The Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University

Transcript for:
Countering Violent Terrorism & the Role of Military Special Operations: A View from India

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Dr. Thomas F. Lynch III  
(Dr. Lynch): Thanks so much. Looks like there are a few more chairs in the room, and thank you all for coming here.

On behalf of the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies and the Program on Irregular Warfare and Special Operations, I wish to welcome you to this special event this afternoon. I’m Tom Lynch. I’m the research fellow for South Asia and the Near East at the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the Center for Strategic Research. It’s my distinct pleasure to work for NDU President MG Greg Martin, his Director of Research for the Institute for National Strategic Studies, COL Tim Vuono, and the Director for the Center for Strategic Research, Dr. Nick Rostow. None of these gentlemen are here with us this afternoon, but all sent along their greetings and best wishes to General Katoch and to all of you here today. It’s my pleasure to work closely with the Program on Irregular Warfare, an affiliate of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, and I’m indebted here and wish to acknowledge the hard work and support of that program’s leadership, specifically Dr. Joe Tonon and Mr. Matt Reid, and thank them for their instrumental role in making this presentation, by LTG Katoch, possible here today. Thank you, gentlemen. I’m also most pleased to be sitting here next to the General today, on this his first visit ever to Washington, DC as I understand it, and to hear him speak in person on today’s topic which is, “Countering Violent Extremism and the Role of Special Forces: a View from India.”

As you may have noted in the advance materials to this presentation, either electronically or before you today, it’s clear to many of us in this room, that the trajectory of American and NATO military and counterterrorism involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan has been the focal point of most western professional military and security study on violent extremism in South Asia over this past decade. Understandable as this parochial focus may be, it too often omits consideration of the unique and variable perspectives on violent extremism and countering violent extremism that emanate from within South Asia itself.

As the largest country in South Asia, India has a unique and quite acute history with violent extremism over its 65 years of existence. Its recent experiences with Islamist extremism, to include those things that most of us here are familiar with—the attacks on Mumbai’s financial hotel district in 2008, the attacks against Mumbai commuter trains in 2006, and the attack on the New Delhi parliament in late 2001 -- are but the most recent examples of this lengthy history. Two of its sitting Prime Ministers were assassinated by violent extremists without ties to radical Islam—Indira Gandhi by Sikh extremist bodyguards in 1984 and then her son, Rajiv, by Tamil Tiger separatists terrorist bombing in 1991. In fact, according to data compiled by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and the Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland, from 1981 to 1995 India suffered more terrorist attacks, and lost more dead in those attacks, than any other nation in the world. So its experiences are indeed rich and varied and go far beyond the emanation of 9/11. Thus, India’s experience with externally generated terrorism and internally generated communal violence and its understanding of violent across the
subcontinent is really worth, I would argue to you, increased western attention now, and for the region beyond 2014.

We are fortunate, therefore, to have LTG Katoch with us here today to extend our understanding of this Indian perspective on terrorism using his own words and own experience to bolster that perspective. We’re also fortunate to have the General here with us today because of his background, and his understanding of the role of Special Forces and special operations in the process of countering violent extremism both in India and across the subcontinent. While Indian Special Forces are reported to be used in counterterrorism roles in the contested areas of Jammu and Kashmir, its military special operations units are thought to be generally barred from operating against homegrown terrorists or insurgents. Indeed, Indian Special Forces were most conspicuously used and, as reported, with mixed results in intervention against Sri Lankan battle with Tamil Tigers, but yet not widely used within the region beyond that in most recorded accounts. LTG Katoch’s personal experience and perspective on Indian Special Forces would be most welcome for us here today as special operations roles are considered after his discussion of terrorism in general.

You will note from his biography in front of you, that as retired Indian Special Forces three-star general, he had a special operations career that included participation in the 1971 India-Pakistan War, command of an independent commando company in counterinsurgency operations, a Special Forces battalion under the Indian peacekeeping force in Sri Lanka, and he also commanded a brigade on Saichin Glacier and during the Kargil Conflict of 1999, and then a Division in Ladakh, and a Strike Corps on the Southwestern theater. The General has also served in senior policy positions to include military Defense Attaché in Japan and Republic of Korea, and retired in 2009 from posting as Director General for Information Systems in the Indian Army. Since his retirement, and important to his project here today, he has written and spoken frequently on military and security issues, especially those concerning the topic of terrorism, extremism, special forces, and network warfare.

So it is my great pleasure to have all of you here today and to have you join me in welcoming GEN Prakash Katoch for this discussion today. Thank you, GEN Katoch.

Lieutenant General Prakash C. (PC) Katoch

LTG Katoch: Thank you, thank you. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. At the outset, let me thank the NDU, the INSS, and Dr. Thomas Lynch in particular in giving me this opportunity to come and address you all. Let me tell you that as you are aware, I am a veteran officer, so the views I present here are mine, and not necessarily that of the government of India. I’d also like to say that I’m a council member of the USI, the United Services Institution of India, which is the second oldest institution in the world of its kind—the number one being RUSI in the UK. Raised in 1870, USI has never missed a single journal since 1870. It has about fifteen-thousand members: military, serving and non-serving, and all civil services, serving and non-serving. And next year on fifteenth of February, we’re having a seminar on Afghanistan post-2014, and any of you who are
interested, including whoever wants to present a paper, can log on to USIOFINDIA.ORG, and you’re welcome to join in.

The topic given to me, as you see on the screen is, “Countering Violent Terrorism and the Role of Military Special Operations.” I’m going to cover my topic in the following headings. I hope I’m not blocking the screen this side. If you look at the “2012 Terrorism and Political Violence Map,” that is the area, the region I come from. You will find that countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen are crimson red, which classifies them into the severe category of terrorism. And India, and practically the whole of Southeast Asia, is classified as high probability. And as far as I can see, at least in the near future, things are going to get worse in this entire region. Now when we talk of violent terrorism, I take it with a pinch of salt. I’ve never found an all-encompassing definition of violent terrorism and what is nonviolent terrorism. I want to give you a couple of examples. You take the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subways in 1995: five metros were hit, a number of people killed, injured about a thousand people lost their eyesight temporarily. This cult had enough sarin gas to wipe out one million people. They had two remote-control helicopters; they had smuggled in a Mi8 helicopter part by part and the Japanese were unaware. Now had this attack not taken place, is this cult one of violent terrorism or nonviolent terrorism? This is something we need to think about. Take the radicals in Pakistan. This is an excerpt from the Daily Times of Pakistan of 2009 vintage; and if you read it says—just read what is underlined, “There are thousands of madrassas spread all over Pakistan urban centers that are producing millions of neo-drones (for terror). At full steam ahead in Pakistan, this is a monstrous experiment in brainwashing and it is at par, if not worse than, Nazi Germany’s eugenics. This is a hugely successful experiment in which nurture triumphs and nature takes a beating.” This type of radicalization, how are you going to grade it as terrorism? Is it violent terrorism? Is it only leading to violent terrorism? Because if you’re only looking at the terrorist organizations, and we are not going to address this part, then I’m afraid things are only going to get worse and worse. And this I’m showing you occurred in 2009. There have been much more writers in Pakistan who have written in recent times.

Hate crimes. You look at the US Patriot Act, it says, “Domestic terrorism is an act of violence that is intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.” Now last month, you had this shooting at that Sikh temple, and the Attorney General has classified it as an act of terrorism. But then you look at the Fort Hood massacre of 2009; that has not been classified by any measure as an act of terrorism. So even as the definition of terrorism is we don’t have a composite one.

