Indo-Chinese Relations & Border Issues in Northeast India: A View from India

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Dr. Thomas F. Lynch III  
(Dr. Lynch): Good morning and welcome to you all.  
Today in addition to the hot weather outside, it’s actually a hot agenda here at the National Defense University both in terms of activities as well as for those that work in the wider intellectual community thinking of issues that we are going to discuss today. I thank you all for being here in a timely fashion and make early apologies for those who will be arriving perhaps a little bit late --- principally from the other side of the river, the Defense Department and the wider Pentagon who will join in as we continue. But I’m delighted to have each of you here today and delighted to be sitting next to our guest speaker. 

Dr. Goswami and I have been in e-mail correspondence now for well over two years, both here at the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) and earlier at her location in the New Delhi Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA). We have been trying to find a way to get her seconded here at the NDU in a temporary duty status or get her here to speak to us about the subject of her important research. So we are delighted to have you here in the latter capacity and we are also appreciative of USIP for finding a way to bring you aboard and here to the United States. 

As you can see from the program notes in your seats, Dr. Goswami is an Indian strategic analyst and represents a couple of elements that I think are unique and important. First, she is a non-military person who is working in the private sector thinking about defense issues and is a younger non-military person in the private sector thinking about these issues in India, which I found in my studies and research in India and South Asia is a new and welcome emerging trend. Indeed, one of my favorite India experts and mentors, Stephen Cohen, of the Brookings Institution has been wont to say that in India strategic policy is driven by civilians but there are few civilian strategic thinkers in India. I think that Dr. Goswami represents a break with that tradition from that past. The second and most important issue perhaps for us here today is that Dr. Goswami brings an intimate knowledge of an area of interface between the two countries in the world that are rising the fastest, that have the greatest growing GDP and the greatest activity in the exchange and interaction of any two joint powers: China and India. And she brings a research perspective as well as an on the ground perspective about one of the areas of their interface and exchange that has well over half century of history. That Indo-Chinese history is poorly understood by many in India itself. But more importantly, the history of North-East India is understood at no level of detail by those of us in the West. And yet there is an important history, an important set of relationships and interactions that tie and tether across the Indo-Chinese borders -- those defined and accepted and those that are not. These matters also engage the unique and cross-cutting socio-cultural ties to the indigenous people of North-East India. 

Therefore, it is my distinct pleasure to welcome Dr. Goswami, who has both a research background and personal history that tie her to North-East India. She will talk to us now about things she’s both written about in the past and things she’s writing right now at USIP which she will be publishing soon. We here at NDU look forward to her forthcoming publications. 

With that set up, I would like to thank you each again for being here today and I welcome you, Namrata, to our stage where we will bring up your presentation slides in just a second. 

Thank you.
Dr. Namrata Goswami

(Dr. Goswami): Thank you Tom. That’s a very, very delightful way to welcome me. I feel very privileged. And secondly, I would like to thank the United States Institute of Peace for funding my research here for a year. So before the power point comes in, what I’m going to talk about here today is on the China-India border issue. What I bring to the table is a view that also comes from the area itself and that is North-East India. Now why do I say that? Because most of my research work in India is based on that area. I work on the armed conflicts in the North-East and also on the impact of that on the border regions. And I also look at the border issue from the local perspective, but secondly also from the perspective of history which was one of the reasons why China claims the area and one of the reasons for the conflict to escalate in the 60’s and to escalate again recently in terms of rhetorical posturing.

Let me introduce the North-East here to you. So if you look at the map here - this is the map of India - what I have identified here are the areas that are affected by armed conflicts. And if you look at the North-East - that is the area over there, and this is the area that borders China, Burma, Bhutan and Bangladesh. And that area, as you see here, has been affected by armed conflicts since 1918 and has escalated since the 1950’s and continues to be affected by armed conflict till today. In fact some of you might have read about this, today the number of armed groups in the North-East are about 72. So 72 different armed conflicts are ongoing, and in the areas that China claims there are two groups that dominate in two of the districts and that is the NSCN-IM (National Socialist Council of Nagalim-Isak-Muivah) and the Naga Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang.

Ethnic profile of the India-China-Myanmar Trans-borders:

Now I want to explain to you about the different tribes and communities that live in this area, so if you look at this (the projected) map the cultural diversity, you see that is immense. So if you see the border there are inter-ethnic linkages across the border. And this is extremely important to understand when you look at the China-India border from the perspective of the North-East, even if not so much from Delhi. And this perspective is actually becoming important now in terms of resolving the Sino-Indian border conflict itself.

Now you see the Tani (ethnic) group that has inter-ethnic linkages with the Tibetan community, the Mishmis, the Membas, the Monpas and also with Burma. So you see the inter-ethnic linkages with Burma and then you see the importance of Tibet to this whole area. So this whole area has Indo-Tibetan and Indo-Burmese influences which are very strong. The dialects that people speak are Tibeto-Burman - it is different from the rest of India. They don’t speak Hindi as their mother tongue; my dialect itself is traced to the Sanskrit language but also has strong Tibetan influences, Tibetan-Burman influences. So that is a very important perspective to keep in mind. The groups that have armed conflicts are the Nagas, the Kuki-Chins, Meites in India, the Shans, the Kachins, and the Karens in Burma. The Tani group is largely peaceful while the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) s have some conflict in Assam, which is the state I come from; and they are two important power groups and they are transnational. So I bring this in to give you a larger perspective of where the India-China border issue is located and how most of these conflicts are not limited to a national
territory they are actually transnational in nature. So since the United States is opening up to Burma it is extremely important to also understand its very strong ethnic linkages to the North-East (of India) and so that area becomes very important in understanding the consequences for these ethnic groups from the opening up and the influence of China in this region and also Tibet.

**Disputed Border and Territorial Claims:**

![Map of North-East India](image)

So this (pointing to map) is Indian territory; this is Arunachal Pradesh, Assam and then you have Nagaland. But China is arguing that this entire area has historically belonged to them and that the border now should come here (subsuming all of Arunachal Pradesh and some of northeast Assam). So the traditional boundary line is here for China and that is the main bone of contention in the North-East.

Now why this contention and discrepancy of understanding of the border itself? One, as I’ve explained to you, China has historically had relations with Tibet as you know and Tibet has also had relations with India. But of course Tibet was de facto independent for a long time. But when I read the documents, archival research on British India, the main desire of the British was to maintain Tibet as a buffer because of the fear of first of all Russia, and also China. So the argument given by the British officers at that time was that it will be useful to keep Tibet as a buffer because they had a big presence in Assam and North-East India. And they wanted to have that buffer to make sure that Chinese troops would not come to the border because of their interests in Tibet or the Russians coming in.

Now at that time the foreign secretary for British India – (Sir Henry) McMahon – had a convention in Shimla. You would be knowing about that, in 1913-14. Now in the convention there were documents which are all available and are actually published; the main contention was that Tibet is one of the signatories of the McMahon Line and Chinese representative was also there. Now the Tibet representative, Lonchen Shatra, was extremely charismatic and was able to argue for Tibet’s autonomy and independence and signed on to the document in recognition that British India would ensure that China recognizes Tibetan independence. But of course, as you know, the British recognized Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, and not complete sovereignty. And so later when India became independent, the Indian government’s argument was that the MC Mahon line has been established, it has been accepted by China and Tibet and so this is the line which is the legal line. The Chinese argument, when I look at their documents – because they have released their documents, the archival documents have been released just last year – so their argument is that McMahon line was not agreed to by the Chinese representative in 1914 and not ratified by the nationalist or communist governments (after 1949). And that continues till today. And so when I look at it from the Chinese perspective, it actually has an emotional resonance with their conception of unequal treaties. So they argue that this particular line was actually negotiated at that time when ‘we’ were going through our century of humiliation and so to impose a treaty that they see as unequal brings back those memories.
Now the other thing which is extremely significant from the perspective that I look at it is that for China, Arunachal Pradesh is not the name that they recognize, they recognize it as Southern Tibet. Their argument is that historically Arunachal Pradesh, especially the Tawang area which I will talk to you about a bit later, was a part of Southern Tibet. So if you look at their documents they actually name it Zangnam and not Arunachal Pradesh. And for the Tibetans whom I talk to quite often in Dharamshala, in India, and even here, they will see it as Loyul or Monyul, especially the Arunachal Pradesh area. So they also have a conception of that being a part of Tibet. Now that is creating a lot of the dissension today.

Now the Indian argument is of course legalistic, so India argues that British India had decided on this so we follow the British deferential line. And also India’s argument is that if you look at the map that I showed you, from a security point of view if the Chinese border line comes here, our entire North-Eastern area as you know the defensive mechanism provided by the mountains gets compromised. So that from the strategic point of view is absolutely impossible to think of. The second argument is that the local people of this area do not see themselves as part of Tibet, because if you remember the map I showed you of ethnic diversity, the only groups that recognize or see themselves connected to Tibet is the Mompa and Memba, and not the Tani. There are 32 different tribes and ethnic communities in Arunachal Pradesh itself, out of which only 2 see themselves as part of Tibet or connected to Tibet. And that’s mostly the Tawang tribe. And so I would argue later that Tawang actually is the bone of contention. The other areas of course because of conception of Tibet, because it is part of Tibet historically; but Tawang would remain a bone of contention and be a big issue at the negotiations that are going on now. Now the other thing that is extremely important from the point of view of the disputed territory is the historical dimension.
Now this is the state that I am talking about, and Tawang is here (see red on map). This is the area that is most contentious and I will explain to you later why it is so contentious. And this is the entire area that China claims; in fact China even claims areas in the state that I come from, that is Assam. So that is 90,000 square kms (35,000 square miles) of territory, Arunachal is 83,743 square kms (32,333 sq miles). The rest is here, right up to the Brahmaputra (River).

