 2, 2016, available at <www.nytimes.com/2016/04/03/world/europe/formigrants-into-europe-a-road-less-traveled.html>.

⁹ Felix K. Chang, "Sweden's Importance to NATO's Defense of the Baltics," Foreign Policy Research Institute, September 28, 2017, available at <www.fpri.org/2017/09/swedens-importance-natos-defense-baltics/>.

¹⁰ Raphael S. Cohen and Andrew Radin, *Russia's Hostile Measures in Europe: Understanding the Threat* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2019), 5, available at <www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1793.html>.

¹¹ Stephen Kotkin, "Russia's Perpetual Geopolitics: Putin Returns to the Historical Pattern," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2016, available at <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-04-18/russias-perpetual-geopolitics>.

¹² Cohen and Radin, *Russia's Hostile Measures in Europe*, 8.

¹³ Russian President Dmitry Medvedev explained, "The world should be multipolar. Unipolarity is unacceptable; domination is impermissible. We cannot accept a world order in which all decisions are taken by one country, even such a serious and authoritative country as the United States of America. This kind of world is unstable and fraught with conflict. Russia, just like other countries in the world, has regions where it has its privileged interests. In these regions, there are countries with which we have traditionally had friendly and cordial relations, historically special relations. We will work very attentively in these regions and develop these friendly relations with these states, with our close neighbors." See Paul Reynolds, "New Russian World Order, The Five Principles," BBC News, September 1, 2008, available at <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7591610.stm>>.

¹⁴ Sergey Lavrov, "Russia's Foreign Policy: Historical Background," *Russia in Global Affairs*, March 3, 2016, via Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Web site, available at <www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2124391>.

¹⁵ Arne Olav Brundtland, "The Nordic Balance: Past and Present," *Cooperation and Conflict* 1, no. 4 (1966), 30–63.

¹⁶ Many have also used *gray zone* operations as the term of art for the desire of certain powers to stay under the threshold of triggering a military response. Gray zone operations are "best understood as activity that is coercive and aggressive in nature, but that is deliberately designed to remain below the threshold of conventional military conflict and open interstate war." See Hal Brands, "Paradoxes of the Gray Zone," Foreign Policy Research Institute, February 5, 2016, available at <www.fpri.org/article/2016/02/paradoxes-gray-zone/>. See also Antulio J. Echevarria II, *Operating in the Gray Zone: An Alternative Paradigm for U.S. Military Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, April 2016); Michael J. Mazarr, *Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, December 2015).

¹⁷ Edward Lucas, "Russia's Influence Arsenal: Watch Out, This Is What China Is Learning from Russia," Center for European Policy Analysis, May 28, 2019.

¹⁸ Cohen and Radin, *Russia's Hostile Measures in Europe*, 13.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 1.

²⁰ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 358–359.

²¹ Stephen J. Flanagan et al., *Deterring Russian Aggression in the Baltic States Through Resilience and Resistance* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2019), 6, available at <www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2779.html>.

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²³ The North Atlantic Treaty specifically states, “In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” See The North Atlantic Treaty, Article 3, April 4, 1949, Washington, DC, available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm>; See also North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), “Resilience and Article 3,” June 25, 2018, available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm?selectedLocale=en>.

²⁴ NATO, “Commitment to Enhance Resilience,” Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, July 8–9, 2016, available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133180.htm>.

²⁵ Christina Anderson, “Sweden Mourns Stockholm Attack Victims; Suspect Is Formally Identified,” *New York Times*, April 10, 2017, available at <www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/world/europe/sweden-terror-attack.html>.

²⁶ Laura Smith-Spark, Rory Smith, and Gianluca Mezzofiore, “Evacuations Ordered in Sweden as Fires Rage as Far North as Arctic Circle,” CNN, July 24, 2018, available at <www.cnn.com/2018/07/19/europe/sweden-forest-fires-wxc-intl/index.html>.

²⁷ *The Swedish Defence Bill 2016–2020* (Stockholm: Government Offices of Sweden, May 8, 2015), available at <www.government.se/government-policy/defence/the-swedish-defence-bill-2016-2020/>; See also *Sweden's Defence Policy 2016 to 2020* (Stockholm: Government Offices of Sweden, June 1, 2015), available at <www.government.se/49c007/globalassets/government/dokument/forsvarsdepartementet/sweden_defence_policy_2016_to_2020>.

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²⁹ *National Security Strategy* (Stockholm: Government Offices of Sweden, October 23, 2017), 6, available at <www.government.se/4aa5de/contentassets/0e04164d7eed462aa511ab03c890372e/national-security-strategy.pdf>.

³⁰ “Stärkt krisberedskap—för säkerhets skull [Strengthened Emergency Preparedness for Safety],” Prop 2007/08:92, Stockholm, April 2, 2015, available at <www.regeringen.se/rattsliga-dokument/proposition/2008/03/prop.-20070892/>.

³¹ For Swiss tactical methods, see Major H. von Dach, *Total Resistance: Swiss Army Guide to Guerrilla Warfare and Underground Operations* (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1965). To quote from the prologue, “We believe it is better to resist until the last. We believe that every

Swiss woman or man must resist. We believe that the enemy cannot be allowed to feel at ease for even one minute in conquered territory. We believe that we have to inflict damage upon him, fight him wherever and whenever we have the opportunity!”

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⁴⁶ Jed Willard, director of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Center for Global Engagement at Harvard, quoted in Reid Standish, “Why Is Finland Able to Fend Off Putin’s Information War?” *Foreign Policy*, March 1, 2017, available at <<https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/01/why-is-finland-able-to-fend-off-putins-information-war/>>.

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⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Norwegian Minister of Defense Ine Eriksen Søreide, quoted in Rune Thomas Ege, "Tydelig beskjed til Russland [Clear Message to Russia]," *Verdens Gang*, November 19, 2014.

⁵⁸ *Unified Effort* (Oslo: Ministry of Defence, Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, 2015), 57.

⁵⁹ Envoy Christian Günther, quoted in Wilhelm Carlgren, *Mellan Hitler och Stalin: Förslag och försök till försvars- och utrikespolitisk samverkan mellan Sverige och Finland under krigsåren* [Between Hitler and Stalin: Proposals for Military and Foreign Policy Cooperation between Sweden and Finland during the War] (Stockholm: Militärhistoriska förlaget, 1981), 12.

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⁶³ Stephen J. Flanagan et al., *Detering Russian Aggression in the Baltic States Through Resilience and Resistance*, 26.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 26.

⁶⁵ Also known as the NB8+1 (Norway, Estonia, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Sweden, plus the United States). See Christopher S. Chivvis et al., *NATO's Northeastern Flank*, 191.

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