Cyber attacks. The first major cyber attack was way back in 1982, where the Siberian gas pipeline was struck. And if you see what has happened over the period of years, it is not only gas pipelines, it has been dams, it has been airports, it has been electricity power shutdowns, it has been nuclear monitoring systems, train signaling systems. And somebody had said way back that while Osama Bin Laden may have his finger on the trigger, his grandson may have his finger on the mouse. Today, the dams which are
operating on a “SCADA” system can actually be blown up by cyber attack. Tomorrow, is it going to be a nuclear attack which can be engineered, a nuclear accident which can be engineered by cyber attack? It is something we have to think about. So if we put all this together, would it not be better that we say that terrorism is terrorism and forget about the semantics of violent and nonviolent? Because then we will be looking at the whole thing per se.

Main causes of terrorism. I think this informed audience already knows, but primarily there are two main causes. The first is perceived political-social and economic injustice, no access to law, and lack of opportunity for political participation. And the second is the belief that violent means will usher in change because there is no other choice, or other choices are considered ineffective. But terrorism aims at intimidation and coercion to further political, social, religious goals but does not always reflect objective, social, or economic deprivation. Along with this, in developing countries with large populations, a problem which is coming up now is that you have a large number of youth, you have unemployment, you have illiteracy, then you have drugs flowing in, and you have weapons flowing in. So this is a cocktail which is highly dangerous. And the existing organizations—terrorist organizations—will get these youth just for the lure of money.

Drivers and stoppers. First is the (issue of the) non-state actor. As far as I’m concerned, is a misnomer and I’ll talk about this later on. Then you have religious fundamentalism, you have indoctrination in early childhood—like I showed what’s happening in Pakistan and maybe Afghanistan and some countries and, sectarian strife to kill and to defend—that’s even happening between the Sunni and Shia Muslim etc., etc. Then you have spreading ideology via radicalization, like the Maoist ideology which China has been spreading into various countries, and has created terrorist groups. Certain states are using terrorism as an asymmetric option as a policy of the state. Then you have the transition from state-sponsored to indigenous terrorism which is a dangerous phase which is ushered in now in the U.S. and India. You don’t have Al Qaeda now coming in from outside, you have U.S. citizens who are doing that job for you. Similar things are happening in India. Now the Indian mujahedeen has come up, which has been propped up by the ISI (Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency). Now you don’t have to send people from Karachi to do attacks like the 11/26/2008 attack in Mumbai. Then you have the business of terrorists infiltrating security forces. The Pakistani media itself is talking today that the attacks on the Karachi Mehran navy base and the Minhas air base in Kamra. These happened because part of the security forces had been infiltrated.

Hate crimes, already mentioned.

Then you have, of course, WMD terrorism which is not far away, which is likely to happen.

Then you have passivity in countering terrorism. Because in certain countries, what happens is the politicians want to use terrorist organizations as their private armies. So in that case, they will not take action, the type of counterterrorism action that is required to be taken.
Then lastly is the effectiveness of banning terrorism. Today, the major terrorist organizations have so many affiliates and thousands of ways to receive finances, that banning actually becomes symbolic. So this is again a problem which has to be looked into; mere banning is not enough.

Earlier, I was talking about the non-state terrorist actor. The non-state actor has to live in a state. He has to have administrative support, he has to have financial support, etc., etc., etc. So how does he become a non-state? He is residing in that state, the state has to take on some of the responsibility there, to be responsible for that fellow’s action. You take cyber terrorism: today technology can tell you 99%, if not the particular computer from which region the cyber attack has emanated. You cannot say if there was a non-state actor here who’s done it. The state has to take responsibility. Unless you’re going to make the states responsible for these actions, the action against terrorism—counterterrorism—is not going to be complete.

OK, India’s volatile neighborhood. I was talking of the threat of ideology. The Chinese links with the Maoists in Nepal, with the Maoists in Myanmar, and now through them, links with the Maoists in India. The links with the erstwhile New People’s Army of Philippines, Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, Japanese Red Army, Shining Path in Peru, etc., etc. But this is part of spreading terrorism; it cannot be that this is something separate. There is a book published in Karachi, the heading is, “From a Head, through a Head, to a Head,” and that says that when Zhou-En-Lai visited Pakistan, and that was during the middle 1960s, he advised Pakistan that you prepare for a long war with India, and you create a militia which is going to fight in the rear of the enemy. In my perception, that was the seed which was sown for the Jihadi policies to come up and terrorists to come into India. It had a certain amount of gestation period. Obviously, this was done in 60s. Now this is an excerpt of a book written by MK Dar, who’s a former Joint Director, (Indian) Intelligence Bureau (IB). In fact, he’s written three books and all three of them are worth reading. And he says that in 1992-93, the process of transplanting armed modules in the heartland of India began, and if you look at the number of states (within India) he’s talking of, it’s not only the heartland, it is the length and breadth of the country. And SIMI (the Students Islamic Movement of India), which is an organization in India, had started sending recruits to Pakistan to get trained in terrorism. And he’s also talked of whole lot of similar organizations in Bangladesh, and terrorist camps which had been established there and the links which had been established with India. So that was the time when the infrastructure came up, now that was 92-93. Today is 2012.

Recently, this lone terrorist (Ajmal Qasab), who was captured and apprehended (after the Mumbai attacks of November 2008), he admits that he’s been trained by the Pakistani ISI. The intelligence has established that the Indian Mujahedeen are the creation of the ISI. This (slide) is a thematic representation of the terrorist groups with whom ISI has got links. I do not say they have 100% control, but they have links including with the Taliban Pakistan Taliban (the TTP). So they have links with the al Qaeda, Taliban, the Haqqani’s, LeT (Lashkar-e-Taiba), and many more. And on the right side (of this chart) you see the Indian Maoists, the Indian Mujahedeen, and the Popular Front of India. And
what do you see in the outer circle are the organizations which are in are in Bangladesh. The caption down below is by David Ignatius in Time Magazine where he says, “When I ask top CIA and military officials what then does this show about ISI activities, they will become visibly angry, they will say see the double-dealing how U.S. intelligence is passed on to the Haqqani network.” Some quotes from Pakistani newspapers. The first one is a recent one which says, “Just as the Soviet Union was defeated by a combination of Afghan Mujahedeen, and Pakistani warriors, this time too Pakistan could infiltrate these non-state actors to the strategic depth it requires to feel safe about its northwestern neighbor. What is scary for the world is the perception that Pakistan doesn’t control its non-state actors 100% as demonstrated by the Punjabi Taliban fighting the Pakistani army in parts of FATA (Pakistan’s Frontier Tribal Areas).” But that does not mean that ISI does not have links. The lower one is the statement by Maulvi Fazlullah of the TTP. He says, “Pakistani leaders approach us when their relations sour with the US and later forget their promises, but they forget their promises and become more harsh and cruel when their relations are restored with the United States. We know these tricks of the Pakistani rulers and do not trust in their promises.” When the US came into Afghanistan and al Qaeda was being targeted, on the India-Pakistan border were the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The neglect of the Lashkar-e-Taiba has now created an organization which is at par, if not more deadlier, than the Al Qaeda. You’ll look at their reach and the latest is they have gone into now Maldives. I’ll be talking about this later. Incidentally, I’d like to tell you this, that wherever I’ve given talks and seminars, you’re welcome to take a copy of my presentation.

As the US was invading Afghanistan (in late 2001), there was a seminar in Bangladesh on regional security. Both the speakers from Pakistan, the Commandant of the National Defense College and Dr. Shirin Mazari of the Pakistan Institute of Strategic Studies, were propounding on LIC (Low Intensity Conflict), terrorism, etc., as the best policy for the state in the modern world. And this sort of a thing was actually confirmed much later on by Admiral Mike Mullen, who confirmed the above state policy of Pakistan before the US Senate Armed Services Committee that you are all aware of. So unless you’re going to finish state sponsorship, I’m afraid you cannot rule out terrorism, and this is a major problem in Afghanistan and in India.