**Chinese Regime Security and Nationalism:**

Now I’ll just explain all the factors that are listed here. I’ve explained to you the disputed border and the territorial claim; now if I talk to you a bit about the historical dimension which is extremely important to understand if you want to have a deeper understanding of why this conflict has continued for so many years.

First, the negotiations between Nehru and Mao are extremely significant. So Nehru’s argument was that these areas, especially Arunachal Pradesh, was administered by British India and was given to India by the British as a conception of India. The local people there, especially the ethnic communities argue that they want to be part of India and not China and they have to respect that. The Mao point of view is that from his conception of Tibet, Tibet has historically
been part of China. So (for Mao) this argument of Nehru is null and void. You could see at a very leadership level there were these differences. Now the second thing which – actually if you look at it from the Chinese negotiation posture -- the Chinese main fear was that India had some kind of expansionist desire over Tibet. And this desire is making Nehru so strong and rigid in the negotiation posture, if you look at the Chinese documents. But what is so interesting for me as a researcher is that in 1960, between 1959 and 1960..... in fact in 1954 before I go to 1960, India gave up its special privileges on Tibet and recognized Tibet as part of China. Now if you look at Nehru’s letters and documents about why he did that, his argument to the Indian Parliament and the people who critiqued him is that he wanted to reassure China that India did not have expansionist designs on Tibet. And so he kind of gave up those special privileges that the British gave India, in terms of trading rights and having representation in Tibet. He gave all that up in 1954.

But what happened in 1954 is another issue that created tension. That is when India printed a map that showed the McMahon line as the legal border, (something) which China was contesting and in Aksai Chin -- the entire Aksai Chin area -- which China had occupied by then but which India conceptualized as its own territory. The 1954 map showed that area in India. And Nehru kind of demanded from the Chinese to go away from that area. And that created extreme tensions between both the countries. But what is fascinating to me when I am looking at the documents, looking at the letters, and looking at the different discourses, even (Chinese Premier) Zhou En-Lai’s discussions with (Nikita) Khrushchev, the Soviet President, who asked China why it was escalating the conflict with India? So Zhou basically offered India a swap deal as we all know, and the swap deal was that if India recognizes Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin then China would recognize India’s administrative presence in Arunachal Pradesh. And this is the kind of swap deal that they offered. It was refused and rejected by Nehru because Nehru’s argument was that first of all China came and occupied Indian territory and then giving a swap deal appeared spurious to him. Because he argued that you come in, take my territory, and then want to swap that territory in lieu of territory that we already have? So that was his point of view at that time.

Now then what happened, there was a “Forward Policy” in 1961 which as a researcher when I look at different documents, public statements or discourses, that created extreme anxiety within China, especially with Mao. So Mao felt that when Nehru activated the Forward Policy (beginning in) 1961, you find documents of that in Mr. Malik’s book, who was the (Indian) intelligence chief then. (His) book is called, My Years with Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal. So Nehru argued that since these areas belong to us we should have forward posts which will identify Indian territory. In the Aksai Chin area China was already present, so when the Forward Policy started getting activated, if you look at the discourse in China on that, Mao felt that this was Nehru’s way of saying that we are going to forward our hold on territory which China recognizes as Tibetan, and this also shows Nehru’s desire to expand Indian influence in Tibet. And then just before the war the (former) PLA General, and then-Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi - if I’m pronouncing the name right – he actually met (Indian Defense Minister) Krishna Menon in Geneva (during a July 1962 international conference on Laos) and offered to negotiate again, and the basis of the negotiation was the McMahon line. But of course India argued that historically this is already Indian so why should we negotiate with you? So that also created tension and led to the war in 1962.
Now the war of 1962 is extremely important from the Indian point of view because first of all India saw Chinese occupation of Aksai China as aggression. The Chinese do not see it that way because they thought it was Chinese territory. Now that is extremely important from the India perspective. Secondly, India felt that – and that is what I as a person who reads Indian strategic thinking – if you look at what Nehru discusses at that time, he never believed that China would attack India. He never thought that China would escalate the conflict; he always thought that China would value India’s friendship. Because his argument was that India has recognized Tibet as part of China so why would China escalate the conflict with India and actually lose a friend? So we could have a cooperative understanding that Tibet would be autonomous, not independent. And if you look at documents from that time, I could make the case that Nehru actually did not have expansionist desire. Because first of all when the Tibetan government in exile, the Dalai Lama escaped from Tibet to China and wanted to take the case to the UN, Nehru did not let that happen. If Nehru had some expansionist desire and wanted to support Tibetan independence, he would have supported them. The second thing is that Nehru supported Chinese inclusion in the UN Security Council at that time. So you could see the fine tune balancing here. Because Nehru was very important in the making of foreign policy at the time, it is very important to understand that he was sentimentally involved with enabling Tibet to be autonomous. And what he meant by autonomy is the cultural and ideational understanding of Tibet as a culture. That did not mean that he had great romanticism about Tibetan cultural values, he was an agnostic himself, but he had some kind of faith that Tibet as a culture has many things connected to India and has historically been such an important relationship that we need to support it. And he felt guilty about not being able to support Tibet in some kind of military way. Now this is why the second point is extremely important to understand the contemporary discourse on the Chinese claim on Arunachal Pradesh.

**Tibet as the Core Issue:**

Now let us look at Tibet; why is Tibet the core issue? As I explained to you, for China they viewed Tibet as part of China and conceptualized the invasion of Tibet as the liberation of Tibet. And they saw Nehru’s talks about enabling Tibetan autonomy as a hindrance to their liberation as they conceptualized it. Now the second thing which is extremely important is the maps. The maps that India printed, the maps where India showed Aksai Chin as part of their territory, created dissension at that time. The other thing that is fascinating is the activities of the Dalai Lama’s brother in a place called Kalimpong. So the Dalai Lama’s brother, Mr. Gyalo Thondup, had actually taken part in enabling the resistance in Tibet at that time. And that had extreme geopolitical impact. Because in the area where I also come from there were huge demonstrations for Tibet’s independence. This China saw because it was right at the border. The other thing is, and I am sure that you will be knowing this, is that Mr. Thondup was contacted by the CIA in 1957. And it is documented that from 1957 onwards the CIA actually supported the Tibetan resistance. And I have talked to people who have taken part in the resistance in Dharamshala and they have very concrete evidence that there was this kind of connection. But of course if you look at the operation of the United States it was also within the larger Cold War dynamics - the fear of communism spreading into Tibet and the desire to counter it. And what is very significant to understand is that if you look at the documents it is not very clear that Nehru was against (CIA assistance to the Tibetan revolutions) or if Nehru really knew it, because the larger understanding of cooperation was missing to fight for Tibetan resistance. Nehru refused to cooperate with the
United States to support the Tibetan resistance. But he kind of tolerated this (covert) activity because he thought that it would lead to Tibetan autonomy. The Chinese saw it as a containment strategy, and which they also do today if you look at the discourses of Indo-U.S. relationship. They felt that there was some kind of containment strategy that India was supporting and Nehru to Mao was this bourgeoisie and expansionist with a dark psychology who wanted to undermine China as a leader in Asia. And these discourses are written, and if you remember those articles got published in the *People’s Daily* and other newspapers.

Now another thing which created dissension when Tibet got connected to the border issue was that around 1963, after the war when India was extremely and badly defeated and had to leave the North-East, I remember my grandfather telling me that Nehru had actually spoken to All India Radio that my heart goes out to Assam because the Chinese were coming down. So the discourse in the North-East is that we were given up by India, and this is a tension that exists even today on the China issue and the border tension that keeps getting escalated. So in 1963 another thing that happened is that there was a Special Task Force that was code named 22 -- which was formed, supported and trained in India. Not much is known about it, but it was basically Tibetan men who had been sent back to resist within Tibet. And this also the Chinese knew and it created dissension and misunderstanding about what the Indian intentions were.

The other thing that created tension and led to the understanding in China that Tibet is what India wants is the giving of asylum to the Dalai Lama in 1959. So when the Dalai Lama came to India, India not only gave him asylum but also allowed the Tibetan government in exile to be formed. Now that created dissension within China, so the Chinese understanding was that why would India do that? Because they did not understand that Nehru’s desire was to basically ensure autonomy of Tibetan culture and their ability to follow the Tibetan way of life because at that time the Chinese were atheist and were not allowing them to carry out their cultural practices. The other argument is of course that Tibetan autonomy is good for India from a strategic point of view; if I look at it from the point of view of Indian strategy is that if Tibet remains autonomous then there will be limited Chinese military presence in Tibet, and that was comfortable for India. So from the strategic point of view there was this great desire for Tibetan autonomy.