This (next presentation slide) is about the Haqqani’s; recently banned. How effective the ban is going to be I don’t know, but you look at all these quotes and there is enough evidence, they are very much inside Pakistan, not only in remote areas, they (the terrorists) are merrily staying in the cities having a ball. This is a recent quote by U.S. General John Allen in Afghanistan stating that Taliban leader Mullah Omar is there; so maybe he’s also living in a mansion in Pakistan like Osama Bin Laden!

Democracy in Pakistan is extremely weak and unless the democracy becomes powerful in Pakistan, I do not know how it can happen, there is no way that the policy, state policy of terrorism is going to be given up. You’re all aware that President Zardari, immediately on becoming the President (in 2008), gave the order that the ISI will be brought under the Ministry of Interior. But he had to eat his words within 24 hours. Unless you can control
that animal, and unless the radicalization can be reversed, this region will keep going from bad to worse.

Bangladesh. When Begum Khaleda Zia was President, major terrorist training camps were running in Bangladesh, at least four major training camps were known in India, and there were even instructors from Al Qaeda. The present government has clamped down, they have really clamped down on terrorism because they’re looking at regional brotherhood. But, if in 2014, again if Begum Khaleda Zia and the BNP come back, we will again find that terrorism is overtaking Bangladesh.

Sri Lanka. LTTE is down, it is not out. Why it is not going to out is because Sri Lankans actually have to agree to devolution of powers to Tamils, which is I’m afraid is not happening as of now. Of course, India has renewed the ban on the LTTE.

Maldives. I went to Maldives in 2009. The military was getting very concerned about the radicalization which is taking place and the youth going to Pakistan to train under the LeT.

Drugs coming in. Maldives has got over one thousand islands which are not occupied, so any of them can become havens of terrorism.

Somali piracy. Starting off as some 350 nautical miles, it has come down to about 1500 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia. Again, there is no international agreement or organization which is looking after them. There have been regional groupings, yes, for the safety of their own sailors, but the Somali pirates today have started off at sea with a command structure; with a main controller and two-three smaller vessels, so the structure can always be used by the people like the LeT and al Qaeda. In fact, it was known that in the heyday of the LTTE, al Qaeda had sent a detachment to learn naval warfare from the LTTE.

China. I’m just showing two slides to you. On this first slide, China says, “...our rise has always been peaceful.” So you have a look starting from 1948 how peaceful the rise of China has been. Today, China is occupying 38,000 square kilometers of Indian Territory of Aksai Chin in Ladakh, this is (rightfully) a part of India. Pakistan has ceded Shaksgam Valley to China in 1963—this was again 6000 square kilometers plus and a part of India. China is now claiming 92000 square kilometers of the whole state of Arunachal Pradesh, calling it South Tibet. The next generation of rulers in China, known as Princelings coming up, are going to be much more aggressive, and the generation after the Princelings, as per various studies, are going to be even more assertive.

This again is from media: that Chinese were giving military advice and weapons to the Pakistan Taliban on how to fight NATO. There were reports that even before the US came into Afghanistan, the Chinese were training Pakistan Taliban. When the Royal Bhutanese Army routed ULFA camps established in Bhutan (ULFA is acronym for United Liberation Front of Assam - an Indian terrorist organization), China provided them sanctuary. China today is providing weapons and support to the militants in
northeastern India, and in fact the weapons have now started coming through the Kachen Rebels of north Myanmar to the People’s Liberation Army of a state called Manipur in India, and through them to the Maoist organizations in India.

The PLA (Chinese People’s Liberation Army) are funding all these border development projects you talk of. Development projects are actually done by the PLA—road construction, etc., etc. So like today if there are 3 million—actually there are 3 million Chinese in Myanmar—you can imagine how many PLA, how many Special Forces will be there. They are all over now. They have come into Pakistan, Bhutan, Nepal, all these countries. Even, you will be aware that while the US was invading Afghanistan in 2001, China had already inducted 15,000 people—Chinese—on to development projects into Afghanistan. Now you and I don’t know how many of these are PLA personnel.

OK, countering violent terrorism. The Dalai Lama, who is the apostle of peace, he gave a talk in 2009 in India, and the excerpts are, he said it is difficult to deal with terrorism through nonviolence. They—that is, terrorists—are very brilliant and educated but a strong ill feeling is bred in them, their minds are closed. The only way to tackle terrorism is through prevention, but this last part of prevention I take a little bit with a pinch of salt and that is the hardcore, there is no question of prevention, they have to be eliminated, there’s no other way.

So what is the strategy that we need? If we are looking at the terrorist organizations as the center of gravity, we are going wrong. The strategy, the center of gravity has to be the community. Because this is actually not different from insurgency, because you have to eliminate the population support which is increasing now with the radicalization from the terrorists. You require continuous de-radicalization of communities and in that you will require different focus. There are certain areas which require different types of programs: religious teachers and educators may require a different type of program, women and girl children may require different type of program, etc., etc. Then, of course, (one must) use force to eliminate the hardcore terrorists and the terrorist infrastructure which may be directly or by proxy; aim is to eliminate them.

Security sector. (This sector must) operate simultaneously at the moral and physical levels; provide security and assistance to population while destroying terrorists and blending development and education with combat operations. Then (it must) choke state support to terrorism including states in which so-called non-state actors are located; I’m afraid this is not happening at all. (It must) establish efficient intelligence system through intelligence acquisition and psychological operations.

International strategy (to counterterrorism) must accommodate individual national interests. It can be your own individual national interest, but then you have to look at it globally. And in this instance, I’d like to give you food for thought: what has happened in Afghanistan-AFPak region in the past, say 10-11 years, when you look at the radicalization which has taken place. I think there is a need to see how much of US national interests have been benefited, how much of Pakistan’s national interests have
been benefited, how much of Chinese national interests have been benefited, and the comparison between the three.

Then you require effective periodic reevaluation of measures (change) affected versus changed required; that is for de-radicalization and counterterrorism. If you find that radicalization is going at a faster rate than your de-radicalization, then you may have reduced the age group of the terrorists but overall we are going to lose the war. That is something which has to be done periodically and accordingly the countermeasures have to be adjusted.

De-radicalization programs obviously has got to be on a continuous basis.

Education system has to be integrated into the national mainstream.

Then separate focus for select communities, etcetera which I’ve already mentioned.

Alternatives have to be given to expend youth energy, which includes employment, but can’t be employment for everybody. It’s like, take India today: 65% of population is below 35 years; huge population.

Psychological operations including exposing terrorist’s abuses, inform and empower communities to challenge radical ideology, monitor de-radicalization versus ongoing radicalization—that is what I’ve mentioned earlier—also if your radicalization is at a much faster pace than the long run, you’re going to lose the battle. This is a recent quote from (Pakistani physicist) Pervez Hoodbhoy, he said, “The common belief in Pakistan is that Islamic radicalism is a problem only in FATA, and that madrassas are the only institutions serving as jihad factories. This is a serious misconception. Extremism is breeding at a ferocious rate in public and private schools within Pakistan’s towns and cities. Left unchallenged, this education will produce a generation incapable of co-existing with anyone except strictly their own kind. The mindset it creates may eventually lead to Pakistan’s demise as a nation state.” I think this article is called the, “Saudiisation of Pakistan,” needs to be read by everybody. He’s given the syllabus of schools today compared to what was earlier also and the present syllabus is much more radicalized. Now if it’s institutionalized, then I’m afraid, then there has to be more violence, there has to be more terrorism, there’s no alternative.

Plus, what I would like to also mention here is that we always talk of—especially from the US media there are plenty statements—fear about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons going to the radicals. But why are we not looking at the state when the keepers themselves are going to become radicals? The generation which is coming up (in Pakistan), which is going to be a serious problem.

The community and population; do we treat it as the center of gravity?

Continuous dialogue, resolve local disputes and grievances.
Integrate local into making communities safe. Involve locals in generating local programs. Like in Jammu and Kashmir, we run a program called “Operation Sadhbhavana.” We will ask the locals, what do you want, and give them those programs rather than thrusting some programs upon them, which they would not like.

Provide roles and responsibilities of threat mitigation.

Share accurate threat-related information.

Community policing.

Community based monitoring groups or you have ombudsman.

The security sector.

Ensure required synergy.

Police forces need to differentiate between law and order and countering terrorists. Often, the police forces do not understand the difference and then there are problems, including collateral damage, which increases the radicalization.

Training required to engage in communities.

Need to respect religion, culture, women.

Assist in education and development.

Simultaneous operations at military and moral planes.

Provide sense of belonging to locals.

Training, not thrust upon population, is required for the police, private security organizations, educators, religious teachers, community leaders, and other relevant government officials and NGOs.

We talk about collective approach. It is definitely required at global level, but then building global consensus, and specifically now post-2014 when Afghanistan is going to be a major problem. There has to be more focus on areas which are doing terrorist breeding, and the terrorist-prone regions, states, and communities. Again, building partner capability must accommodate individual interests as far as possible.

Proactive approach to include even potential sympathizers of terrorism so that they don’t become hardcore.

Improve intelligence, border management, financial investigations, law and prosecution.
Link financial assistance to de-radicalization.

Maximum pressure on states harboring non-state actors supporting and sponsoring terrorism. How do you do it? For example, aid can be linked to education programs, aid can be linked to de-radicalization programs.

Of course, very high level of coordination is required at the global level.

WMD terrorism. My personal view is it’s about to happen. It can be nuclear; it can be radiological; so we might as well prepare for it. In fact, my view is that al Qaeda has not done it until now, because in their own assessment they feel that at least in retaliation, their areas which are not accessible will be tactically nuked, so that’s why they’re probably not doing it. It doesn’t mean they’re not going to do it; it’s very easy to build a bomb, specifically when you are going to have terrorists which are homegrown and the wherewithal is available how to make it.

Special Forces. Ideally suited for counterterrorism, definitely. Should be central to asymmetric response in countering threats like terrorism.

Should be applied at low and precisely calculated levels without signatures or (with) ambiguous signatures. And this you’ll find is happening, because that is why globally, tell how many Special Forces operators have been killed or captured. In fact, in the last couple of years only one US Special Forces operator was captured and even he was rescued.

Objective should be to achieve strategic objectives through application of modest resources with the essential psychological element.

Preferably operate by proxy and/or in conjunction with indigenous Special Forces.

May operate incognito as force multipliers to indigenous security sector.

Indian Special Forces. I know subsequently there are going to be a lot of questions so I kept it brief. We have a variety of Special Forces. Largely, they have been employed within borders other than in conventional conflict, when part of Indian peacekeeping force in Sri Lanka, and as part of UN mission. But they are pretty effective in countering insurgency and terrorism. And periodic joint training has been done with a host of Special Forces, including the US.

Role of military special operations. Information support operations—top of the line.

Neutralize terrorist leaders, organizations, support groups, infrastructure—including by infiltrating terrorist organizations through proactive, sustained, and disruption operations.

Intelligence, surveillance, psychological operations.
Incident response operations.

Build partner capacity for counterterrorist threat; now this is international and national, and national implies that the police forces, the required ones, should also be trained by Special Forces; that’s one of the jobs.

Employ unconventional warfare against state sponsored terrorism and transnational terrorist groups.

Assist existing resistance movement where populations are subject to genocide.

We’ve come to international cooperation. (This) is a requirement to link all the national counterterrorism centers globally, whoever believes in counterterrorism and there is consensus.

Share intelligence analyses, forecasts inclusive.

Plan a preventive strategy.

Better coordination and resource optimization.

The next two bullets are given in italics because that is not happening at all. That is share technology, data, tools, models, and visualization; share R&D for counterterrorism including in cyberspace and electromagnetic domains.

Joint training for Special Forces.

But of course, periodic dialogues and forums like we are doing here today.

When we talk of military alliances, you find that hackles are raised in certain segments, oh so-and-so military alliance and what. My personal belief is that the same objective can be achieved through strategic alliances which can be bilateral or upgraded to multilateral, depending on what is the objective.

I think I’ve talked enough, now I’m open to questions.

[Applause]

**LTG Katoch:** Thank you

Questions and Answers

**Dr. Lynch:** Thank you, General. Thank you for that very comprehensive and thorough review. I think you’ve illuminated a host of issues that will be of interest to the group, and I see some hands that have popped up already. If I could ask, since I will pass the
prerogative of the chair, since I see hands up already, I know some of you have classes and other things to get off to. I will go ahead and try to collect your names as I see your hands, try to monitor and get your chance to add, ask your questions. If you would please, as you ask your question, since we are not mic’d here, but we are in fact recording on the front table, if I could ask you to stand, tell us who you are, and then go ahead and address your question to the General.

With that, I will go ahead and I think I first saw John’s hand up, are there any others? I’ll make sure I capture you, so, John?

**John Gerlaugh, NDU-ICAF:** Thanks, Tom. General, thanks for your very informative presentation. My name’s John Gerlaugh, I’m faculty here at the Eisenhower School. Sir, from your view, your experiences, could you talk to us a little bit about what you think India’s role can be, should be—

**LTG Katoch:** A little louder, please.

**John Gerlaugh, NDU-ICAF:** Sure. Could you tell us what your view is of what India’s role can be, or should be, in post-2014 Afghanistan? That’s more you all’s neighborhood than ours. We, of course, have a plan to draw down, as you know, in 2014. We’ll have a presence there, it’s undecided yet what that will be. I think that most of us are very interested to understand the other regional players there, what their role will be with Afghanistan. Thank you.

**LTG Katoch:** I think your pointed question is with respect to Afghanistan, am I right? Post-2014? Well, as you’re aware, Special Forces deployment, this type of deployment, is not really a military deployment; it is a political deployment. The decision has to be taken at the highest political level. And, I presume that depending on what the political authority feels is in India’s national interest will be the level of participation. But that, I cannot tell you; that has to be the highest political authority there to take that decision.

**Dr. Lynch:** General, if I could follow up on that question though, could you extend that a little bit then, would you see it as more likely for additional intelligence assets to be moved forward in the post-2014 world, would you see some patterns that may have been learned in the 1990s for example with India’s concerns in Afghanistan to be either repeated or improved upon? Could you maybe extend your answer to John’s question in those directions where you’re comfortable?

**LTG Katoch:** As I’ve mentioned, we have a variety of Special Forces. They have been operating jointly, but we do not have an integrated Special Forces command structure as of now. For the Prime Minister appointed to the committee which has just submitted his report and creation of a Special Forces Command is very much on the cards. How much time that will take, I don’t know exactly. We have our hands full with terrorism, as it is inside of the country. Now, under what circumstances it’ll, I mean Special Forces would be employed abroad, as it is I said they are largely employed within the country. I didn’t say they were only deployed within the country. Right, but the decision to employ in
Afghanistan will essentially be a political decision. Militarily, I will say yes, but it has to be a political decision.