Now the impact of the border today is actually traced historically; so what is fascinating is that China again offered India a swap deal in 1980 when Deng (Xiaoping) was in power. But India again rejected it, because they would argue that Aksai Chin is their territory and why should we have a swap deal with you on our own territory? So this was the India argument. And then from 1985 the border conflict from the East started escalating because then China became rigid and said that we are not only claiming Tawang, but we are claiming the whole of Arunachal Pradesh as Chinese territory. And that is the tipping of the conflict. And then what India did was that it enabled the Dalai Lama to travel abroad to showcase the Tibetan cause. Before that he was travelling abroad, but he was not projecting the Tibetan cause or what the status of Tibet was before that. But in 1987 onwards he started travelling abroad for the cause of Tibet and his first stop was Washington D.C. where he gave a speech to the US Congressional Human Right Caucus in which he identified a “Five Point Peace Plan” for Tibet; 1987 also witnessed the first pro-independence protests in Lhasa after 1959. The Chinese saw that as an Indian enabling of the Dalai Lama coming out to and being able to project China as the aggressor and Tibet to be independent. And so that led to the incident in Samdorong Chu in the Tawang area. There was an
escalation of conflict that nearly led to war again but got de-escalated. So these are connections I make.

Now coming to why Tibet is such a core issue in terms of Arunachal Pradesh, I have explained that to you. Why it is a core issue? Because the Chinese see Arunachal Pradesh as Southern Tibet, they don’t see it as Arunachal Pradesh. Their argument is that within Tibet there is a discourse that sees the Tawang monastery where the Sixth Dalai Lama was born as extremely important for Tibetan religious discourse, so we have a duty to our people. The other argument that I would make is that they were willing to negotiate that as you see so why is that they have come back? I’ll explain that to you in my section about negotiations, about why I think that they continue to escalate that and have not resolved that border.

Militarization of the Border:

Now the other important, very significant thing that is happening based on the historical difference and the impact that it has on the North-East is the escalation in military posture in the border. Now before I explain that I’ll just show you a map.

So this is a map that I had made with the help of my institute in India, IDSA. The sources are open, and some of the sources are based on my interviews with military officers in the North-East.
So what is extremely visible now is the fact that border has got extremely militarized. This was not happening before say 2005 or 2004, military presence was there but it wasn’t on a higher scale. But today there is a huge political pressure, for instance if you see the Indian defense minister’s speech to the army commander core conference, he actually cautioned the army core commanders that the biggest threat to Indian security is China, and Pakistan comes next. So we need to focus on our strategic thinking, our alternative scenarios on China. So there was this caution, and then the army also made a presentation in the South Block explaining what their military posture is. The army chief just two days back reassured the people of India that the Indian army will not suffer a 1962 defeat. So you can see that this psychosis is extremely strong. The influence or pressure is coming from first of all the discourse that China is escalating its posture on the border, claiming Arunachal Pradesh in strong diplomatic terms, showing Arunachal Pradesh as their territory in their passport. If you know that their passport has a map now that shows Arunachal Pradesh as part of China along with the South China Sea islands, Taiwan and also the East China Sea islands. So this is the first time it is happening since last year, so there is an escalation in diplomatic posturing, or testing India or the countries around it. And this is very much noticed, and it is also important that the Indian political discourse or Indian politicians are down-scaling the conflict saying that this is their opinion and we will deal with it through negotiations. But public pressure is immense because the ’62 memory is extremely strong. Public memory argues that before 1962, in 1959-60 the public opinion and
newspapers kept warning Nehru that China would attack India, but Nehru did not act on it. So even today we see the same kind of discourses. So there is this strong hawkish mentality which is very noticeable in Indian public opinion. While there (are) counters to that, it is still important.

**The Balance of Military Forces:**

But in terms of balance of military forces let me give you a few numbers so that you understand why I bring this to the fore.

For India, based on the data I have, there are around 120,000 troops at the border. Not exactly at the LAC but at different military bases there. Because the understanding between India and China is that they will not have strike forces at the border, they will only have border police. The border itself is guarded by the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and on the Chinese side by the Frontier Guards. But they do have the strike corps below, the mountain divisions. In fact if you look at the Indian planning, that is why there was so much misunderstanding between India and the US with regard to the MMRCA (medium multi-role combat fighter aircraft). Where India went and signed a deal with France for the Rafael. But what is interesting is that in the next decade or so India plans to invest $100 billion on its military modernization. Which is an extremely high number; if you understand India - the poverty levels, the different development programs – this is an extremely high expenditure curve that we are seeing as Indian citizens and which we haven’t seen before. And who’s the threat? Obviously Pakistan is not the threat, but somebody else who is creating some kind of fear.

The other thing noticeable is that for the PLA there are around 300,000 troops in Tibet, and which is higher than the Indian scale. And according to Indian army estimates they are able to move around 40,000 troops to the LAC within a period of 15 days from their earlier capability of 90 days because of better roads and better railway infrastructure. And this has been noticed by India. The other thing that is significant from the Indian strategic perspective is that they (China) also have forces called the Rapid Reaction Forces, so they have their 6th Divisions in Chengdu. And according to some of the former army chiefs like General V.K. Malik, the (Chinese) Rapid Reaction Forces are capable of reaching the Indian borders within 48 hours, whereas from the Indian side it would take around three to four days. So there is this asymmetry of balance in terms of military forces.

The other important and significant thing that has happened at the border – this I got at the FAS (Federation of Atomic Scientist) website and I think the scientist did a great job, he used Google Maps and located the different missile bases. And this has been corroborated by Indian evidence too. So the significant fact is that there are missile bases and the missile that India is worried about is the DF-21, which is a (Chinese) MRBM. It has a range of 2,150 km and it is in Delingha. And from Delingha, Delhi is 2000 km. So it is within range. The other missile which according to the U.S. DOD document on Chinese military developments from a year ago argues that China has deployed the DF-31A in Tibet. And so that’s what the Indians are looking at with concern about why would they have this kind of escalation and who is the threat? It could be India or it could be Russia, because these are all in the possible targeting zone. I mean North-East India is absolutely right there at the border, but there are cities that could be targeted. Now the other important thing is that most of these missiles – based on what I understand – can be
launched from a 15 meter diameter pad. So they don’t need these huge pads to be launched, And
to kind of zero in from a public knowledge base is extremely difficult, because they are so small.
I am sure there are satellites which could see, but if you look at just the available pictures it is
very difficult to locate them. And so that’s another concern.

Now another thing which is of concern from the Indian side for citizens who come into this area
is that there has been Indian deployment too in terms of missiles. There is the Brahmos which
has been deployed in 2011. It is a very limited capability – 290 km. but it has been deployed.
You know it is fascinating, because it has never happened before but it is starting to happen now.
It is known around the world now that this militarization is escalating to the point that there
could be tensions at the border. Now the other important thing from the Indian side is that there
are the Sukhoi-MKIs which are deployed at the different bases in the Eastern sector and what is
more significant is that we have more air force bases in Tezpur, Chabua, I mean you would know
about that, but what’s significant is that a year or two back the Panagarh base has also been
developed. And that was the base that was used by the U.S. military to fly their planes during
WW2 to China. Now that base is upgraded. So you can see the geopolitical significance of that
development, because that base was not upgraded before and the Sukhoi-MKIs are there and in
Chabua air base. There are about 4 squadrons, with 16 to 18 planes per squadron. Now as I told
you there are two new mountain infantry divisions with nearly 35,000 soldiers which will be
deployed in the next two to three years. And the targeted amount is 100,000 soldiers. It is
fascinating because all this has been noticed by the (Chinese) People’s Daily. If you look at this
article which was on the People’s Daily online – India’s troop surge aimed at rising China – and
that was written by a Colonel in the PLA. And so you can see that they have this argument that
this is basically targeted at China.

Now just to give you another significant development which has happened in the last three to
four years is the rise in military exercises at the border. And this actually contradicts the
agreements that China and India have been good at maintaining peace at the border areas. In the
last year, in 2012, China had an exercise right at the border where they had the J-10s (airplanes)
with laser guided munitions exercising and what is significant for China watchers in the defense
department in India was that this was the first time China had an exercise not just during the day,
but also in the night and sub-zero temperatures; this had not been done before. And the other
thing that was noticed was that the PLA had kept the J-10 jets deployed at Gonggar-Lhasa
Airport throughout the winter of 2012. In response the Indian military also conducted an exercise
called Parlay which means destruction. It included the Sukhois, Special Forces and it was done
when the Chinese Foreign Minister, Yang Che Chi was in India in March 2012.

Now this kind of strategic discourse or incidents was not possible in the last four or five years,
but it is becoming possible now – that you also showcase your military muscle; which is a
deviation from India’s long term strategic thinking of upgrading from a dialogue driven non-
vioent posture. And which is a big discourse in D.C., the entire concept of non-alignment and
India’s Nehruvian policy of non-alignment. This actually shows that India’s strategic thinking is
bending towards realist discourse, and that is the showcasing of military power to show a
defensive ability to deter (China).

Infrastructure Development:
In terms of infrastructure development actually on the Chinese side there is extremely high developments of airports; Gonggar-Lhasa, the main military airport, the Pangtha, the Lingchi, the Oping, the Yengthri airport, they have all been upgraded. But on the Indian side they have also upgraded their airports in Mechuka – I have been to Mechuka last year and seen the upgrade – Panagarh, and also Tezpur. Menchuka is actually the area where the Chinese had come in 1962 and completely overrun the Indian Army. So now when you go there is a huge Indian Army contingent. The Maratha Light Infantry regiment is there and then you have the border. I’ll show you pictures in a few minutes about that.