**Dr. Lynch:** Hassan, Dr. Abbas?

**LTG Katoch:** I hope I didn’t offend you.

**Hassan Abbas, NDU-CISA:** Absolutely not, thank you very much. I’m Hassan Abbas, professor at College of International Security Affairs. I have two questions: first, thank you very much for your really important insights; I’ll ask my first question and later, if there’s time in the second round, I can ask the second question. My first question is about all the quotations that you showed us of Pakistani writers and journalists, and I think it was a very appropriate, Pervez Hoodbhoy is my teacher and colleague, I think those were not only very accurate but really pointed and explains the right context. However, I interpret those in a slightly different fashion as well. I would argue—and I want your comments and any views you have on that—that if the discourse about Pakistan’s problematic policy, [inaudible], is now so widespread within Pakistan also, I mean these all were 90% of your quotations were from Pakistani newspapers. So it means this discussion about militancy and fighting extremism and all these problems are now discussed in Pakistan. In this scenario, don’t you think that those progressive forces were challenging these and writing these about these issues, they can get more empowered if the peace process between India and Pakistan improves? And I was very delighted, and many others were delighted, to see this India-Pakistan [inaudible] about visa relaxation, and I’m interpreting, I hope, that this was built upon this idea that better relationship between India and Pakistan will help progressive forces in Pakistan to defeat extremists. Do you agree?

**LTG Katoch:** Absolutely. In fact, the economic relations and trade must increase. As it is both countries have now permitted investment into each other, each other country is possible. The problem is that the faster the democracy grows in Pakistan, the area can become peaceful. Otherwise, if there is always a clash, you see last week, there was a Parliamentary delegation from Pakistan in India—last week, last fortnight—discussing CBMs. So the Pakistani military went for periodic, unprovoked breaching of the ceasefire. Firing away, so whatever message you are giving, you see there has got to be some sort of—people have to be in sync within Pakistan. You can’t have both ways; one side doing this, other side you do that. Now the Indian Parliament I didn’t mention. There are forty training, military training camps in Pakistan occupied Kashmir. That infrastructure is not being shut down. So what is the message which is being given? Message has to be given that, fine, these camps have been shut down. Otherwise, we are saying you have the capacity just to question when to pull the trigger. Infiltration is taking place; well that has to stop. Let me tell you the problem in this entire region is two: one is de-radicalization and bringing up democracy in Pakistan, and second is controlling the ISI. You talk to the Afghans; they’ll tell you the same thing. In fact, I didn’t show you a slide that was in my backup slides. In 2010 December, I was part of the India-Pakistan-Afghanistan trilogue in Kabul. A serving Lieutenant General of the Afghan Army told the Pakistanis let us not go around in circles. You’re breeding
terrorism, you’re giving them support—stop that; everything will become alright. Now your problem is in Pakistan, the military has gone into every sector, government, you are aware, finance, everything. And there are writers like Ayisha Siddique, they’re saying that it is time the military should not get involved in all this. Now that power they don’t want to lose; that is the problem. Otherwise who doesn’t want good neighborly relation, tell me? Now, but having better relationship doesn’t mean that you demilitarize Siachen, you demilitarize Sir Creek; that has to be later on. People who talk of Siachen do not understand the strategic significance of that place. If it didn’t have strategic significance, Musharraf would not write in his autobiography, “Line of Fire,” that we were wanting to put up a battalion there but the Indians pre-empted us. Today the geo-strategic environment has totally changed there. The Chinese have come into Pakistan and POK. Pakistani media is saying that for fifty years they want to lease this, give Gilgit-Baltistan to the Chinese, they’re already sitting in Shaksgam Valley, they’re sitting in Siachen. You want to make this bridge and push the Indian back into Ladakh? If that happens, infiltration will start into Ladakh. And that is why ISI has been nurturing Shia terrorist organizations. With this in mind, the Ladakh are Shia Muslims. These are the problems. Both must sit down and talk. Trade must go up, but until the military and the ISI what I’m talking of is not controlled, I’m sorry.

Of course, he’s a Shia, Agha H. Amin. Have you read his article recent, “Can India and Pakistan Live in Peace?”

Hassan Abbas, NDU-CISA: Yes I have, but I don’t think he is a Shia.

LTG Katoch: And he’s an ex-Army officer and a known defense analyst. He said, “Utopians in India are jubilant that Pakistan has made peace with India. Nothing in reality can be farther from the truth. Pakistan’s apparent shift is merely a tactical response to extreme confrontation with the US over perceived US view that Pakistan is playing a double game in Afghanistan. The real picture of true intentions of the Pakistani military will emerge when the US withdraws from Afghanistan. This will be the time when the Russians, Iranians and Indians will have no choice but to support the Northern Alliance against Pakistan sponsored Taliban who regard all Shias, Ismailis, Non-Pashtuns, moderate Pashtuns as infidels who deserve to be massacred. Pakistani politicians will remain the puppets of the military that they have been since 1977. Terrorism will remain a tool of foreign policy while the Pakistani military runs the Pakistani state under a facade of PPP or PML or (Pakistani) Tehrik-i-Insaf.”

He goes on to say, “Pakistani military will be hoping to achieve all its objectives: an extremist dominated Afghanistan, a Baluchistan fully fragmented and crushed, a Pakistani political party leading Pakistan fully subservient to the Pakistani military, a renewed infiltration in Kashmir, a brinkman’s nuclear policy with India, a greater Chinese vassal with far greater Chinese interests in Pakistan. There is no doubt that Pakistan will be a semi-autonomous Chinese province by 2030 or so. Pakistani Baluchistan by 2030 would be a completely Chinese run show. This means that Pakistan’s political economy of exporting terrorism as a foreign policy tool, massive corruption at home and the resultant ever growing reservoir of economically deprived
youngsters who will fill ranks of extremists and suicide bombers will continue.” The heading of the article is the same what I’ve written here. It may be a very extreme view, I’m not denying that, may be a totally extreme view, but there is substance in this what he’s saying. There are a lot of sane people in Pakistan who want to reverse the process. It’s very, very difficult. Until the democracy comes up, how is it going to come up? Now the Pakistani media is saying that the military has joined-up with the judiciary and taken on the civilian politicians. They’ve hijacked them, that’s what’s happening. There are cases against the President, cases against the Prime Minister.

Sorry, I took long.

**Dr. Lynch:** That’s ok, I’m sure that’s stimulated some other good questions from the group as well. Please, others, hands. Alright, Chris?

**Christopher Lamb, NDU-INSS:** General, I’m a colleague of Dr. Lynch from the Institute for National Strategic Studies. I wanted to ask you a question more about Special Operations Forces as opposed to India-Pakistan-Afghan relations and events. I noticed on your slide about Special Operations Forces, you emphasized the importance of psychological operations or information management, for lack of a better term. In this country, there’s a debate about whether those kinds of activities are really special operations, properly understood. Can you tell us more about the Indian approach to the whole subject of psychological operations or military information management and how you’re currently using them to combat terrorism?

**LTG Katoch:** Of course as I, when I mentioned the recommended tasking, I said information support operations are top of the line. And that should be also at the international level. Of course there are psychological operations also. Then in Jammu & Kashmir and northeast etc., we go after the leadership -- the Special Forces will go after the leadership. They will also be required to go in very, very difficult terrain. Quick insertion when the information comes to go into those areas. They will infiltrate the terrorist groups and eliminate leadership etc., etc. They will masquerade as infiltrators to eliminate infiltrators. These are the type of actions that are taking place?

**Dr. Lynch:** If I could follow up on that, General, because clearly over the last decade there have been a lot of reviews, as you indicated yourself, about the status of Indian Special Forces and some of the inefficiencies of the Indian Special Forces. You yourself referred to fact that there’s a momentum towards perhaps a consolidated or combined command, but can you talk to us about your perceptions of where presently India has significant limitations with its Special Operations Forces, and perhaps where you think they would need to go to be better capable of operating in these areas against violent extremists?

**LTG Katoch:** As I mentioned, firstly the integration is not complete. We don’t have a Special Forces Command. The support elements are not fully dedicated; it’s not that support elements are not there but some are not fully dedicated. Intelligence is a problem as of now, because we had nine major intelligence agencies in India, which are in the
process of being integrated. The National Counterterrorism Center [NCTC] has yet to be established. Now these intelligence agencies have various channels of command, so timely information coming is also a problem as of now. And even when you get a National Counterterrorism Center, you have to have state-level counterterrorism centers also, because information flow has to be both ways in these sort of settings. And specifically if you’re operating within the country, more intelligence is going to come, bottom upwards. But it has to be a two-way flow. So that integration has not happened as of now. But what the Special Forces are doing is, in insurgency areas they’re generating their own intelligence. They generate their own intelligence. In addition, whatever they get from top is a bonus.

**Dr. Lynch:** [inaudible]

**Lt Col Peter Garretson, USAF:** General, I’m interested in the authorities. My understanding is that by constitution, security is a state rather than Union of India responsibility. So how, under what authorities and how does Army, specifically Army, and also paramilitary—any kind of federal forces—how do they get called in, how do they get tasked, how do they work with the state government when they’re operating internally?

**LTG Katoch:** The Pakistani army?

**Lt Col Garretson, USAF:** No, no, Indian.

**LTG Katoch:** Yeah. See, Indian Army firstly, when they are employed in a particular area, it is the state which asks for them. And there is something called the Armed Force Special Powers Act, Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which was not derived by or asked for by the military. Military is put into those areas when the state administration fails. Now, if there is insurgency in certain areas, as far as the military is concerned, their job is to bring the level of violence to a particular level, and establish the rule of law. Beyond that, it has to be the state administration. And that is applicable anywhere.

Have I replied your question?

**Lt Col Garretson, USAF:** I, I think so. So you always operate under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act or, like for instance, in this case you either were or people discussed calling into the violence that’s going on in Assam right now, right? So when something like that happens, what is the route, the state—

**LTG Katoch:** The state asks for the military.

**Lt Col Garretson, USAF:** —who in the state asks, directly to the MOD, and then how does that get—

**LTG Katoch:** The central government. In case of emergency, they can directly requisition from the local Army unit, they can request it. Not only for violence, for
disaster relief, etc., etc. That provision exists. But, if it is against violence, then Army will go only when Armed Forces Special Powers Act is there, otherwise they might as well wear a police uniform.

Lt Col Garretson, USAF: And who is the chain of command? Does the Army now report to whoever is the state government, or do they, or is this, the state releases that until—

LTG Katoch: It is like, let me give you example of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). There is a unified command which is established. That unified command headquarters is chaired by the Chief Minister. Right. But under that unified command, you will find the military, the police, all the heads meet periodically or whenever a meeting is called for. Otherwise, the chain of command is direct, like Northern Command—which is there in J&K—reports to Army headquarters, doesn’t report to the Chief Minister. That unified headquarters is only to coordinate certain things, and not per se only the, the specific operations; that, they have no role to play. The unified headquarters will look at broad policy decisions in a particular state. So, the Chief Minister has a say in that.

Dr. Lynch: Jack?

Jack Gill, NESA: Sir, Jack Gill from the Near East South Asia Center. Along the lines of the previous two questions, maybe you can talk about some of the changes in India since Mumbai attacks in 2008, where Special Forces, in the role of Special Forces in particular, I know the National Security Guards do not come under the Army, but it might interesting for the audience to think about how India has changed the role of some of its national-level Special Forces in dealing with terrorism incidents since the Mumbai event in 2008.

LTG Katoch: Of the Special Forces that we have, the National Security Guard (NSG) is also one, which is not under military. But, in the Special Action Groups (of the NSG), the military goes on deputation, one-hundred percent. So what has happened now is that certain new hubs have come up of the NSG. Like now there is NSG in Bombay itself, there is one in Calcutta which is also come up; there are more likely to come up. And of course the, the police also has raised a special force in Bombay; it is called Force One.

Dr. Lynch: [inaudible]

Mohammed Karimi, USAF: Hi General, thank you for speaking. I’m Mohammed Karimi from the U.S. Air Force. I have a question: you touched on this briefly, that, you know, despite where the seed of terrorism that your country is facing may have come from, you said that there’s, it’s kind of flourished and developed into some internal terrorism, so in Pakistan, for example, you discussed the madrassas as being a source of cultivating that. In your own country, since the Mumbai attacks, has your government or military looked at possibly what is, if any, is flourishing there and what are the steps that you’re changing to take to prevent that? I’m not really familiar with India as far as they have madrassas or similar institutions that are fomenting this type of terrorism.
LTG Katoch: We have been subject to terrorism now for over two decades. There are some basic problems in India. That is, in the states, certain states still consider it as law and order, because the constitution has not been amended to say that an act of terrorism is not law and order. Right. Then, as far as the military deployment is concerned, that decision is taken at the government level, central government level. The state’s Chief Minister may ask for it, for anything which is emergent, but the military deployment, for example, the Maoist problem today: Army is not deployed against it. It is the paramilitary forces who are doing it. Then you have states which have rule by different political parties; then what is at the center? So that is why the National Counterterrorism Center is not taking off, because certain states think that their powers will be curbed. These are problems of a democracy. And this all has been in media what I’m talking about; I’m not giving you a secret. The National Counterterrorism Center, as per my reckoning, should have come ten years back. But it is still taking time, the integration of the intelligence agencies should have taken off ten years back. So the process is slow, but yes, change is coming. Change comes more when something suddenly happens. It is more reactive in a coalition government, there are the problems.

Dr. Lynch: Yes, the back row.

USAF Officer: [inaudible] here, U.S. Air Force. Thank you, General. Your briefing made clear that Pakistan has aligned unfairly—

LTG Katoch: Little louder, please.

USAF Officer: Your briefing’s made clear that Pakistan’s allied itself militarily with China. In fact, they’re developing next generation fighter aircraft with the Chinese. But India, it appears, is purchasing the bulk of their next generation military equipment from Russia. Now is this a counterweight to Pakistan’s alliance with China militarily, or is this simply out of necessity, because the Russian’s are the only people that can sell this type of equipment? Is this a strategic decision—

LTG Katoch: I haven’t gotten the gist of the question.

Dr. Lynch: Yeah, he’s acknowledging that your presentation showed that Pakistan-China has a tight military linkage in terms of weapons development. He’s citing the fact that a lot of India’s procurement for new weapons recently has been with the Russians. He’s asserting that it’s the bulk of the purchases, but he’s asking if that’s an intentional counterweight to Chinese-Pakistani integration?

USAF Officer: Is it an intentional strategic decision? —

LTG Katoch: Let me tell you, it was happening at a certain point of time. Today our bulk equipment is not from Russia anymore. It was also happening at a time when they were accepting payments in the Indian Rupee; now they don’t accept it. So we have, we are taking it from all countries. It is not anymore that is only Russian equipment which is
coming. No, not correct. Whereas when you’re talking of the China-Pakistan, now if China really wants to curb terrorism, it can actually pressurize Pakistan and let the democracy come up. You’re aware of the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) action? There was a mosque in Islamabad which had become a hub for terrorists, and President Musharraf acknowledged that he was forced to take action against it. Why? Four Chinese were killed in Pakistan by terrorists. China’s the one who said clamp down. China, if it wants, can do it today. But it’s looking at its own national interests, whether it is to cut down India to size, or to have a link with Taliban, because Taliban will probably take some portion of Afghanistan post-2014, so they’re looking at their own game. These are the problem areas.

Dr. Lynch: Could I invite Brigadier Jain, who’s our Indian DATT (Defense Attache) here in Washington, into the conversation.