**Indo-US Relations:**

Now in terms of the concept of Indo-U.S. relations and this I see as deeply connected to the escalation in Chinese border posturing since 2005. Now why would I argue that? If you look at the Chinese discourses, their main question is why is the U.S. getting so close to India? They wanted an explanation. So we argue that of course it is the value driven democracies, but they wouldn’t believe it. Because they would argue that why would you? I mean you have joined hands with Vietnam, you have joined hands with Japan, South Korea and Australia in the last five years; signed defense deals. Why would you do all that? Why would you have a trilateral dialogue between India-U.S.-Japan for the first time? It has never happened before. So there is this kind of discourse. According to my discussions with Chinese scholars, the relations between the U.S. and India started getting better during the Bush administration when the nuclear deal was signed. It became better. There is a strategic partnership towards an end goal. India became a de-facto nuclear state, recognized. The other issues are the next step in strategic partnership, defensive cooperation framework. So they (China) ask why India is escalating its relations with the U.S. when historically it has been non-aligned? There is also a Chinese discourse, which is important to know, that India would have its own foreign policy, would not be influenced by the U.S. in terms of its posturing and the U.S. itself would not want any conflict with China. So that source of discourse also exists. But this discourse also sees the relationship from that particular prism, and what is interesting is that comes from a think tank called China Institute of International Studies which is extremely influential as you know is part of the Chinese government. The Academy of Military Sciences, I am told, (and) has the biggest influence on the PLA and also thinks this way about India’s relationship and is worried about India’s posturing.

**Local Perceptions Regarding Border Conflict:**

Now what are local perceptions about this claim? So what about the perception from the area I come from? What would they think about the Chinese claim?

One, most of the discourses in Arunachal Pradesh which is the disputed territory is that historically they have no connections with China. They have connections with Tibet and they see Tibet as being illegally occupied by China. So that’s the main discourse. They argue that Tibet has never been historically a province of China, we have deep connections with the Lhasa monastery and have deep reverence for the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama. And for China to argue that we are part of China is extremely historically biased. It’s not based on any historical understanding.
The other thing that the local people argue, especially in interviews across Arunachal when I was there in March and April of last year -- and I go there very often and do consult with the Arunachal government too -- so the main bone of contention is that they are extremely worried about what China is doing in Tibet in terms of the Han populations coming in. And which they hear, these are perceptions right, you can’t ever be saying that this is exactly what is happening. But the argument is that within India we have our own autonomous rights, we have preserved our culture, Arunachal is the only state in North-East India besides Tripura, Meghalaya and Mizoram that does not have armed conflict. They have never stood in armed conflict against the Indian state, whereas Nagaland, Manipur, and Assam ha(ve). They have armed conflicts asking for secession. So their argument is that we hope that India doesn’t leave us like they did in 1962 and left us to the Chinese. And it was the Chinese that decided to go back unilaterally. So that is the fear. And they say, their argument is that, especially the defense and home minister of Arunachal Pradesh say that China wouldn’t do that now. Because at that time the supply lines were not very good, the infrastructure was not very good, if the monsoon passes were cut off then China would not have been able to sustain itself; but now it can. Because it has developed capabilities, and so this discourse is very strong.

Now the other discourse which is very strong from the local perspective is the river diversion issue. Now this is a very significant issue in the North East. Their argument is that the river Brahmaputra comes from Tibet, the Yarlung Tsangpo is the main river. Their perception is that there is a Chinese plan to divert the river. Now when I look at it from a scientific perspective or if I consult my friends in the agricultural university in Assam, their argument is that this is absolutely impossible. Because it is a 2000 meter drop, the terrain is difficult and you would need a major explosion to break the mountain and it would be seen from satellites. And also the Chinese dams which have been built in the upper reaches of the river, the Indian Ministry of Water Resources have reassured us that they are run of the river dams and not storage dams. But as you know, perceptions are perceptions, and these perceptions create conflict. And so the perception in the North-East is that the Indian government isn’t capable of fighting the Chinese and so they are giving us these fake assurances; but our water levels are going down, the Siang River in Arunachal is going dry and this is all because of what is happening up there. So the perceptions are extremely strong and this creates pressure in Delhi, because there is a lot of questioning. In fact, just five days back there was questioning in Delhi about the water diversions and what is India doing about it. And I will tell you what that pressure did; it made Prime Minister Manmohan Singh talk to Chinese President Xi Jinping in Durban and request a joint water commission. So you can see the pressure working at the Prime ministerial level and it is very significant coming from the North-East of India.

Now the other thing that is extremely significant is the roads. Within Arunachal Pradesh – as I told you Tibet has 58,000 km of very good roads and extremely good railway connections – Arunachal Pradesh has no railway connections; Roads are in an extremely bad situation and during the monsoon period there are landslides and you cannot use the roads. And when I went to the border I had to trek for 5 days in the mountains to reach the border village. So you can imagine how isolated the people are and these are issues that they keep bringing up.
The other issue that they keep bringing up is that Arunachal needs more development. It needs to fight corruption better. Arunachal is one of the highest corruption inflicted states in India after Manipur. And these issues keep coming up and I have written about it, about these issues; and it creates a kind of tension about the conception of India, about the conception of India as a pluralist state that is able to take care of its people. And this is a conception which is also there in the North-East. I would argue that the Indian state is trying; it has given a lot of resources. But the local state also has a big part in ensuring that the money does not go to waste or is used for other purposes.

Now let me get quickly, before I stop, to the complexity of the negotiations. Now this is what I think would interest you the most. Now what is happening in terms of negotiating on the border based on all the complexities that I have talked to you about?

In terms of negotiations, first of all the bone of contention is about the line as I told you. So the Chinese view is that this line is a British imposition, it is an unequal treaty; it is a deep wound and an understanding of us being victimized during our century of humiliation. And why would India, who itself has suffered from colonialism, impose this line on us? That’s their perception and something which we understand and I think we can empathize with; because they have that perception, and we want to negotiate. The Indian point of view is that this is a legalistic understanding of the treaty and is something which is geographically very viable because it follows the watershed. And that is a valid argument too, because China has resolved the border on similar grounds with Burma as you know. The same McMahon line has been resolved with Burma. So that creates a contradiction because how can they be so upset with the McMahon line when they have resolved the border with Burma. And I’ll explain to you why it was easier with Burma and not with India in a short time. And so that is the bone of contention.

The other bone of contention is – why are the Chinese so not willing to negotiate with this particular treaty? The second thing that I realized is that the treaty was signed with Tibet. Now for China to recognize a treaty signed by Tibet is to recognize Tibet as an independent entity in 1913/14. That is completely contradicting their own argument that Tibet was never independent. So you can understand from their perspective why they are so unhappy with accepting the McMahon line. If you look at China as a negotiator, it has negotiated with Burma, with Nepal on the McMahon line and resolved those conflict(s). China has negotiated with Mongolia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and North Korea and resolved conflicts with Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia. In fact with Russia in 2004, which is not too long ago and you know the conflict between them escalated in 1969 over the river and now it is resolved. So the only two countries with which China has not resolved conflicts is Bhutan and India and on the same McMahon line.

So why not India? That is the main question. And some within India and in the West argue that China is maintaining the border as a dispute as a bargaining posture for a simple reason. And the simple reason is that China still suspects that India has some kind of expansionist desire over Tibet; and so to ensure that a more powerful, more militarized India does not use that to kind of increase. Because first of all you must remember that the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government in exile is still in India. So they have this feeling that this is some kind of Indian desire to aspire for an independent Tibet. So to keep India down and weary, let’s keep the border
conflict escalated, so India with the ‘62 war memory is cowed down. My argument to that is that the counter argument would be that if China and India resolve the border it would mean that India recognizes Tibet as part of China, because it is a legalized border. So why would the Chinese not resolve the border, remember they wanted to when they offered the swap deal. But then I also understand the fears if the border is resolved, so there is some validity to the first argument. But then if the border is resolved, it is completely legalized and Tibet is part of China and that’s my counter to that.

Now another factor that I thought about was that in the 60’s and the 80’s when they offered the swap deal from the Chinese side the Indian negotiators seemed very rigid. Because India was like there is no border problem, Aksai Chin is part of India and India did not want to negotiate on the border line at that time. Nehru and Krishna Menon’s argument was that there is no negotiation needed, it’s already established. But the Chinese were like no, this is the point of contention and we need to negotiate. But today the Indian government is actually negotiating on that line and I would argue that if the border will be resolved, then it will be resolved on that line; because it is already established. And the swap deal could very well happen and there is support in the Indian public opinion. Within the Ministry (of External Affairs) there is a lot of dissension and contention because Aksai Chin is seen as Indian territory.

Now another factor that plays a big role in this is the conception of Tawang, especially, and Southern Tibet by Mao - remember Mao is the founding father – that it is part of Chinese territory. This basically cuts deep into their conception, that’s why I understand they are so sentimental and aggressive on the islands of South China Sea; because it was conceptualized by their founding father as Chinese territory. And so they are following this particular – this is a perspective, because I’m trying to understand why they are so, so aggressive on these particular claims.

Progress of Border Negotiations:

Now with regard to the negotiations these are the incompatibilities, what is happening in the negotiation? Actually quite a lot that is hopeful. Despite all these differences and contentions, India and China actually signed a 1993 agreement that stipulates maintaining peace and tranquility along the LAC. The other agreement they signed was the CBMs in the military field. Now what this means is that military cannot be deployed 20 km near the border. So it is a completely demilitarized zone and whoever guards the border has to be lightly armed. The other thing is that whenever there are exercises, they will let each other know that this is just an exercise and not an attack posture.