Brigadier General Jain, INDIAN DATT: I just thought I’d just bring all the facts on Indian procurement in last five years; I can speak of only three years I’ve been here. We bought aircraft, transport aircraft from United States of America, that is C-130s and C-17s and C5s. Our surveillance aircraft are P-8i’s which is from United States, fighter aircrafts are from France—that is Rafale. Army’s—last so many years we haven’t bought any guns, and we’re in the process of signing an agreement, LOA, with BAE systems for new artillery, and there is also an LOA for Apache helicopters, which is in the process and hopefully we will sign by the end of this year. We’re also looking at repeat orders for P-8i’s, we’re also considering Chinooks, which is again, an American company. The only agreement signed in this last five years with Russia was development of a fifth-generation aircraft, which we are wanting to develop and we simply don’t have the money for the F-22, and even the Pentagon is finding that it doesn’t have the money.

[Laughter]

LTG Katoch: The earlier buyers were, as I mentioned, just because they were taking rupee payment. So we didn’t have a foreign exchange for that.

Dr. Lynch: I think a good question, and two excellent answers, if I could just add a footnote to. One of our experts here in town, Stephen Cohen at the Brookings Institution, had written a book with a colleague called, “India’s Militarization Policy: Arming Without Aiming.” And that may be a little bit uncharitable, but it is fairly accurately to what the Brigadier and General Katoch have mentioned in terms of when you look at the procurement pattern, especially over the last decade, India has spread its procurement around very generously, and really it’s difficult to accuse it of doing anything other than perhaps just trying to maintain a balance in all suppliers at this point rather than aligning with any particular one.

Other questions? Yes, sir?

Doug Kelley, J5: Sir, Doug Kelley, Joint Staff. Sir, you mentioned the commission report that the government is looking at now. It suggested that they intend to move
toward having an integrated Special Operations organization. Does that, is that separate from, or is that parallel to integration of your conventional service staffs into something that would strengthen the IDS?

**LTG Katoch:** As I’m looking at it, I’m looking at, in fact, writing a book on that. The strategic part, those were going to be strictly for strategic deployment, doesn’t have to be 20,000 people. That is the strength of our Special Forces today; it’s massive. So those guys will have to be focused, but possibly it will be a two-tiered thing. But maybe something like what the United States has. But the strategic part has to be under the political authority. It’s something like, say the Australian Chief says, he says when my guys, some of them are employed, I don’t even come to know they’re employed. I come to know later that the military is not even told. Something like that. But at the moment it is only the recommendation has come. The implementation will take a little time. But definitely the existing Special Forces will be integrated, possibly under the tri-service military. We don’t have a Chief of Defence Staff as of now. This particular committee has talked of a Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff committee. Right. Possibly this integration will be under that.

**Dr. Lynch:** Other questions? Hassan, I think you had a second?

**Hassan Abbas, NDU-CISA:** My second question is about a statement that you mentioned, rightly so, I think that for any counter, successful counterterrorist model there has to be a focus on, to treat community as a center of gravity —

**LTG Katoch:** Yes?

**Hassan Abbas, NDU-CISA:** —and also de-radicalization. And this, I link this with your other comment that terrorism action should not be, or any terrorist action should not, is not a law enforcement, is not a law and order issue. This brings me to the issue of Special Forces of military versus law enforcement action. And I refer to a recent excellent speech by the Indian Prime Minister, when he went to Kashmir and he invited all the Chief Ministers, the Council of Chief Ministers, and he really emphasized that there has to be law enforcement reform in India. So I want to ask you, what is the Indian lessons learned for the global community from your fighting terrorism in Kashmir as well as in Northeast, where both there have been successes and some challenges, but what is the ultimate moral that you suggest for internal issues? Is it specifically law enforcement, which my view is that it should be the core, but how to balance between this military action and law enforcement?

**LTG Katoch:** My personal view is that firstly the military is sent into an area when state has failed. Right. But that does not have to be a prolonged deployment. Right. Why it is having to be prolonged is, because the infiltration is taking place and the support to terrorism which is coming from the other side (Pakistan), but while military does its part balance has to come from the administration, a former Indian Army Chief had made a statement that while the military has brought the level of violence (down) to a particular level, the state administration has not capitalized on it. In other words good governance is vital. I give you an example: post the 1999 Kargil Conflict when I was commander at
Siachen, later on I was commanding the division in Kargil. Now as part of Operation Sadhbhavana (in Jammu & Kashmir), of course we were looking at the girl-child and the mothers because they are the head of the family. We were running ten schools in my division. So, time came, I said we’re going to hand over five schools to the state administration. You will not believe, there were demonstrations by civilians. They said please don’t do that, because the government school there, ten teachers are on the payroll but two attend on daily average, education will go for a six. State administration has to work hand in hand with the military. Otherwise, the military will carry on, then. That’s the point.

Dr. Lynch: Peter?

Lt Col Peter Garretson, USAF: So sir, I wanted to take it down a totally different angle. You had talked about technical cooperation in science and technology. And I wanted to know if you were aware that the United States has a collaboration, international collaboration called the Counterterrorism Technical Support Organization, which there are a number of non-allied states, and it’s curious to me that India is currently not part of that. Are you aware of this organization or do you have thoughts about India’s participation?

LTG Katoch: Let me give you just one example: 26/11. Taj Palace Hotel. If the NSG had the technology to look through the walls—see the heat blobs through the wall—things would have been faster. I’m just giving you one example. Nobody is prepared to share that.

Brigadier Jain, INDIAN DATT: May I—it may not be appropriate to speak too much about this, but I, inside this forum of professionals, I can assure you that a lot of cooperation is taking place between India and the U.S.A. Sometimes all of it is not in public domain, and I would leave it at that.

LTG Katoch: The joint Special Forces exercises invariably, why invariably, I’ll say 100%, are on counterterrorism. So that itself is creating partner capacity.

Dr. Lynch: Let me ask this gentleman, Peter, and we’ll let you follow up. Sir?

Michael Voyles, NDU-ICAF: I’m Michael Voyles, I just started interning here not long ago. I was just wondering, you mentioned with using religion to help with de-radicalization, what sort of interfaith initiatives are already occurring to help with de-radicalization?

LTG Katoch: Sorry?

Michael Voyles, NDU-ICAF: What interfaith initiatives are being taken to help to de-radicalizing terrorist groups?

LTG Katoch: Interface with [inaudible]?
Dr. Lynch: Interfaith

Brigadier Jain, INDIAN DATT: Interfaith.

Michael Voyles, NDU-ICAF: Interfaith. Two religions cooperating to—

LTG Katoch: Between two religions?

Brigadier Jain, INDIAN DATT: Between multiple religions.

LTG Katoch: Let me tell you, at least in the Indian Army, you go to any unit, there is now one temple that has got four corners. You got the Hindu god, you got the Sikh god, you got the Quran, you got the Bible and the Christ. Earlier it was too separate. It is one of the most secular armies you’ll find in the world.

Brigadier Jain, INDIAN DATT: It is called Sarv Dharam Sthal.

LTG Katoch: It is called Sarv Dharam Sthal, means all religion institute. In any unit you go in Indian Army, and it does not happen now, it happened about 10-15 years back. This is one example. Then you have, what is that institute where you have the, the religious teachers are trained?

Brigadier Jain, INDIAN DATT: Institute of National Integration.

LTG Katoch: Institute of National Integration. Where all the priests go together for a course.

Michael Voyles: Thank you.

Brigadier Jain, INDIAN DATT: Even the unit I commanded, which had that cell, so the religious service is held together. That means that half an hour or 45 minutes, so the troops belonged to three religions: Hindu, Sikhs, and Muslims. So the prayer meeting when we sit down for that is one-third Hindu, one-third Sikh, one-third Muslim. So it’s held simultaneously and the deities or the religious spot is placed one next to the another. The distance between the three of them is one foot each. So when you are bowing, you are bowing to all three together, you’re praying together, you’re having religious service together.