Now the other thing that happened was during (Indian Prime Minister) Vajpayee visit to China and is very significant is the declaration of principles of relations of comprehensive cooperation where it was decided that the border will not stop economic cooperation. So as you know India and China have a large trade relationship now which is nearly $75 billion and will quickly become $100 billion. There is a deficit, and it is rising. And China has become India’s largest trading partner this year, so that is improving to a certain extent. And then in 2005 there are these guiding principles. Now when I looking at the guiding principles and I look at the documents there are a lot of dissensions with regard to the guiding principles. And I’ll explain why this is
happening, first of all if you look at the document itself it is a very vague document. It sounds diplomatically excellent – we should look after each other’s regional interest, we should respect each other’s national sentiments, these can be interpreted in any way. And that has led to extreme differences because one of the, Article 4 for instance states that give due consideration to each other’s reasonable interests. China argues that our reasonable interest is that Tawang should be ours. So you see it creates that kind of tension. It is a guiding framework; it is good for that perspective but creates its own problem. The other thing that is happening is Article 9, now according to Article 9 both sides agree that they will not intrude into each other’s territory, and it happens all the time. Because of a lack of border and this is the argument given for why these incursions happen. These incursions have been very provocative, because if you look at Chinese incursions in Ladakh they have come in and written on the Indian stones. So it is not just unconscious, it is done very consciously. And this creates mistrust in the negotiations and has stalled the negotiations to a large extent. And so I call it simultaneous talks along with aggressive military posturing. I don’t think negotiations are going to succeed in that way if you are going to follow that particular pattern.

My final take on the negotiations is that I think it is not going to be resolved in the next say 4 or 5 years; I have written for Chinese publications like the *People’s Daily’s Global Times* and have said that it is in India and China’s interests to resolve the border since they are militarily rising, they are becoming powerful in the Asian region. India is having deep, strong relations with all the countries neighboring China, and China is having very good relations with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka. So this kind of military posturing is dangerous because first of all you have the largest populations in the world, you share a border, you have nuclear weapons and if there is conflict it is going to be disastrous. And you cannot hope that it is going to be limited all the time. But at this point of time because of all these complexities and all these differing views, negotiations appear to have crossed the first stage and that is the stage of framing the guiding principles. But at the second stage which is the most important stage, as Shiv Shankar Menon the Indian representative pointed out that is the stage where you actually define the border, have joint commissions. And that is getting very difficult because of these differing claims and demands. And what India and China have done is that they have instituted a Joint Border Commission, which they hadn’t done before. The border commission is a continuous body, it is a kind of body that has knowledge and is continuous, and so it is not ad hoc where some people come and go and don’t know what is happening or where the negotiations are going and it is at a high level. So that is the hopeful sign.

And before I finally conclude let me show you some pictures. Here are the hydroelectric dams that India is planning in Arunachal Pradesh. As you can see there are 108 dams that India has planned. This is the Yarlung Tsangpo, you can see the river coming in from Tibet and becomes the Siangi. Beautiful area, if you see the pictures you will see. It is very diverse in terms of natural resources. And that’s another point too, it is very rich in natural resources and Assam is the largest oil producer in India. This is the river that goes to Assam and becomes the Brahmaputra. Now if you see the dams, the dams have created a lot of attention within Arunachal Pradesh itself for two reasons. One, according to the India constitutional law you cannot build a dam unless the local people give you land to build a dam. And Arunachal has a special constitutional right, for instance like Nagaland where you cannot use the land unless the Nagaland State Assembly allows the Indian government to do so. And in Nagaland there is oil,
but the Nagaland State Assembly passed a resolution stating that you cannot drill and so India’s
national gas corporation can’t do anything. But the dams are coming up and one of the
arguments of the MEA (Ministry of External Affairs) is that the dams are important because it
also shows that you are using the rivers and internationally it is significant in terms of
international rights to rivers. And China and India have never signed a treaty for water sharing,
they do not have a non-aggression pact, so these issues come in. Now these are the roads to the
border, and Colonel you must be knowing that since you have been deployed there. This is the
Gelling area, and that’s China there, so if you go up there and climb this border. And we have the
Indian military deployed there. Now if you see the roads they are in extremely bad condition, so
you cannot think of having huge deployments on these roads. And you have to trek, when you go
ter to the border you have to trek and climb and go and this continues today. This is just from
April last year. This is the area where you had the 1962 war. This is the Menchuka area, it is a
beautiful area, absolutely fantastic; I was amazed to see it because it has so much tourism
potential, it is very pristine. Of course I cannot take pictures of Indian military bases, but there
are bases here, but they are Maratha Light Infantry and you have Indian military presence at the
border too. Now these are the basic bridges to the villages; if you see the villages they are
connected by this kind of bridges and they do not have proper – I’m just giving you this so you
have a proper understanding of how the state looks like. We spent about a month there, trekking,
talking to people and understanding how they feel.

And this is the famous Tawang monastery, this is the second most important monastery in
Tibetan Buddhism, and so now you understand why Tibet is so significant to the North-East and
epecially to Arunachal; because of the connection, and it is historical. It is not just about the
Dalai Lama, it is a connection historically over centuries. And this is where the sixth Dalai Lama
was born and the Chinese fear is that the fifteenth Dalai Lama might come from here, and so if
the next Dalai Lama comes from here then I don’t have to say much. It continues you know, the
entire Chinese legitimacy and sovereignty over Tibet continues to be questioned. And the Dalai
Lama hinted that, because as you know when the Dalai Lama dies then where the little Dalai
Lama – as my brother calls it – so where the direction where the Dalai Lama looks when he dies
is where the next Dalai Lama will come from. And there is this discourse in the Tibetan
community and in India that the next Dalai Lama will come from Tawang. It is a very, very
sacred monastery.

Just the final, this is how the India-China border looks like, so land operations from a strategic
point of view is difficult. It is not easy. The operation I think can possibly happen is aerial, so
you do have a lot of aerial exercises and this is what the focus is today of the Indian Air Force.
But of course the Chinese have their anti-strike missiles if the air force comes in. So these are the
scenarios that are playing out at the India-China border right now. I think I have spoken for quite
long now, and thank you.
**Q & A Session:**

**Dr. Thomas F. Lynch III**  
*(Dr. Lynch)*: Thank you Namrata, fascinating and powerful presentation. I commend you to have been able to, in the short period of time that you had, condense all of this material since I know the enormous amount you have written on this topic over the last four to five years and continue to do so.

And now we are going to turn it over to the audience for the opportunity to ask questions. If I could request you to as you ask your questions to please tell us your name and your affiliation. Just put up your hand and I will try to catch you and make sure you all get a chance.

**Robert Boggs, NESA Center:**  
Hi. I’m Robert Boggs, I work on South Asia affairs next door at the NESA Center. Just want to ask you about what you said at the very end. A friend of mine is a Chinese scholar and in our discussions I asked him isn’t it true that these new claims that you have made in the East is part of a diplomatic strategy? This idea that if you claim more on the Eastern sector then you get more concessions than less. And he said no that is absolutely not true. He said this is really serious and he said exactly what you said, that the government in Beijing is really frightened of a reincarnation of the Dalai Lama. And they want Tawang under Chinese control to stop that. And so he was very categorical about that.

**Dr. Namrata Goswami**  
*(Dr. Goswami)*: Thank you for bringing that up, because in my talks with the Tibetan government in exile and also in the Dalai Lama’s monastery in Dharamshala and also the (His Holiness Gyalwang ) Karmapa who is there. And yes, so there is this discourse that the next incarnation - of course as I said when he dies it depends on which direction he is going to look; and he will probably look at the direction of Tibet – that’s my opinion. Southern India as well, and that is a very sobering thought, that he could look at Southern India and have the Dalai Lama from there in Karanataka. I think the Chinese fear is that it will come from Tawang, and even if it comes from Southern India, if it comes from anywhere in India then it will question Chinese legitimacy over Tibet. But their biggest suspicion or fear or perception is that since Tawang is the second most famous monastery and not the monastery in Karanataka and that is why it is so important that Tawang is included in the conception and so that as you said that legitimacy over Tibet is firmed up in the long term. And thank you.

**Polly (Mary Nayak):** I’m Polly Nayak, I’m an independent consultant for South Asia for a long time. I wanted to ask what the state of play is in Track II between Indian and Chinese former officials, scholars, even retired military officers. Track II has proven important on a number of other issues and at least in expanding understanding.

**Dr. Namrata Goswami**  
*(Dr. Goswami)*: Thank you for the question. There are significant Track IIs. For instance my institute (IDSA) has bilateral relations with CIIS (China Institute of International Studies). We have delegations from China coming to our institute and having discourses, which also includes not just retired officials and officers but also present government officials. So it is kind of a 1.5
Track dialogue. There is a lot of exchanges between universities, JNU (Jawaharlal Nehru University) has very strong exchanges with The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, but on the border issues it is always tricky. That’s very important to know, so when I have delegations from CIIS, first of all you do not raise it very strongly. Secondly when you raise it the answer is that this is for the next generation to kind of negotiate on, or the answer is that Tawang is part of China and so we need to negotiate from the point of first establishing that. So there is a dissension, there is an understanding and conception of the Dalai Lama. Actually if you talk in the Track II dialogues I have noticed in my discourses in Delhi, and even in my discourses from Kolkata, because Kolkata has a strong exchange and it is even more important because it is closer. I have noticed that the scholars have a lot of hope that India and China will become cooperative, will be economically strong, but the other fear which they also mention, and that’s where the relationship with the U.S. also comes in, and so they would argue that they have hopes that the U.S. would have Track II dialogues with China but then they also see China as becoming more powerful. And so the argument given by Shen Dingli, I’m sure that you have heard of him, he would argue that China is becoming more powerful and the U.S. should learn to accommodate rising powers. And if they don’t then they will do it through the BRICS, so you have the BRICS development bank coming. So things are happening. On the border there is rigidity. There is an unwillingness to discuss from an objective point of view and so both perspectives. But I don’t see this as a fault, I also understand that there is a limitation from Chinese scholars about how much they can critique Chinese policy. If they were friends they would say something different, but on a public platform they cannot. Thank you.

Captain Chan Swallow, U.S. Navy; Eisenhower School (ES): If you could give me some of your perspectives on the India, China, Pakistan, Afghanistan issues as they cross over to the border issues that you have been discussing.

Dr. Namrata Goswami (Dr. Goswami): Let’s take the issue of Pakistan itself, and this is known discourse and it is oft repeated. It is also very insightful for me, and Mr. Anthony also said that recently. They (India) see China as cultivating Pakistan, and recently there was this nuclear issue where China was helping Pakistan develop a nuclear reactor. So they see China as kind of not just using because Pakistan also supports that, there is a kind of understanding between both that they need to keep their relationship robust to keep India down. And so the Indian strategic perspective is that it plays into China’s rationale that if you could keep India tied down in the western side, first of all there is a huge presence of Indian troops on the western border and also other force structures and that cannot be deployed to the Eastern sector. So this particular issue plays in.

Now in terms of Afghanistan, I understand why Pakistan is disturbed by any suggestion that there is Indian military presence in Afghanistan. I understand that from their point of view and see why they feel threatened by that, because there is after all an asymmetry of power between India and Pakistan. But in terms of India’s ambitions, India and Afghanistan have signed a strategic partnership, India wants a larger diplomatic presence, more engagement, train Afghanistan, because for India an Afghanistan that is destabilized directly affects their border and it is directly impinging on Indian national security. As you know the Mumbai attacks, the attacks that continue in the cities, the recent attack in the courts. So they (Indians) see that area as linked, and there is a rationalization within Indian public discourse.
But what is fascinating to me is that if you look at the military strategy, there is no strategy of an expansionist force from India. There is a strategy of defending borders. There is a strategy of improving the military because of these threat perceptions from Pakistan and China, but there is no document in terms of taking territory or expanding ideas. For instance there is Cold Start which is seen as an offensive document. There is a lot of discourse on Cold Start in my Institute; Ali Ahmed, a colleague of mine, just wrote a fascinating monograph on Cold Start. And if you look at Cold Start, it was discussed and thought about but it has not yet got civilian approval. And that’s important because after all the military works under civilian approval. And even that is actually seen as a deterrence posture, hoping that Pakistan would somehow not do activities, because there is the suspicion in India that all terrorist activities in India are coming from Pakistani soil. My argument is that it has actually made Pakistan more insecure. Because of the Cold Start Pakistan’s conceptualization is that this is an offensive document and this could be activated and so the nuclear issue comes up and then you have deterrence. If you look at this issue I could argue that why does Pakistan feel that way, because there is a history. The officers that I have talked to still remember 1971, they still remember that India had some hand in the division of Pakistan in 1971. And those officers are now in lead positions and so you can see how that plays out. And it has a deep impact on the border in terms of military deployment, because now India had to deal with two different fronts and not just one. And for China it makes strategic sense.

Sanjeet Deka, NDU War Gaming and Simulation Center (CASL): Great presentation. Great grasp on how deep this conflict is. And kind of what I want to touch on a little further with you is the, I was in Assam in 2011 and I talked to the elderly folk there, people in their 50’s and 60’s, and they have a very graphic memory of people from this region coming into their state during the incursion in ’62 and so it kind of plays up into the humiliation factor a lot and also from an immigration standpoint there are concerns there as well. But what I want to talk about is the ceasefire in 1962 specifically. In your research did you come across any internal papers or did you speak to anybody about the reasoning behind China’s ceasefire? Because the war itself lasted only one month, Afterwards there wasn’t much discourse from the Chinese about why they decided to go back after humiliating the Indian Army. And as you said very astutely that is a running theme now since the humiliation….(and what I saw with the North-East Indian) public, and I just want you to elaborate a little more on that because it is an important dynamic that hasn’t been touched on very much historically.

Dr. Namrata Goswami (Dr. Goswami): Actually some of the documents have been released on the ’62 war from the Chinese side, not from the Indian side. In terms of the ceasefire and China going back, China never had plans for a total all-out war. I look at Mao’s statement because he by the way took over as commander and chief at that time. He dictated the policy if you look at the documents from the Chinese side. If you look at his argumentation it was based – because first of all Nehru was refusing to negotiate on the border and (Foreign Minister) Menon made it very clear to (then-Chinese Foreign Minister) Chen Yi, the retired PLA general in Geneva that we don’t have a border problem and that we don’t want to negotiate with you. So Mao said that give the Indians a rope so that they hang themselves; because Nehru and Menon are arrogant, their tone is arrogant. So if you look at it from their perspective, they firstly wanted to show India that first of all you need to stop your “Forward Policy” that India was having in terms of having the posts,
you need to stop that. The second thing was that they needed to teach India a lesson for being arrogant and not willing to come and negotiate. Both Mao and Zhao argued that they would like to negotiate on the McMahon line. So my understanding from their perspective is that.

Now the Indian official history on the 1962 war has been released in 2002 as you know. So if you look at it from the Indian perspective, the Indians argue that it had a lot to do with geography, because that was just the border as you said, because they did not even come to Assam, they stopped at Bomdila. They occupied Indian forces in Bomdila and went back immediately and it was a one month war. The Indian argument is that this is because the mountain passes would have closed during the winter, and so if you don’t go back then the Indian Army which wasn’t actually defeated because they had forces in other parts of India could actually go in. Secondly, there could have been a guerrilla kind of warfare if they did not go back. Now the other argument could be, not in the official history but in strategic discourse, that Nehru had actually reached out to Kennedy for help and Kennedy had activated some kind of help. Now before the internationalization of the issue and China coming in, China thought it wise to go back. But my first argument is that the Chinese did not have any strategy to continue the war, they just wanted to show India that you cannot continue with this particular policy, and it stopped.

Dr. Mark Bucknam, National War College (NWC): I was wondering if you could share with us whether your information on the influx of Han Chinese into the Tibet region is quantitative data or is it a more qualitative observation.

Dr. Namrata Goswami
(Dr. Goswami): First of all there is a document that was published in 2009 by the Tibetan Parliament. So what they did is that they have actually given you the numbers and they have based this on sources within Tibet. Now you see there could be biases because it comes from a Tibetan source but it is corroborated by institutions like news channels like the BBC which is authoritative and verifies its sources. But that document has most of the data and it shows the movement since 1951; the slow movement, the camps. For instance in the 50’s and the 60’s what is observable is that the people coming in did not want to come in live and occupy areas that were previously not occupied. But now it has become better because there are business opportunities, better connectivity and so this is happening. The other source is based on my interviews in Dharamsala, with people who have sources within Tibet. Now I try to verify these sources; I understand that there is a strategic desire to show that this is happening but it is also corroborated by the Heinrich Boll Foundation document in 2009 which is a German Foundation and was based on their sources in Tibet. It shows you the numbers and the kind of movement of people that is happening within Tibet. And I can share that with you if you like.

Dr. Thomas F. Lynch III
(Dr. Lynch): Good point. My colleagues who do research here on China have also been tracking, in terms of parallel activity, a similar claim regarding China’s westernmost Xinjiang province as well: the investment of Han Chinese there. And the claim - and assertion - that the Han Chinese migration is motivated by the government, not just a natural expansion is a point that parallels the dispute regarding Han migration into Tibet.
Cooper Brown, OSD: First, thank you for the informative session. It was wonderful. My question is very general and tangential to a lot of what you were talking about. But you spoke of - and we are hearing a lot about - the strategic shift among Indian leaders and policy makers identifying China as the primary threat now as opposed to Pakistan. And I’m just curious from your perspective whether this is reflected in the general populace from the grassroots up or is it still limited to the upper echelons of Indian society?

Dr. Namrata Goswami
(Dr. Goswami): I think there are three different layers I have to look at to answer that question. One is the politicians themselves, the other is the bureaucracy and the military and the third is of course the public opinion. Now in terms of public opinion I look at not just the national papers but also look at papers in North-East India like the Nagaland Post or Assam Tribune, these are papers that are read by people in the region. Now if you trace the argumentation, and I have taken part in a lot of these seminars revolving around the China issue, what is interesting is that China has been seen as a neighbor in the North-East that has attacked India in 1962. But there is also a kind of desire to open up to Tibet, so these are contradictory points of view. What is so fascinating to me is that the discourse still differentiates Tibet from China. They see those two as different entities. But they recognize China influence on Tibet and that it is now part of China and that is India’s policy. In that discourse and also in the national discourse there has been a growing and written by significant Indian strategic thinkers – Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Kanti Bajpai – who have an influence on Indian strategic thinking, and also the IDSA and ORF, there is a growing cautioning if not a direct call for confrontation. And that’s important to know, so there is a cautioning that China is getting more and more strong on its demand for Arunachal Pradesh. There is the Chinese conception that India is part of the Chinese containment strategy, and it is a perception and so there is pressure from the public discourse that we need to be wary of China for the historical reasons that I pointed out.