LTG Katoch: Next, you’ll ask me what is the effect. I’ll again give you one example: 26/11, Mumbai terrorist attack. The terrorists which were killed; Muslims of Mumbai passed a resolution, they made a proclamation that their bodies (Pakistani dead terrorists) would not be buried in our burial ground. So they’re not Muslims. It’s on record, it came in the newspapers also. They said, throw them into the sea, we’re not interested where you’re going to bury them.
Dr. Lynch: Peter, you had a question?

Lt Col Peter Garretson, USAF: General, I wanted to ask again on the technical side. One of the ways in which the United States, both in terms of tactics and technology, has really put a lot of emphasis recently on Improvised Explosive Devices—IEDs. I had heard just a little bit that India was starting to see this problem and I wanted to know more about what is the scope and level of the IED problem in India and how you see it transforming over time?

LTG Katoch: Well, you see as far as IEDs are concerned, again there’s been reciprocal training with the US. Now IEDs, as you know, can be operated, activated in a number of methods. So it is a question of, you know that you’re building up the technology, it’s like a normal mine and anti-mine and that’s it. But if new technologies have come up, those are being adopted. Those are being very much adopted. In fact, the experience which we had, say in Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka, maximum people were fighting mines and IEDs. But today that situation is not happening in J&K. It is happening in Central India against the CRPF (Indian Central Reserve Police Force), because the police forces are not properly equipped and not properly trained. That’s where I said Special Forces one job is to train security forces also how to fight terrorism. We don’t hear of now military personnel getting killed, blown up through IEDs in insurgency area with the frequency with which it was happening earlier.

Brigadier Jain, INDIAN DATT: If I may be permitted, Indian Army through PACOM and Gyro joined inter-IED defeating organization by having a very wide range cooperation between each other and it’s regular, it’s yearly changes are taking place, and the Indian Army delegation have been visiting PACOM center in Hawaii, Gyro institutions here as well as in Quantico—the FBI center—and simultaneously, Indian Army’s counter IED center is in [inaudible], in College of Military Engineering and U.S. delegations have been going and visiting there and having [inaudible]. And one of the key themes of that dialogue that we’ve had is that while U.S. focuses have largely been on technology, the Indian Army, what Americans have been looking at is, how we have tackled this issue of IEDs which came in a big way in J&K, how doctrinally we have treated in a manner and we’ve brought it down. If you actually will see our average IED blast inside J&K is less than three per year.

Lt Col Garretson, USAF: Thank you, sir.

Dr. Lynch: Chan?

CAPT Chan Swallow, NDU-ICAF: Navy Captain Chan Swallow. I teach at the Eisenhower School. My question to you is, do you, if the United States was to be attacked again by al Qaeda, how then would you propose that we respond? And has the Indian model of responding at a lower level, as opposed to the U.S. very high, expensive, large footprint model; is that a model that you think plays into the strategy of al Qaeda?

LTG Katoch: You’re talking of if a similar attack in India?
CAPT Swallow, NDU-ICAF: No, in the U.S.

Brigadier Jain, INDIAN DATT: If you permit me, sir. What he’s saying is if al Qaeda attacks U.S.A. again, he’s comparing the Indian model of low response versus U.S. model of high level, very violent response. He’s saying which one would you recommend.

LTG Katoch: I would put it this way, that firstly that will depend on the level of the violence which has taken place, the level of the attack. For example, if it was WMD terrorism, then you have to go in for high level. Otherwise, you will have to go in for focused ones. Doesn’t have to be high level, but I suppose, now they’ll be plenty of afterthoughts in United States also whether they should have gone into Iraq, whether they (should have gone) into Afghanistan, but if a policy decision taken at that point of time, it was possibly because of the inputs which came in. And part possibly looking at a future political aim, which you and I don’t know. So it is incorrect to say it was the wrong decision, it was incorrect to say that it is the right decision; it is somewhere in between. But those inputs, unless you know. I was asked in Taiwan last month, if Taiwan is attacked, will India help? I said that’s a political decision.

[Laughter]

Dr. Lynch: Ok, thank you. Yes, sir?

LCDR Jim Crowe, USN: Yes sir, Lieutenant Commander Jim Crowe, United States Navy. My question was on the de-radicalization. You presented it as a rather large problem, and so, for example, in Afghanistan, any de-radicalization problem I foresee would have to come internally only. I am uniquely unqualified to conduct that mission, but my question would be, do you see inner region cooperation as a possibility to tackle that problem? Because the scope is so big, there’s so many schools. As you pointed out, the scope is large. So, would there be a push, regionally, to conduct that de-radicalization, or are the inner state parties just too opposed to each other?

LTG Katoch: As I mentioned, the problem is a global consensus. In Afghanistan, Iran is looking at their own national interests. In the USI we have been interacting with Central Asian Republics who have their own apprehensions and national interests. They say there has to be international force post-2014 between the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. U.S. maybe says, Kabul is not going to fall, we’ll ensure that. And certain areas, but if the balance goes to the Taliban, after Afghanistan is open to Taliban, which is going to be a bigger problem. But it’s very difficult to say that, you know regional interests, whether you will have consensus. Very difficult to say, because everybody is looking at their own national interests. Everybody is looking at their own national interests. We are not looking at, I mentioned this that in AFPAX, how much has U.S. national interests been served, how much of Pakistan, how much of China also if I wanted to add, how much globally? How much do you say India’s interests has been looked into that? We have to look at the entire region. I cannot give you a definitive answer. There’s no definite
answer. Definitely regional cooperation is required; how much? That is what we all are debating, that is all what think tanks are talking about, that is why there is seminar after seminar on post-2014 Afghanistan. There’s no readymade answer to that. Yes, cooperation is required; in what measure? And then if people are double crossing and playing double games…

**Dr. Lynch:** Yes, ma’am?

**Eve McCloud, NDU-CISA:** General, Eve McCloud, student at CISA. To continue on with that point on a global consensus and international strategy, where or how—which forum are we not approaching that problem correctly from, hey we all have our own individual interests, now let’s have a global consensus as to an approach or a strategy for an Afghanistan or any future Afghanistan, if you will. What’s your opinion on—

**LTG Katoch:** Which forum?

**Eve McCloud, NDU-CISA:** Yes, is it NATO, or just where have we not gathered that ball?

**LTG Katoch:** See, as far as Afghanistan is concerned, I particularly, my own suggestion would be that it has to be U.S. led discussion. But, it has to not only include India, Pakistan, Afghanistan; it has to include Iran, it has to include the Russian Republic, it must include China. I don’t think that is happening. It’s not happening. You have to look at the, in fact, you see when you (US) looked at the AFPAK region, whereas AFPAK -India should have been looked into, and possibly that happened because you had CENTCOM only looking at the Pakistan border, and you had PACOM responsible for Indian region but PACOM is looking at primarily at Asia Pacific. This entire region should have been looked at; how are we going to curb terrorism here? That didn’t happen. And now, post-withdrawal, the Pakistanis are saying that there is going to be now Taliban offensive. I talked to Afghan military serving generals, they said there’s going to be a Taliban offensive, so what do you do?

**Dr. Lynch:** Any other questions from the group? Alright, well, this is about a tour de force, 15 questions to go with a very dynamic presentation, General.

**LTG Katoch:** Thank you.

**Dr. Lynch:** On behalf of all of us here today and on behalf of the National Defense University, INSS, and the Program on Irregular Warfare, thank you so much for comments and for answering questions. And please join me for a round of applause.

[Applause]

**Dr. Lynch:** Thank you, have a good day.

[End]