Now in terms of the civilian – let me talk of the MEA (Ministry of External Affairs) and I do consult with them and I do a lot of work with the Indian Administrative Staff College in Mussoorie and the National Defense College, and in that discourse it is very fascinating to me. Now if you talk to military leaders in Delhi there is a conceptualization of China as the long term threat. So China in the long term is going to be a big challenge for India because there are many issues that haven’t been resolved yet and there does not seem to be any movement. And the other argument that is very strong in this discourse and also includes the academic/strategic perspective is that China and India have historically wanted to be the leaders of Asia. Nehru saw India as a leader of Asia, not of a militarized strategy but of ideas, and China too. And so if you look at the world view I think Vertzberger has this beautiful book on conceptions of China’s foreign policy. So Nehru saw India as being oppressed by colonialism and showing a new way through nonviolent means of getting liberation. So India is this great example – and China too. Mao saw China as a fighter against oppression, imperialism. So these discourses exist very much even today in terms of leadership role; which country should have the leadership role in Asia. Because aspirations are there, it might not be reality but they are there and influence thinking.

In terms of politicians if I look at the discourse of say the PM or the President, Defense Minister, External Affairs Minister or people of that caliber, I think understandably the discourse is very much about having cooperation with China. Manmohan Singh’s repeated statement is that Asia
has place enough for both. We don’t need to be in this competing environment where China is better or India is better; we have a lot of commonalities like poverty, underdeveloped areas, so we have a lot of issues in common and we cooperate on issues as well like climate change. So this discourse is very strong as well. If you see the recent BRICS summit it is quite useful to understand how there is a common understanding. And so Pakistan does not play into this larger strategic discourse, it plays in on a more micro level. So the macro discourse has shifted already, it has shifted to China. It has shifted to a few competing ideational influences of cooperation and cautioning. But in terms of Pakistan whenever there is a border dispute, recently there was a firing, this gets into the discourse. But I don’t think India is worried in terms of causing a threat to India as a nation to exist, that’s very important. So if you look there is priority, so first priority is that does Pakistan have the capability to undermine India’s stamping as a world power? No. But Pakistan does have the ability to create micro level discrepancies in terms of terrorist attacks or small interferences. The other issue I think I should point out is that there is one conception of threat which gets attention and that is the nuclear response tactic. But then there is this reckoning that nuclear weapons will never be used because they are deterrence, but that discourse does exist. But I see this shift happening in my own Institute which was very much Pakistan focused and is now becoming more and more China focused. We have Mandarin speakers; we have trained people in Mandarin speaking, so you can see the resources that are being invested.

Dr. Thomas F. Lynch III
(Dr. Lynch): Thanks, I think that is a powerful and very well crafted answer. If I could add to it, having discussed with political leaders in India recently, there really is this notion that in the next decade at the political and leadership level that we Indians have focused and significant issues and have tried to develop our country, and China can be an assistant in development for at least the next decade. But as Namrata has said there are these leaders who have said that we will put these strategic issues on the backburner, but there is a growing class of people that Namrata represents that are thinking about this and when they see the future and the ties to the historic past they see great potential for conflict here, and I thank you for that and as well as for clarifying for our audience that Pakistan is seen as a spoiler and not as the primary security issue.

Forest Yang, State Department: In your talk you mentioned that Nehru didn’t expect that China would attack in 1962 and to this day China still suspects India of supporting Tibetan independence and harboring expansionist desires. So there is this decades of misunderstanding and not being able to read each other’s signals, so with increased engagement between both sides recently do you think that both from China and India’s side that they have developed a better understanding of each other’s intentions and aspirations?

Dr. Namrata Goswami
(Dr. Goswami): Yes, even I have tried to do that. I have tried to understand a lot about why China is behaving that way. But it is a difficult issue for me to explain why a country is behaving that way from its perspective and not just from an Indian perspective. In terms of engagements as I said before there are increasing instances of engagements, there are strategic dialogues that happen at a very high level. But a very important point that I forgot to mention is that before 2003 the negotiations were at a level that were lower than the level of a national security advisor, since 2003 they have been at a higher level so that is also a very important development in the talks. Now in terms of understanding, there has been better understanding in India. For instance
with the passport issue, Nirupama Rao, who is the Indian Ambassador in the U.S., stated that is their opinion and let us try and understand why they are doing that. She was not trying to escalate the issue. Of course Salman Khurshid who is the External Affairs Minister was very vocal about the issue and against it. Now my worry is that despite all these engagements and we are going to have joint military exercises as you know, despite all these what creates dissension is very important. First of all in January 2012 I will give you an instance, a group captain who is now in the Eastern Command and an Arunachal Pradesh native, Mohonto Panging, was included in a military delegation that was going to China and that was when the talks were happening and we were in a better relationship and the basic idea was to inform and have dialogue on the military activities that were taking place in the Eastern sector, which is a great point of anxiety. Now what the Chinese did was they refused him a visa saying that he is a Chinese citizen and you know what happens, when you do that these issues are escalated in the media and creates great tension and actually downgrades those engagements because ironically those engagements were supposed to bring in greater military dialogue but then it got cancelled because of this particular issue. The other issue that created dissension recently was that in November 2012 when India and China were about to have their meeting on the border issue suddenly the passport issue came up where they showed Arunachal Pradesh as part of China. So when that happens Indian politicians are susceptible to domestic pressures; and I keep telling this here when people ask me why India didn’t sign the MMRCA with the US. Like Obama when he is talking against outsourcing, I understand why he is doing that, I understand that it is not against India but domestic pressure. So every time the PLA intrudes into Indian territory or writes on Indian stones or when Indian Army goes into Chinese territory or there are these visa issues which have been happening since 2007 when an IAS batch was going to China there was the same issue. People from Arunachal were told that you are Chinese citizens and you don’t need visas. So these issues create a lot of mistrust.

Peter Garrettson, U.S. Air Force: When you just started talking about domestic pressure and so I wanted to ask you some basic questions. First of all how much leeway does each government have to negotiate or is there so much pressure that you can’t even give up one inch of territory. Secondly, you talked a bit about the perceptions of people in the North East, specifically those people from Tawang. Do they feel that they are India, or Chinese or Tibetan? And then the final question that I have if you were to speculate, what would a war between the two look like?

Dr. Namrata Goswami
(Dr. Goswami): Now in terms of domestic pressure, the claim is from China and India would have to give up the territory. From the Chinese side they are very serious about the Tawang issue and they are also serious about Arunachal. And I believe them when they say that this is what we are claiming, I don’t think they are doing it for the visibility and they are serious about the claim, at least from 1985 onwards. Now in terms of giving up an inch of territory I was there in March, 2012. I was there on a conference that was sponsored by the Arunachal Pradesh government, and where the Governor was participating. Now what was significant to me as a participant was the General JJ Singh who was the government representative to Arunachal Pradesh and who was speaking to an audience in the university where you have people from all over Arunachal Pradesh, and he argues that there should be give and take. We should be willing to be flexible; we should understand that the McMahon line could be a problematic name or a problematic line.
And that shows that there is an understanding that there could be flexibility. There could be a shift from the British stand which we had in the 50’s and the 60’s to each other’s benefit.

Now the other question about Tawang and what do they think? This is what I love to answer because I have done so much work on Tawang and based most of my field work there for nearly four years now. Now in my visits to Tawang, my interviews have been with the first Lama who is the most important Lama of the Tawang monastery…of (t)he monks there. Now their argument is that and they do admit that Tawang area had been historically deeply connected to Tibet and that acceptance is there, but the Dalai Lama had stated four or five years ago that Tawang is part of India. And so in the Tibetan religious hierarchy what he says what they believe and follow. And they worry that the Chinese were here in 1962 and so we hope that the Indian army will be able to defend next time something happens. Now talking to the local people, and I have written a paper about that, so in Tawang itself there is a great desire because if you go to the rest of the North-East there is a tension like in Nagaland or Manipur, but not in Tawang. They know Hindi, they want to show that they have this great connection with India. They keep telling me that Tibetan Buddhism is deeply connected to the Buddha and Bodhgaya and we have this deep religious and cultural connection to India. Tibet historically has deep cultural connection to India. They are very strong in that particular view. But to be fair the people there argue that they want better development, they want better infrastructure, roads, healthcare, education and they keep telling me that when they talk to our kith in Tibet they tell us that the infrastructure is good there. So we want India to develop this area more and ensure that these are not ungoverned place and so this is the perspective I get. And I have written about it in the IDSA website and if you are interested then I can send you that particular paper.

Now on the issue of what a war will look like, first of all I hope there is no war because it is not going to be the way it was in 1962; because India’s response will also be robust now; because India has developed its capabilities and focused on China. In terms of warfare I don’t think it would be so much land based but more air based as many of the exercises I see. Special Forces and mountain divisions will be involved. The other thing that people talk about is that even if we face defeat we can always use guerilla tactics because the people of Arunachal are with us. I don’t see India escalating the conflict, I don’t see India crossing the LAC, I don’t see India threatening Chinese presence in Tibet military; I don’t see that happening. When I talk to military commanders at the border and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police, their basic desire is to understand Chinese strategic culture, the Chinese perspective about why they are claiming and to work for better military understanding of each other. But the war to my mind will not look like 1962 because there was no air power that was used in 1962.

Dr. Robert Boggs, NESA Center:
Some years ago I had the chance to visit the Eastern Air Command Headquarters in Shillong and my friend was the commander there. We were in the command center actually and he spoke very confidently, and he said that unlike ’62 we have forward air assets and we have munitions that could cut off Chinese passage and their lines of logistics. This was the air headquarters so of course he would talk about air warfare. I think the Chinese would have to come in and conduct a surprise attack; they would have to attack the Indian air stations on the ground along the Brahmaputra to prevent that. And I think that is what is going to happen.
Dr. Namrata Goswami

(Dr. Goswami): And they are actually planning for that, and that is normal right? Because you know what your enemy is thinking and you know that the biggest threat from India would come from the air fields like Pannagarh, Tezpur and they would target that. And that’s what Indian Air Force officers tell me in my discourses with them, because they (China) are developing a stealth aircraft which is supposed to be ready by 2018. So the stealth capabilities are something they are worried about but we still have some years to go.

Dr. Thomas F. Lynch III

(Dr. Lynch): We have a limited amount of time right now but we are going to go as close to noon as possible so that lunch and other things can go on. Let me take the last two questions, here and then we’ll finish up.

Min Jie (Terry) Zeng, NDU:
I heard some opinions in China that according to the development trajectories of China and India it seems that time is on the side of China and it can hold off on the border issue till later when it has more bargaining power. What do you think of this opinion?

Dr. Namrata Goswami

(Dr. Goswami): Yes, as I told you when I talk to Chinese scholars some of them - not all – who come from some of the international think tanks their argument is that let the next generation solve it because as you said time is on our side. But my argument is that this is not really true because if time was really on China’s side, then why would China keep on escalating its posture? There is something that is driving China to escalate because you wouldn’t want to do that if you don’t want India to respond or militarize or develop its military infrastructure along the border if time were on your side. So this is also connected to the whole Tibet issue and the Dalai Lama who is getting old. As I said if the Dalai Lama’s institution continues in India then Chinese legitimacy over Tibet continues to be questioned. And I’ll tell you why this is such an important play in the border issue because since 2008, the Tibetan issue has suddenly become active again. As you remember during the Olympics then there were Tibetan protest movements etc. By the way if you look at the discourse in Burma – because I read them and I studied the ethnic conflicts in Burma and its relation with North-East India – while studying the papers that come up in the Kachin and the Karen. When I look at those papers they are extremely and deeply worried about the border issue, the impact that it will have on that geopolitical setting. As you know there is also a border from Tibet to Bhutan and those angles also play a role. And China also has a deep influence with Burma at this point of time, but that could change. So I don’t see time on China’s side. Also I don’t see time on China’s side because both countries are developing, of course India is nowhere close in terms of GDP growth rate etc. But India also has certain advantages – demographics, the ability to attract investments which also acts on India’s side and where China is a bit weaker. But China is stronger in its ability to grow faster, whether it is economic growth, poverty reduction – I respect China for its ability to uplift its people from poverty. And another thing that your President mentioned in the Durban talks with Manmohan Singh was that he saw the border conflict as difficult – when Manmohan Singh talked with him on the border conflict in an informal basis. But what happened immediately after that was that one of the scholars from the China Institute of International Studies wrote an Op-ed which was widely reported by the Indian media. The India media is extremely quick to pick up reports and
sensationalize it at times basically to my mind. So it was carried all over and everyone in India saw it because it was not only carried in the English press but also in the vernacular which is extremely important to understand because there is a big Hindi readership in India. So that particular scholar identified Arunachal Pradesh as a core issue in terms of Chinese reunification and which was a new conceptualization from the India perspective. So it is an issue which is in the interests of both countries to resolve. And so that is why I am trying to understand what are the incompatibilities to give better inputs to the (Indian) policy makers.

**Captain Mike Devine, U.S. Navy; Eisenhower School:**
I’m interested in the trade relations between India and China and whether that has had an impact on lessening political tension. I thought that you had alluded to that in your talk. Do you think that it has had that effect and whether it is intentional on the part of Indian foreign policy to engage in trade relations with China to lessen the political tension and whether it would have that impact with Pakistan for the same?

**Dr. Namrata Goswami**

*(Dr. Goswami):* So as you know the trade relations are becoming better but there is a trade deficit like between the U.S. and China. In terms of the impact that it has had, for instance as you know India has a “Look East Policy” which we conceptualized in 1991; and China has a look west policy that was similarly conceptualized. They are actually coming towards the same area and Burma is seen as the link. It is a major foreign policy issue for India to engage with South East Asia and China through the Look East Policy, develop the Asian highway, etc. But that has not taken off because of the border issue and the impact of the trade is not much in the border areas or in the North-East (of India) because most of the exchange of trade is in raw materials. So it is not goods and commodities but of course there is generation of revenue. The other thing with the trade relation that causes tension is that recently the Chinese port authority made a bid for one of the ports in Karnataka which is a commercial port, the Indian Commerce Ministry and the MEA refused it because of security reasons which wouldn’t have been the case with Singapore or any other country. There is huge tension about China taking over the Gwadar port (in Pakistan) from Singapore, so you see how the border issue tensions play out. Another thing that was a huge acrimonious discourse when I was there in India was the telecommunication center. China is investing hugely in India’s telecommunication sector but the Ministry of Home Affairs which is very, very careful (has) raised concerns about security issues. And those telecommunication links have got into the North-East, by the way the North-East is only opening up now. We didn’t have cell phones till 2006, it is only now that we have opened up. So those security tensions play in.

My contention is that with Burma opening up and getting investments from India and the rest of the world – the U.S. played a big role there – relationships through land will get better. But as you know there are problems even there because if you look at Burma itself, North-East Burma is completely dominated by the United Wa State Party - 30,000 armed men - a huge drug industry, and that’s where China has a huge influence. Between the major insurgent groups -- the Karens, the Kachins and the Wa State Army -- there as many as 60,000 armed men and China knows the area well which plays a big role. It is doing a lot to fight the drug industry there; recently it caught a drug lord. But that complicates matters because states are not the only stakeholders in the border areas, the armed groups are stakeholders, the local communities are stakeholders and there are obstacles there.
Phillip Autry, U.S. Department of State:
My question is about the week before Durban, Xi Jinping gave a five point framework on China-India relations and much of it was repetition and stuff that is been said before. But his fifth point was that China and India should be more accommodating about each other’s interests. And really it bears strong resemblance to what the Chinese have been saying about Sino-American relations which is a new type of relationship which as you were saying earlier should be more accommodating of each other’s interests. But what I want to ask you or Indian observers on a larger scale is whether you see anything new on that particular point or anything of interest.

Dr. Namrata Goswami
(Dr. Goswami): It didn’t seem new because even Hu Jintao or the leadership before him had talked about accommodating each other. So it is good that he reiterated it or offered that particular gesture. In terms of foreign policy per say, I will just give you the Indian perspective – I may be wrong. So from the Indian perspective there is a caution or worry that the PLA will have a larger say in terms of foreign policy making. So that is the perception, it could be completely wrong. So if the PLA comes in it could be a more hawkish. So from the Indian perspective, the posture on the South China Sea or the passport issue, which happened before the transition, shows that there will be an escalation in the border conflict. My argument is that I don’t think that this is true. I think that there will be continuity in terms of negotiations, we will be having the next round of negotiations soon. The foreign minister’s (China) status, as you know, has been increasing and he has more ability to make decisions during the talks and he is the person who is going to represent China during the talks. So I would say that there will be a push towards, if not a solution, then at least towards having an understanding. I told you that the talks are already at the second stage, they have already crossed the first stage and that was framing the guidelines stage. The guidelines itself created a bit of stability in the process, but the second stage in the next five years I think there will be movement in terms of the boundary line; the joint commission could possibly identify border lines. I think that it is not that China or India does not want to resolve the conflict, I think the historical baggage in terms of the conception of the McMahon line – their understanding from their own humiliation and victimhood and their strategy to delay the process might play a part. That is why when General JJ Singh said that it would be useful to think of a different name for the McMahon line, it is actually a serious suggestion. Because the memory of what happened to China - which if you go to India you will not find that anxiety about British colonialism that China had -- and I think I understand why because if I look at the founding fathers of India, Nehru and Gandhi, they never conceptualized Britain as an adversary. Gandhi conceptualized them as someone who we need to have dialogue with and change their ways, whereas there is a different conception in China.

Dr. Thomas F. Lynch III
(Dr. Lynch): On that very powerful note let us offer three sets of thanks: to the staff here at NDU for organizing this event and my research assistant Jayant Singh for his efforts in organizing and running this event. Thanks to you all here for being a great focus group for the talk today. And my very special thanks to Namrata here. For two years I have been looking forward to this presentation and it was everything I hoped for and what I know you in the audience hoped for. You have given us a very powerful and illuminating presentation. I think most importantly, you provided concentrated shafts of light toward understanding a very
important part of the world that will continue to grow in importance as both India and China continue to rise -- shafts of light not only on the border issue, but also on the Tibet issue, the future of Myanmar and all the things that the rest of us in this part of the world should pay more attention to. So thank you very much.